Jagdish Sahai, J. - (1.) This special appeal is directed against the judgment and order of our brother Dhawan dated 22nd of September, 1959. The facts giving rise to this case are very short. The respondent No. 1 Sri Ram Kumar is the tenant and the appellant Sri Ram Gopal the landlord of a premises situated in the city of Etawah. Sri Ram Gopal applied under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for permission to sue the respondent No. 1 for ejectment on the ground that the premises was needed for his own use. The R.C.E.O., who was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate, rejected the application whereupon the dissatisfied landlord went to the Commissioner, Allahabad Division. The Commissioner allowed the Revision and remanded the case for rehearing by the R.C.E.O. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, after rehearing the case, granted Sri Ram Gopal permission to sue Sri Ram Kumar for ejectment from the premises in dispute. Sri Ram Kumar preferred a Revision to the Commissioner. Allahabad Division, which was allowed and the order granting permission was set aside. Thereafter Sri Ram Gopal filed a revision application before the U.P. Government (hereinafter called the State Government). On 20-9-1958 the State Government, quashing the order passed by the Commissioner, allowed the application of Sri Ram Gopal for permission to sue Sri Ram Kumar for his ejectment from the premises in dispute. A writ petition was filed against this order of the State Government which was heard by our brother Dhavan who by his judgment dated 22nd of September, 1959, as already mentioned above allowed the same and quashed the order passed by the Stale Government. The present appeal is directed against that order of our brother Dhawan.
(2.) The question that has been canvassed before us and requires consideration in the present case is a very short one, the same being as to whether the order passed by the State Government was one contrary to law or was based upon considerations extraneous to the merits of the case. The submission of the respondent No. 1 before the learned Single Judge was that the State Government only considered the need of the landlord and not that of the tenant. This submission was based upon the following words in the order of the State Government: "Prarthi ko niji avashyakta ke adhar par prashnagat dukan se vipakshi ko bedakhal karne ke hetu diwani adalat men mukadma dayar karne ki anumati de di jae". Relying upon the above passage in the order of the State Government the learned Single Judge held that the order passed by the State Government was bad as the respective needs of the landlord and the tenant had not been considered. The sentence in the order of the State Government read as a whole is as follows : "Rajyapal Mahoday is mamle men nyay ki drishti se yeh uchit samjhte hain ke prarthi ko niji avashyakta ke adhar par prashnagat dukan se vipakshi ko bedakhal karne ke hetu diwani adalat men mukadma dayar karne ki anumati de di jae." Translated into English the sentence would read as follows:- "The Governor considers it from the point of view of justice that in view of the need of the landlord he may be given permission to file a suit in the Civil Court for the ejectment of the opposite party." There are two questions before us. The first is one of fact and that is, as to what is the exact meaning of the words quoted above. Do those words show that the State Government addressed themselves only to the consideration of the needs of the landlord or they carefully looked into the whole matter and then came to the conclusion that the interests of justice demanded that permission should be given to the landlord in view of his needs. It is not a matter of dispute that when the State Government decided the revision application filed by the appellant they had before them not only the orders passed by the R.C.E.O. and the Commissioner but the entire record of the case including the written revision application presented by the appellant. In this connection it would be relevant to notice the opening words of the order passed by the State Government which read as follows : "Sri Ram Gopal ko unke uprokt vishay par dinank 12 May, 1958 ke prarthana ke prasang men suchit kiya jata hai."
(3.) There is a clear, reference to the revision application made by the appellant. The order of the State Government read as a whole does not show that it did not look into the entire record of the case and did not consider the needs of the landlord and tenant both. There is a strong presumption that it would have considered not only the needs of both the landlord and the tenant but other relevant circumstances also. The presumption gets stronger in view of the fact that in the writ petition filed by Sri Ram Kumar it was not alleged that the State Government did not apply its mind to the facts of the case or that it did not peruse the material on the record of the case. Sec. 7-F of the Act which confers on the State Government the revisional powers does not provide that the order passed by them should be a speaking order. It is not analogous to Or. XX, C.P.C. or Section 367, Cr. P. C. which provide as to what a judgment should contain. Under these circumstances the State Government were not required to draft their order in a particular form. Inasmuch as it has not been contended or alleged that the State Government did not consider all the material placed in the record of the case, it is not possible to hold that they did not actually do so. We may also add that under the provisions of Section 114 of the Evidence Act there is a strong presumption that all official acts are properly done. Sec. 4 of the Evidence Act provides that whenever it is provided that the Court may presume a fact it may either regard that fact as proved, unless it is disproved, or may call for evidence of it. The law clearly is that once a presumption has got to be drawn under the provisions of the Evidence Act then the Court must either act upon that presumption or call upon the party to bring evidence. It is not possible for a court not to draw that presumption and also not to call upon the party to bring in evidence. In the case of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 156 the Judicial Committee after considering the provisions of Section 4 and 114 of the Evidence Act held that it must be presumed that the Governor who passed the order of detention of Sibnath Banerji and others had complied with all the requirements of the law. Their Lordships observed as follows:- "Sub-Sec. (1) assumes that the order is made in exercise of the power, which clearly leaves it open to challenge on the ground that it was not Made in conformity with the power conferred, heavily though the burden of proof may lie on the challenger, as stated by the Chief Justice in the passage just cited, Sub-sec. (2) raises a presumption of fact, which may be displaced, though here again the burden is likely to be heavy. Sec. 4, Evidence Act, provides: 'Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved.' Accordingly, the contention of the Crown that the Court has no jurisdiction to investigate the validity of the orders fails." This case was approved and followed by our Supreme Court on more occasions than one, the most recent occasion being in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. State Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1961 SC 1381 . We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel that in the present case the needs of the landlord alone were considered.;