Kailash Prasad, J. - (1.) This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner was granted a private carrier permit in respect of his vehicle No. U.P.D. 64 on October 20, 1953 for a period of three years. The Regional Transport Authority, Kumaon Region by its order dated 7th April, 1956 made under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, cancelled the permit. The petitioner challenges the validity of the order on several grounds and prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order. He also prays for a writ of mandamus ordering the Regional Transport Authority not to give effect to the order. On behalf of the opposite parties the State counsel raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable and urged several grounds in support of this contention. His contention firstly is that the Regional Transport Authority is an administrative body and the order made by it under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act cancelling the petitioner's permit, was an administrative order and was not amenable to a writ of certiorari. He pointed out that Section 60 is in Ch. IV of the Act which relates to 'Control of Transport Vehicles.' He referred to other sections in the Chapter and argued that the provisions of the various sections reveal a scheme to deal administratively with the matters referred to therein. An order under Section 60, therefore, will be an administrative order. He also urged that the pre-requisite of a judicial or quasi judicial order is that there should be two contesting parties and there should be a lis between them to be determined. It is no doubt true that a writ of certiorari can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression 'judicial act' is not to be confined to acts of courts as such but is applicable to acts and orders of such bodies as have been empowered to impose liabilities or adjudicate upon the rights of individuals. It includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities obliged to exercise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministerial acts. Vide Basappa v. Nagappa, A.I.R. 1954 SC 440 . The presence of two parties before an authority one proposing and the other opposing is not essential to render the order of the authority judicial or quasi-judicial; nor is a is necessary in order that a determination may be a judicial or quasi-judicial one. Vide Province of Bombay v. K.S. Advani, 1950 SCR 621 : A.I.R. 1950 SC 222 . It does not appear necessary in the present case to examine in detail the provisions of the various sections in Ch. IV of the Act in order to determine if the functions exercised by the Regional Transport Authority under those sections are judicial or are of purely administrative nature. In Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1959 SC 694 which was also a case under the Motor Vehicles Act, their Lordships, while considering the question of interpretation of Sec. 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is in Ch. IV, observed at page 698 "Secs. 46, 47, 48, 57, 60 and 54 prescribe the procedure for issue of permits and also create a hierarchy of Tribunals for hearing of applications and disposal of appeals. The ............. "Said procedure is clearly quasi-judicial in character and has been held to be so by this Court." In view of the above observation it is clear that the order of the Regional Transport Authority cancelling the petitioner's permit is in its character quasi-judicial and is, therefore, amenable to a writ of certiorari. Another contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party is that an appeal is provided under Section 64 of the Act against orders revoking a permit and as the petitioner did not avail of this alternative remedy, his writ petition is not maintainable. The impugned order of the Regional Transport Authority is dated 7th April 1956. The appellate tribunal was not sitting at that time. The petitioner could not, therefore, obtain any immediate interim orders from the appellate tribunal and delay in getting such interim relief would have resulted in a serious loss to the petitioner. To ply his vehicle was a fundamental right of the petitioner. In Himmatlal Hiralal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 SC 403 it was laid down that the principle that a Court will not issue a prerogative writ when an adequate alternative remedy was available does not apply where a party has come to the Court with an allegation that his fundamental right had been infringed and sought relief under Article 226. So even if we assume that the alternative remedy available to the petitioner by way of appeal was adequate, the present writ petition is maintainable. Another ground in support of the maintainability of the petition is that it involves the consideration of constitutional validity of Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Another argument of the opposite party regarding the non-maintainability of the writ petition is that the permit in question was granted to the petitioner on October 20, 1953 for a period of three years. This period expired in October 1956 and the prayer for quashing the order cancelling the permit has become infructuous. The writ petition was filed in April 1956 before the expiry of the period of the permit. Under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act if a person's permit is once cancelled, it can be a bar to his getting the permit renewed. The subsistence of the order therefore acts to the prejudice of the petitioner and affects him adversely. In the circumstances a petition for quashing it can be maintained even if the period for which the permit was granted has expired. The impugned order mentions that the case of the petitioner came up for consideration of the Regional Transport Authority on account of four