Shiv Nath Katju, J. - (1.) The suit giving rise to the application in revision before me was instituted for a declaration that the defendant -opposite party Phulla is the adopted son of Risal Singh and he has no right and title in the property left by the father and grandfather of the plaintiff -applicant. The applicant further sought a declaration to the effect that he was the owner in possession of the suit property which consists of houses and agricultural plots. It was conceded by the learned counsel for the defendant -opposite party before the court below that it was competent to grant a declaration regarding adoption. It was further conceded that the court could also declare the applicant's share in the properties which are not agricultural properties. It was however contended that the civil court had no jurisdiction to grant any declaration regarding the agricultural plots in suit. The court below rejected the applicant's contention that the relief of declaration regaining the agricultural plots in suit was merely an ancillary relief. It expressed the view that it could not grant reliefs for declaration and possession regarding the agricultural plots in suit. It directed the applicant to move an application for the amendment of the plaint. The rights of the parties in the suit properties, agricultural and non -agricultural, depend on the question of adoption of the defendant Phulla by Risal Singh and this is the cause of action which has given rise to the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff. The main question in the suit, therefore, is with regard to the adoption of Phulla by Risal Singh. As mentioned above, it was conceded that thy civil court is competent to grant a declaration regarding adoption. Once it is found that the main cause of action in the suit is the question of adoption and the Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief based on that cause of action, then all possible reliefs flowing from that cause of action can be given by the civil court itself. It was observed in Mewa v/s. Baldeo ( : 1966 AWR 597) that If the cause of action is one in which the revenue court can give no relief then the suit is one which would lie in the civil court. If the cause of action is one in respect of which no relief can be claimed in the revenue court then the suit is maintainable in the civil court and once the suit is maintainable in the civil court then there is no bar in civil court granting all possible reliefs flowing from that cause of action Consideration of individual reliefs divorced from cause of action is, therefore, wholly irrelevant.
(2.) The reliefs as claimed by the applicant relate to agricultural land as also non -agricultural properties. The claim of the applicant mainly turns on the question whether Phulla was adopted by Risal or not. The question of the validity at adoption is one in which relief can be granted by the civil court and certainly the civil court is the only court which could give relief with regard to the non -agricultural properties involved in the suit. I have no hesitation in holding that it was not the intention of the legislature in enacting S. 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted even in cases arising out of the cause of action from which the relief could be given by the civil court.
(3.) It was observed by a Division Bench of this Court in Sukhdeo v/s. Basdeo ( : 1935 AWR 581) while interpreting the provisions of S. 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1928: That the legislature should not have contemplated the splitting of a cause of action, and the institution of two separate suits, one in the civil and one in the Revenue court, by a plaintiff when the reliefs prayed for in the two suits are based on identical set of facts, is demonstrated by the fact that such a course would be highly inconvenient and might lead to anomalous results. The institution of two such suits would involve both the plaintiff and the defendant in the unnecessary expenditure of adducing the same evidence in two different courts and would manifestly lead to waste of public time. Apart from this, there would be the risk of contradictory decisions on the same set of facts being arrived at by the civil and the revenue courts. In the absence of a specific provision in the statute countenancing such a deplorable state of affairs a Court is not justified in crediting the Legislature with such an intention. If the question of adoption were to be considered in separate proceedings in the civil court and in the revenue court with regard to agricultural plots in suit, the result would be that there would be two separate proceedings, one in the civil court and another in the revenue court with regard to the common question of fact and it would result in multiplicity of proceedings and there may be the risk of contradictory decisions. I find nothing in S. 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act which prescribes such a course and prevents the civil court from taking cognizance of the suit in its entirety and giving relief to the applicant with regard to the properties involved in the suit, whether agricultural or non -agricultural.;