D. S. Mathur, J. - (1.) This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Surendra Kumar for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 16-1-1959 of the State Transport Authority Tribunal (to be referred hereinafter as the Tribunal), respondent No. 1, and also for the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct respondent No. 1 to remand the cases of the petitioner and of other appellants, disposed of under the impugned order, to the Tribunal (Mathur, J.) 269 Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow, respondent No. 2, for consideration on merits.
(2.) The facts of the case are not in dispute. The Regional Transport Authority, Lucknow, respondent No. 2, invited applications for the grant of six stage carriage parmits for the Lucknow-Hardoi route and 79 persons applied for the grant of stage carriage permits. The petitioner was one of the applicants and respondent Nos. 3 to 5 were the other three. These respondents are Smt. Zubeda Begum, M/s. Hindustan Transport Company, Unnao, and Mukhtar Ali. The Regional Transport Authority took the decision in the meeting held on the 1st and 14th of February, 1958, and stage carriage permits were granted to six applicants not including the present petitioner and respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Only eight respondent Nos. 3 to 5. The appeals were decided under order dated 16-1-1959 whereby the grant of permits to three persons was set aside and instead permits were granted to respondent Nos. 3 to 5. The order of the Tribunal is contained in Annexure C to the affidavit.
(3.) It is a settled preferred an appeal before the Tribunal including the petitioner and respondent law that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India High Courts do not usurp the functions of a court of appeal and for that reason do not interfere with the order of a subordinate authority or tribunal whose finding of fact is final unless it acted illegally or committed some error in the exercise of jurisdiction. In other words, it was for the Tribunal to decide the appeals on merits and grant stage carriage permits to such of the applicants as were in its opinion most fitted for running the transport service. To arrive at a decision it was, however, necessary for the Tribunal to act with in the law and not to be moved by extraneous considerations which did not come within the object or purpose of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (to be referred hereinafter as the Act). Where it appears that the Tribunal was moved by extraneous factors, which could not be taken into consideration while taking the decision on the grant of permits, it would be a case of an illegality committed in the exercise of jurisdiction and this Court would be justified in quashing the order of the Tribunal. At the same time it must be observed that the courts of law shall have to grant certain latitude to the Tribunal, all the more, in the circumstances of a case of the present nature. With regard to some of the applicants for the grant of permits the Tribunal can know, without any possibility of doubt, whether or not they are fitted for the purpose, that is, if they would be in a position to run the stage carriage in the interest of the public. There would be persons who already hold permits and are running transport service without any complaint; there would be others who cannot efficiently manage the transport business or who had been previously punished for committing breach of the provisions of the law. But most of the applicants will be new-corners who had no prior experience of running the transport business and with regard to such applicants the transport authority including the Tribunal shall not know whether in the end they would be able to run the service efficiently and to the benefit of the travelling public. While considering the applications falling in this latter category, the authority concerned shall have to prefer one and not the other. In other words, if it appears that the authority or the Tribunal had acted keeping the provisions of the Act in mind, this Court shall not interfere simply because in its opinion another applicant was more suited for the grant of a permit.;