charges. The charges were that - * * * It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act was ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it was in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention Sri B.N. Katju pointed out that under the Motor Vehicles Act, the case of an offending permit holder can be dealt with under two sections, namely, Secs. 60 and 123. Under Section 60 the Regional Transport Authority which granted the permit can cancel or suspend it. The section further provides that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to furnish his explanation. Under Section 123 a permit holder could be punished with fine for a first offence and with imprisonment for a subsequent offence. The argument of Sri Katju is that there is a fundamental difference between a case which is proceeded with under Section 123 and a case dealt with under Sec. 60. Under Section 123 the case is tried by a regular criminal court and the accused permit holder gets an opportunity to cross examine prosecution witnesses and to give defence evidence. A permit holder who is proceeded with under Section 60 is deprived of the opportunities which are available to the accused under Sec. 123. The only safeguard which Section 60 provides is the opportunity of an explanation to the permit holder which cannot obviously stand on the same footing as the opportunity of cross examining the prosecution witnesses and producing defence witnesses. As the same kind of default on the part of a permit holder can be dealt with under two sections it is left to the arbitrary discretion of the executive authority to send up some case to be dealt with under Section 60 and another similar case under Section 123 and the person whose case is dealt with under Section 60 is put to a disadvantage though he runs the risk of severe liability in the form of cancellation of the permit. Sec. 60 is thus a discriminatory piece of legislation and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Sri Katju placed reliance upon State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, A.I.R. 1952 SC 75 and Dhirendra v. Supdt. and Remembr. of L. A., A.I.R. 1954 SC 424 . The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not appear to be well founded. Sec. 60 does not single out, for its application, any offending permit holder in particular. It is equally applicable to all permit holders who infringe the conditions of the permit or use their vehicles in a manner not authorised by the permit. Secs. 123 and 60 are widely different in their scope and ambit. Sec. 123 provides for criminal prosecution in a court of law and Section 60 provides for a sort of departmental action. The procedure for a proceeding under Section 60 cannot, therefore, be as elaborate as for a proceeding under Sec. 123. A person who is convicted under Section 123 gets the stigma of being guilty of a criminal offence. If action under Section 60 is taken against a permit holder it carries with it no stigma of criminality. Action against a permit holder under Section 123 amounts to prosecution but there is no such implication of an action under Sec. 60. Mr. Katju made it clear during the course of his arguments that the petitioner was not complaining of double jeopardy or violation of Article 20 of the Constitution. And he is perfectly correct in it; because action under Section 60 cannot be regarded as prosecution. It is well known and well established that many wrongful acts give rise to a double liability - liability for criminal prosecution and liability for civil action. If the law provides both for criminal prosecution and a civil claim or departmental action in respect of a wrongful act there is nothing illegal or invalid about it. The scope and purpose of Secs. 60 and 123 being different, there is, as observed in re Venkata Rao, A.I.R. 1955 Andhra 277 , no conflict between them. Sec. 60 is conceived to enforce more effective and strict administrative control. There might have been some substance in the petitioner's argument if the law provided that the same wrongful act on the part of a permit holder was to be dealt with either under Section 60 or under Section 123 and there were no indication in the Act, based on any reasonable classification, as to which case was to be proceeded with under Section 60 and which under Sec. 123. There is nothing in the Motor Vehicles Act to suggest that action against the offending permit holder whose case is covered by both the sections is to be taken under one section only. On the other hand, a perusal of the two sections indicates that an offending permit holder whose case falls under Section 123 should be prosecuted in criminal court and his case may also be considered by the Regional Transport Authority for departmental action under Sec. 60. The statute itself does not confer any authority on the officer entrusted with the duty of reporting cases of use of vehicles against the terms of permit to make a selection at his pleasure to send up a case either for action under Section 60 or for criminal prosecution under Sec. 123. If, however, such officer sends one case to transport authority to be dealt with under Section 60 and another case to a criminal court under Section 123 and a third case to both the transport authority and the criminal court under the two sections then the conduct of that officer may be condemned as discriminatory but the law cannot be struck down for that reason. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. It does not assure uniformity of decision or immunity from merely erroneous actions whether by a court or executive agencies. