Srivastava, J. - (1.) IN this case the following question has been referred to us for answer by Mr. Justice Lal: Whether in a suit for declaration of the present nature, cause of action or fresh cause of action would be deemed to have accrued when the Plaintiffs acquired knowledge in 1939 or when the application for correction of papers was originally dismissed on the 29th June, 1942 or when it was finally dismissed on the 14th July, 1943 or on any subsequent date? Whether the present suit instituted on the 30th August, 1947 is or is not within time.
(2.) THOUGH the case has had a chequered history it is not necessary to enter into the details of that history. The only facts which it is necessary to mention are that the suit out of which the second appeal has arisen relates to grove No. 886 situated on a rent free grant. The case of the Plaintiffs was that this grove along with three other plots originally belonged to the common ancestors of the parties. In a partition this grove and one other plot was allotted to the Plaintiffs' branch while the remaining two plots were allotted to the Defendant's branch. For, sometime the names of the Plaintiffs' branch alone were recorded in respect of the sir plots but subsequently at some stage the names of the Defendants' branch too were entered in the village papers. This fact was discovered by the Plaintiffs in the year 1939 when they wanted to file a suit against one Niadar for the price of the fruits of the grove. The Plaintiffs contended that they had been in possession of the grove throughout. Having discovered that the names of the Defendant's branch had also somehow been entered in respect of this grove which belonged exclusively to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs made an application for correction of papers in the revenue court. That application was contested on the ground that the entry of the names of the Defendant's branch in respect of the plot was correct. The application for correction of papers was first dismissed by the sub -Divisional Officer on the 29th of June 1942. Thereafter there was an appeal and the case was remanded back to the trial court. The Sub Divisional Officer before whom the case came up on remand again dismissed it on the 14th of July 1943. The Plaintiffs then attempted to obtain a declaration of their rights first in the civil court and then in the revenue court and then again by the present suit. The present suit was instituted on the 20th of August, 1947. It was contested on various grounds of fact and law but we are concerned at present only with the plea of limitation that was raised to defeat the claim. The suit being primarily for a declaration of title it was not disputed that it was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The limitation was therefore six years and was to be calculated from the date on which the right to sue accrued. The parties were however not agreed as to the date on which the right to sue accrued to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs contended that the right to sue accrued when their application for correction of papers was finally dismissed on the 14th of July, 1943. The Defendant, on the other hand, contended that the Plaintiffs' right to sue really accrued in 1939 when the Plaintiffs admittedly came to know of the fact that the Defendant's name had also been entered in respect of the land. Each side relied on certain decisions of this Court and when the appeal was first heard by Mr. Justice Lal he was of opinion that there was conflict between the decisions relied upon by the parties. He thought that it was necessary to resolve the conflict and therefore referred the question we have already quoted, to a Division Bench. That is how the case has now come before us.
(3.) ART . 120 of the Limitation Act was considered by the Supreme Court in a recent decision reported in Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and others : AIR 1960 SC 335, and it was laid down:;