- (1.) WE see no force in this revision which is directed against an order restoring an application for execution, which was dismissed for default in prosecution in the following circumstances :
(2.) IT appears that the decree passed in Suit No. 28 of 1929 was put in execution. The decree-holder had obtained another decree in Suit No. 42 of 1933 and in order to realize the amount due thereunder he applied for rateable distribution out of the proceeds which were to be realised in execution of the earlier decree. The execution of the earlier decree had been transferred to the Collector, and a 'robkar' in connection with the second application was sent to the Collector requesting that the decreeholder, for satisfaction of the second decree, may be allowed rateable distribution.
(3.) WHILE execution proceedings were pending before the Sales Officer, an objection was filed on behalf of the judgment-debtor to the effect that the execution of the second decree had become time-barred. This objection along with execution case was adjourned from time to time. On 25-7-1944, the objection was heard and orders were reserved. The cases were next set down for hearing on 28-7-1944. On the last mentioned date the orders were not ready and the cases were postponed to 1-8-1944. On that date the objection was allowed and the second execution was held to be barred by time. In the main execution case 16-9-1944 was fixed and the decree-holder was directed to pay process fee etc. for the issue of a sale proclamation. The decree-holder or his general agent was not present on that date and the Court directed that the decree-holder's agent be informed of the date fixed and the steps to be taken.;