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, A.I.R. 1952 SC 75 several persons were charged with offences alleged to have been committed by them in the course of their raid as an armed gang on a certain factory at Dum Dum. They were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by the Special Court to which the case was sent for trial by the Governor of Bengal in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. That section provided that a Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may by general or special order in writing direct. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act were ultra vires the Constitution by reason of their being in conflict with Article 14. The provisions of West Bengal Special Courts Act prescribe a special procedure, some features of which mark a departure from the established procedure for criminal trials under the Criminal Procedure Code. This departure operated in some respects to the disadvantage of the persons tried before the Special Court. Sec. 5(1) did not provide any reasonable basis of classification and conferred upon the State Government an authority to select at its pleasure any offences or cases to be tried by the Special Court where the procedure was different from the established procedure for criminal trials under the Criminal Procedure Code. The section was, therefore, held to be ultra vires. This is not the case with Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In Dhirendra v. Supdt. & Remembr. of L. A., A.I.R. 1954 SC 424 a notification was issued with reference to the accused persons in a set of cases known as the Burdwan Test Relief Fraud Cases. The accused in those cases were charged with certain offences which were triable by jury. Under the notification in question this right was withdrawn by the State Government in respect of the accused of Burdwan Test Relief Fraud cases. It was held that the notification was invalid inasmuch as it singled out certain persons as a special subject for discriminatory legislation. The Supreme Court observed that there is nothing wrong if the State discontinues trial by jury in any district with regard to all or any particular class of offences. Sec. 269(1) does not envisage that persons accused of the same offence but involved in different cases can be tried by the court of Sessions by a different procedure. There is no such discrimination in the present case. As mentioned above the Motor Vehicles Act does not envisage that some of the offending permit holders are to be dealt with under Section 123 and others guilty of similar wrongful act under Sec. 60. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act indicate that a permit holder whose case falls under Section 123 should be proceeded against under that section and the Regional Transport Authority may also deal with him departmentally if the case is covered by Section 60 also. Another contention of the petitioner is that a criminal case was brought against him in respect of charge No. 1 and the Special Motor Magistrate, Haldwani by his judgment dated 30-12-1955 acquitted the applicant of that charge. The Regional Transport Authority could not, therefore, enquire into that charge again under Section 60 and impose the penalty of revoking the permit. In the criminal case against the petitioner one of the charges was that he was carrying fuel on the truck against the conditions of the permit. The charge did not specify the condition which was infringed or the manner of its infringement. It, however, appears that the defence which the petitioner took in this case was that his truck was carrying 'torch wood' and not 'fuel' because in the judgment of the Magistrate there is a discussion to the effect that the evidence on record showed that the vehicle was carrying 'Chhilka', i.e., small pieces of 'chead' wood. The learned Magistrate then found that the wood that was carried in the vehicle was 'torch wood.' He further found that 'torch wood' was included in the list of the business goods of the petitioner and the permit of the petitioner authorised him to carry his business goods. On these findings the Magistrate acquitted the petitioner. From the perusal of the impugned order of the Regional Transport Authority it will appear that the question considered by it in regard to charge No. 1 was whether the wood that was carried by the petitioner was his own goods. It did not examine the question whether that wood was 'fuel' or 'torch wood.' It will thus appear that the charges against the petitioner with regard to carrying of wood on 22-3-1955 that were enquired into by the criminal court and the Regional Transport Authority were not identical. Even if it be assumed that both the charges were broadly speaking the same, the Regional Transport Authority was legally authorised to enquire into it and come to its own conclusion not-withstanding the fact that the criminal court had acquitted the petitioner of the charges; because the scope and purpose of proceedings under Secs. 123 and 60 are quite different. Sri Katju relied upon Jerome D'Silva v. The Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1952 Madras 853 , which is a decision on Section 60 of Motor Vehicles Act. In that case a permit holder was charged by the police under Section 186, Indian Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. After a full enquiry the Magistrate discharged the accused holding that the accusation was groundless. This order was passed on 6-1-1951. Meanwhile the Regional Transport Officer called upon the petitioner by a communication dated 3-11-1950 to show cause why his permit should not be cancelled or suspended as the lorry was engaged in smuggling food grains. The permit holder submitted his explanation, but the officer passed an order on 3-3-1951 suspending the permit for a period of three months. Subsequently an application was filed by the permit holder to the Regional Transport Officer to reconsider his decision in view of the order of the Magistrate holding that the accusation