Jagdish Sahai, J. - (1.) The petitioner was appointed an assistant teacher in Maha Bodhi Higher Secondary School, Sarnath in 1943. In 1952 he was appointed as the officiating Principal of the school and on 24th of February 1954 he was confirmed on that post. On 19th December 1959 he was suspended and charge-sheeted. He submitted his explanation to the charges. The respondent no. 1, the managing committee of the school, on 13th of January 1960 passed a resolution purporting to terminate the services of the petitioner. A copy of the resolution was sent to the District Inspector of Schools, hereinafter referred to as the Inspector, for approval as required by Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The Inspector after perusing the file of the petitioners case issued a show cause notice to the petitioner to which the latter submitted an explanation. By his order dated the 25th Feb. 1960 the Inspector refusing to confirm the order terminating the services of the petitioner ordered the withholding of his three increments with cumulative effect and also directed an adverse remark to be entered in his character roll. Both the petitioner and the management filed appeals before respondent no. 3, the Regional Appellate Committee constituted under Section 16-G of the Act, hereinafter referred to as the Committee. The respondent No. 3 directed the petitioner to submit an explanation which the petitioner did. The respondent No. 4, the Deputy Director of Education, Varanasi, informed the petitioner by means of a letter dated 18th of April 1960 that 20th of May 1960 had been fixed for the hearing of the appeals by respondent No. 3. After being adjourned twice the two appeals were heard on 17th June 1960. On 18th of June 1960 the respondent No. 3 pronounced its order reverting the petitioner to the post of an assistant teacher from that of the Principal and directed the payment of a subsistence allowance to the petitioner for the period he was under suspension but not his salary and further ordered that his salary as an assistant teacher will be paid in the scale and grade which he was getting in 1952, i.e., before becoming the Principal. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed. The only submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 3 had no jurisdiction to enhance the punishment approved by the Inspector. No other submission has been made before me.
(2.) Section 16-G (3) (c) deals with matters relating to appeals. The relevant parts of that section read as follows:- "16-G (3) (a) No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. (b) The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management: Provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders, the Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal the Headmaster or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why proposed punishment should not be inflicted. (c) An appeal against the order of the Inspector under Cl. (b) may be made to the Regional Appellate Committee constituted under Cl. (d) within one month from the date of such order being communicated to the parties concerned and the Regional Appellate Committee may, after such enquiry as it considers necessary, confirm the order or set aside or 'modify' it, and the order passed by the Regional Appellate Committee shall be final." From the provisions of Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Act it is clear that the Committee could either confirm or set aside or 'modify' the order passed by the Inspector. It has been contended that in the present case neither the order has been confirmed nor set aside and even though it purports to have been modified it was in fact not even modified but the punishment has been enhanced.
(3.) It is common ground, in fact the section itself is clear, that he Committee could do any of the three things, i.e., it could either set aside the order or confirm the same or 'modify' it. The question for consideration is therefore whether in the instant case the respondent no. 3 has modified the order. It is contended that the word 'modify' includes reduction but not enhancement. In Websters New International Dictionary, second edition, amongst others, the following meanings have been given to the word modify. "1. To limit; also, to mitigate; assuage. 2. To reduce in extent or degree; to moderate; qualify: lower, as, to 'modify' heat, pain punishment. 3. . . . . . . . . . 4. To change somewhat the form or qualities of, to alter somewhat; as to 'modify' the terms of a contract.";