V.K. Shukla, J. - (1.) PETITIONER claims to be adopted son of late Vrindavan and there is valid adoption deed in his favour. Petitioner submits that during entire life time of late Vrindavan he stayed with him and after his death benefits admissible to a son have been extended to him. Petitioner request for offering compassionate appointment in lieu of death late Vrindavan, but his request has been turned down on the ground that under the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, there is no provision for offering compassionate appointment to an adopted son.
(2.) RULE 2(c) of the U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, the term "family '' has been defined; it includes wife or husband, sons, unmarried and widowed daughters. Under Rule 5 of the aforesaid Rules one member of the family is entitled to be offered compassionate appointment on the terms and conditions being fulfilled. Petitioner claims himself to be adopted son of late Vrindavan; his claim for compassionate appointment has been non -suited on the ground that under the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, there is no provision for offering compassionate appointment to an adopted son. In the definition of the term "family" the word son has been included, but there is no mention with regard to natural son or adopted son. This Court in the case of Shiv Prasad v. State of U.P., (2009) 3 UPLBEC 2484 has considered the right of adopted son and taken the view that adopted son is as good as natural son, as such claim of a validly adopted son cannot be non -suited on the ground that under the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, there is no provision for offering compassionate appointment to an adopted son. Paragraph 12 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted below: 12. It appears that in Rule -2 of Dying in Harness Rules which defines various words or expressions mentioned in the definition clause, these words and expressions are preceded by the words 'unless the context otherwise requires'. It means that the definitions given in the definition clause should be normally applied and given effect to but this normal rule may however be departed from if there be something in context to show that definition should not be applied. In view of legal position stated by Hon'ble Apex Court referred hereinbefore, the definition of expression 'family' given in the definition clause appears to be an inclusive definition as the definition clause used the word 'include' in the definition of family. Such definition is known as expansive definition and is used to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of statute and when it is so used, the words or phrases should be construed as comprehending not only such thing which they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. Where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning. Contrary to it, where in a definition clause of a statute a word is defined to mean certain thing whenever that word is used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition 'unless the context otherwise requires'. Such definition is known as restrictive definition and used to restrict the meaning of expression defined in the definition clause and whenever such word or expression is used in the body of the statute, it shall be restricted to meaning assigned in the definition clause and popular or natural meaning of such word or expression shall not be applied. Same view has been reiterated by this Court in the case of Ravindra Kumar Dubey v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2005) 4 E.S.C. (All.) as also in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26617 of 2010, the case of Jagat Pal v. State of U.P. and Ors., decided on 24.09.2010, wherein this Court has taken the following view: The problem which is wriggling in my mind is that why the framer of the Rules of 1974, in Rule 2 (c)(ii) and (iii) has attached plurality with the word 'son' and 'daughter' as 'sons' and 'daughters' and why singularity is attached with the word 'brother' and 'sister' in Rule 2(c)(iv), whereas either it is son, daughter, brother or sister they constitute one class and in each category their number may be more than one, therefore, in view of Rule 5 which provides that only one member of the family is entitled to be considered for appointment, attaching plurality with the word 'son' and 'daughter', the framer of the rule has intended to mean something more behind the attachment of plurality with the word 'son' and 'daughter' and that looking into the object of the rule in recent perspective is to attach plurality means not to infer number of the 'son' and 'daughter' but the kind of the 'son' and 'daughter' who are legally recognized under law, as after the enactment of the Act of 1956 the kind of 'son' and 'daughter' has become more than one i.e. natural/real/son/daughter and adopted son/ daughter. It may be noticed that according to the Act of 1956 right of adoption has been given to a male and female both to adopt either a male or female child. The effect of such adoption is that by virtue of adoption a male or female child becomes a 'son' or 'daughter' as the case may be of the adopter and this constitute a separate category i.e. adopted son/daughter and that is why plurality is not attached with the words 'brother' and 'sister' under Rule 2(c)(iv) as the kind of 'brother' and 'sister' for the purposes of this rule or other rules is not more than one. Otherwise also the Act of 1956 has been enacted by the Parliament and the provisions contained in this Act, unless something otherwise is provided under this Act, will prevail over any Act of the State legislation or Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the Rule which is under consideration has been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, therefore, also the effect of adoption providing same status to adopted child as of a natural child will prevail over the rule in question and both the adopted child as well as the natural child will be treated at par, without there being any difference amongst two. For the above reason, I am of the view that the Rules of 1974 itself provide that the adopted son/daughter is also included in the definition of family as defined under Rule 2(c)(ii) and (iii) of the Rules.
(3.) ONCE law has been settled by this Court that adopted son is as good as natural son, then his claim for grant of compassionate appointment under Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 on other terms and conditions being fulfilled, in all eventuality is liable to be considered, and the opinion formed by the Respondents cannot be approved of.;