H.N.Seth, J. - (1.) A Division Bench of this Court has referred two Questions of law for consideration by a Full Bench. Facts leading to the reference are that on 29-1-1965, Ram Kishan and Babu Ram, the two landlords, obtained permission under Section 3 of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Evic tion Act (U. P. Act III of 1947), here inafter referred to as the Act, from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Meerut, for filing a suit for ejectment against their tenant Baleshwar Dayal. The tenant went up in revision before the Commissioner, Meerut Division, who by his order dated July 22, 1965 dis missed the revision application and up held the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. On 3rd August 1965, the tenant filed an application in revi sion under Section 7-F of the Act. be fore the State Government. The State Government, by its order dated 6th August, 1965 directed that the operation of the permission granted, .under Sec tion 3 of the Act, by the Additional Commissioner. Meerut Division, to Sarva-sri Ram Kishan and Babu Ram to file a suit for Baleshwar Daval's eiectment from the shop in question, be stayed pending consideration of the case by the State Government. Before the order dated 6th August 1965 could be served upon the two landlords, they filed a suit for the ejectment of the tenant on 16th August, 1965. Subsequently, on 17th of May, 1966 the State Govern ment dismissed the revision application filed by the tenant on the ground that it was not open to it to interfere with the permission granted under Section 3 of the Act after a suit for ejectment had been filed. The tenant then filed a writ petition against the order of the State Government, dated 17th of May, 1966. dismissing his revision application. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court. Baleshwar Dayal questioned the correct ness of the order made by the learned single judge by filing a special appeal. During the hearing of the special ap peal, reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt Bhagwati Devi v. Bail Nath, (1966 All WR (HC) 631), in which it had been held that powers of the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act, are wide enough to enable it to pass stay orders during the pendency of the revision before it and that the stay order passed by it would operate from the date it is made. Learned Judge hearing the Special Appeal, felt that the decision in Smt. Bhagwati Devi's case, 1966 All WR (HC) 631 re quired reconsideration and accordingly they referred the following two ques tions for being considered by a Full Bench. (1) Whether the State Government has get power to pass a stay order ? and (2) Whether the stay order operates from the moment of its birth or from the moment of its communication to the landlord to whom permission has been granted.
(2.) SECTION 7-F of the Act reads as follows: "The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for a eviction referred to in Section 3 or requiring any accom modation to be let or not be let to any person under Section 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under Section 7-A and may make such order as appeared to it necessary for the ends of justice." The power given to the State Government under this section is in very wide and general terms. After the State Government calls for the record under this section, it gets the jurisdiction to make such orders as may appear to it necessary in the ends of justice. This power in our opinion includes the power to make interim orders which may appear to the State Government to be necessary in the ends of justice. There does not seem to be any reason to confine the jurisdiction of the State Government to the mak ing of final orders alone. It is a well recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that where a statute confers a power on an authority, such ancillary or incidental powers must be implied as are necessary for the effective and complete exercise of that power. The Kerala High Court acted upon this principle in the case of M. K. Moham mad Kunhi v. Income-tax Officer, (1966) 59 ITR 171 (Ker) and held that the In come-tax Tribunal has the power to stay recovery of tax pending the dis posal of an appeal before it; and, al though such power is not expressly provided under the Act, it is ancillary and incidental to the appellate powers of the Tribunal. This decision of the Kerala High Court has since been af firmed by the Supreme Court in appeal. Such a power to make interim order will be more readily inferred in a case where the jurisdiction to make order has been worded in such wide language as in Section 7-F of the Act.
(3.) IT cannot be disputed that under Section 7-F of the Act. the State Government has the power to revoke the permission, granted under Section 3 of the Act, to file a suit for ejectment of a tenant. In the case of Mohd. Ismail v. Nanney lal, (1969 All WR (HC) 281) = (AIR 1970 SC 1919) it has been held by Supreme Court that the State Gov ernment can exercise its jurisdiction to revise the order of the Commissioner only before the actual institution of the suit. Once the State Government summons the record under Section 7-F of the Act the power to make orders with the view to make it certain that it may be able to pass an appropriate and effective order must per necessity be conceded to it. Prima facie such an order would be necessary to be made to secure the ends of justice. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that under Section 7-F of the Act the State Government can make such in terim orders which are calculated to prevent its jurisdiction becoming in fructuous.;