Desai, C.J. - (1.) THERE is no substance in this special appeal at all. The question raised before the consolidation authorities was whether the Respondents had acquired SIRDARI rights under Section 19 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on account of their being hereditary tenants on the date of vesting. This question did not at all involve a question of title. The Appellants might have claimed to have acquired BHUMIDHARI rights under a sanad granted to them under the Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, but the objection of the Respondents did not involve any enquiry into the question whether they acquired BHUMIDHARI rights under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for the simple reason that if they had lost their tenancy rights before the date of vesting they could not have acquired BHUMIDHARI rights under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Bhumidhari rights are conferred by S. 18(2) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act upon a person holding a sanad granted under the Acquisition of Privileges Act only if he is a "person belonging to the class mentioned in S. 3" of the Acquisition of Privileges Act. The class of persons mentioned in S. 3 are persons holding certain tenancy rights. On the date of vesting a person must belong to that class in order to be entitled to Bhumidhari rights; mere possession of a Bhumidhari sanad is not enough. If the Appellants had lost their tenancy rights under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, they would not on the date of vesting be persons belonging to the class mentioned in S. 3 of the acquisition of Privileges Act and, therefore would not be entitled to Bhumidhari rights. If the Respondents were hereditary tenants on the date of vesting the Appellants could not have any of the tenancy rights mentioned in S. 3 of the Acquisition of Privileges Act and it was unnecessary for the consolidation authorities to go into the question whether they acquired bhumidhari rights or not. When they could not possibly acquire Bhumidhari rights it means that the question of their acquiring them did not arise at all. There was thus no occasion for the consolidation authorities going into the question of title, and they did not; they only went into the question whether the Respondents were in adverse possession of the land from before the date of vesting and whether they had acquired hereditary tenancy rights under the U.P. Tenancy Act. Having answered both the questions in the affirmative they were bound to hold that they acquired Sirdari rights under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and this is what they have done. In order to find that the Respondents acquired Sirdari rights under Section 19 they did not have to go at all into the question of Appellants' title; it was enough for them to hold that the Appellants had lost their tenancy rights under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. This finding that they had lost their tenancy rights under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was not a finding on a question of title at all. What is a question of title within the meaning of S. 12(4) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is defined in S. 36 -A and the question whether the Appellants had lost their tenancy rights under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and whether the Respondents had acquired hereditary tenancy rights under the same provisions are not questions of title within the meaning of S. 36 -A. Our learned brother, therefore, rightly held that the findings of the consolidation authorities that the Respondents were Sirdars was not a finding beyond the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities.
(2.) THE special appeal is consequently dismissed summarily.;