was baseless. This application was also rejected. Thereupon the permit holder filed an application in the High Court praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the transport authorities. The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court made the following observation:- "We have no hesitation in making it clear that a quasi-judicial tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal therefrom cannot ignore the findings and orders of competent criminal courts in respect of an offence when the tribunal proceeds to take any action on the basis of the commission of that offence . . . As primarily the criminal courts of the land are entrusted with the enquiry into offence, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals like the Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act .... This procedure would avoid the spectacle of two departments of the Government proceeding on contradictory lines to the annoyance and hardship of the citizens." It will be noticed that this decision emphasised the undesirability of enquiry by Regional Transport Authority into a charge on which a criminal court had already given its decision, on the ground that the spectacle of two departments of the Government proceeding on contradictory lines to the annoyance and hardship of the citizens should be avoided. Two independent tribunals with different jurisdictions and scope can examine the same matter and it will be lawful on their part to come to different findings in relation to the purpose of the enquiry before them. * * * Another contention of Sri Katju is that the carrying of goods by the petitioner's vehicle, as alleged in the various charges did not constitute any breach of the conditions of the permit even if those allegations are assumed to be true. The argument of Sri Katju is that in the permit there is a column at serial No. 9 of which the heading is 'conditions.' That column in the permit is blank. The column at serial no. 4 is 'area' for which the permit is valid and the heading of Col. No. 6 is the 'nature of the goods to be carried.' In Col. No. 4 the entry in the permit is: "Haldwani-Almora. Further following routes allowed for transport of kerosene oil only and no other goods: 1........ 2...... 3.Almora-Chita. 4........ 5........ 6......... 7........." Sri Katju urged that the stipulations under Cols. 4 and 6 are not the conditions of the permit; those entries are merely details of the particulars of the permit. In support of his contention Sri Katju relied upon In re G. D. & Co. Madras, AIR 1950 Madras 837 . It was observed in that case that a reading of the various columns of the permits makes it clear that each column cannot be interpreted as a condition of the permit. It is only a description of the particulars required for the licensing authorities so that they may be in a position to issue a promit. If these were conditions there was no need why there should be separate column for 'conditions'. It does not appear correct to give such a restricted meaning to the expression 'conditions of the permit.' In the petitioner's permit the column of 'conditions' is blank. If the petitioner's argument is to be accepted it will mean that he was granted an unconditional permit and he could, therefore, use his vehicle in whatever manner he liked. Permits under the Act are designed for the purpose of control of transport vehicles. That purpose is defeated if the contention of the petitioner is accepted and his permit is held to be an unconditional permit. Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 59 of the Act enumerates six conditions and provides that those shall be the conditions of every permit. It appears that Col. no. 9 in the permit with the heading 'conditions' is particularly meant for the conditions enumerated in Sec. 59(3). As those conditions are enumerated in the Act the same were not repeated in the permit and Col. No. 9 was left blank. The question as to what, if any, technical meaning is to be given to the expression 'conditions of the permit' does not really arise in the present case. A reference to the order of the Regional Transport Authority will disclose that the permit of the petitioner was cancelled under Sec. 60(1) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act which is to the following effect: "(1) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit - (a)........... (b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit." It will be seen that action under Sec. 60(1) (b) is not for breach of any 'condition of the permit'; it is for using the vehicle in a manner not authorised by the permit. If under the terms of the permit the petitioner was allowed to carry specified kinds of goods and to ply his vehicle on specified routes and was authorised to carry only a particular kind of goods on a particular route, any use of the vehicle in contravention of those specifications will amount to its user 'in a manner not authorised by the permit.' It is true that in the body of the order where the Regional Transport Authority gave its findings with respect to some of the charges it is stated that transport of goods which were not the business goods of the permit holder constitute a major breach of the conditions of the permit. Here the word 'conditions' appears to have been used in a general sense. The dictionary meaning of the word 'condition' is stipulation. There is no doubt that the specification of the routes on which the petitioner was permitted to ply his vehicle and of the goods which he was authorised to transport are some of the terms and stipulations of the permit. For the reasons mentioned above I am of the view that the petition has no force and should be dismissed with costs.
(2.) Oak, J. - I agree. By the Court - The petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.;