Agarwala, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for cancellation of a compromise decree.
(2.) ONE Lachcha was a tenant of a certain holding. On his death there Were two sets of claimants who claimed to be the heirs of Lachcha. One set consisted of Moti Lal, Hukum Lab Bhajan Lal and Sipahi Lal. All of them were minors under the guardianship of Girdhari, brother of Laohoha. The other set consisted of Murli and Jiwan, also minors under the guardianship of their mother Mithana. On behalf of Moti Lal, Hukum Lal, Bhajan Lal and Sipahi Lal, Girdhari filed a suit in the revenue court under Section 59, U.P. Tenancy Act, for a declaration that they, being the sons and heirs of Lachcha, were the tenants of the holding in dispute Murli and Jiwan were arrayed as defendants to the suit. The defence of Murli and Jiwan was that they and not the plaintiffs of that suit were the real sons of Lachcha and entitled to the holding. During the pendency of the suit, there was a compromise between Girdhari, the guardian of the plaintiffs of that suit, and Mithana, the guardian of the defendants of that suit. By this compromise, It was agreed that Murli and Jiwan, and Moti Lal, Hukum Lal and Bbajan Lal (but not Sipahi Lal) be recognized as tenants of the holding. The guardians presented an application to the revenue court for leave to enter into a compromise. In this petition they stated that the compromise was not detrimental to the interest of the minors. They did not specifically say that it was beneficial to the interest of the minors. The counsel presenting the application also did not make any statement whether the comprise was for the benefit of the minors. The Court passed the following order. Allowed to "compromise on behalf of minors" A decree was accordingly passed in terms of the compromise on 18th April 1945. Then Murli and Jiwan; tinder the guardianship of one Sukhbasi, filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal, in the Civil Court, for the setting aside of the compromise decree passed by the revenue Court on the grounds that the compromise was obtained by fraud practiced upon their mother. Shrimati Mithana, and upon the ground that the Court did not apply its mind whether the compromise was for the benefit of the minors, and that therefore the decree of the Court was passed without jurisdiction. The defence was that no fraud was practiced upon the minors' mother that the compromise was for the benefit of the minors and that the decree passed by the revenue Court was validly passed and could not be set aside by the Civil Court. Various ether pleas were also taken but we are not concerned with them in this appeal. The trial Court held that this compromise was obtained by means of fraud and that the compromise was not for the benefit of the plaintiffs. It. therefore, decreed the suit. Against this decree there was an appeal. The lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that there was no proof that any fraud was practiced upon Mithna and further that it could not be held that the compromise was, for the benefit of the minors or otherwise. The Court observed that ''there is nothing in this record which might show that any patty had suffered any particular material injury on account of the compromise.
(3.) THE Court, however, dismissed the appeal upon the grounds that it was not brought to the notice of the revenue Court that the compromise was for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that the Court itself did not expressly state in the order permitting the compromise to be entered into that it was for their benefit and that, as such, the minors were not bound by the compromise. Against this decree the defendants have c me up in second appeal to this Court and it has been urged on their behalf that upon the facts found, the Court below had no jurisdiction to set aside the decree of the revenue Court.;