- (1.) HEARD Sri I.K. Chaturvedi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Learned standing counsel has accepted notice on behalf of Respondent. Sri S.D. Sahai, appears for Respondent No. 2 -Corporation Bank.
(2.) IN pursuance to the recovery certificate issued under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Petitioner's mortgaged house was put to auction, after completing proceedings under Section 13 and 14 of the Act, and the sale has been confirmed. The Petitioner has not enclosed the order or notice issued under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and the auction notice. This writ petition does not give the full and complete facts of the loan transaction. If the auction has been held, the house has been sold, and the sale is confirmed, the Petitioner has a statutory alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 in the Debts Recovery Tribunal. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others, SLP (C) No. 10145 of 2010 decided on July 26th, 2010 the Supreme Court has taken notice of the discretion exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and has made following observations in para 17 of the judgment, requesting the High Court not to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the Debts Recovery Tribunal Act: 17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.
(3.) WE do not find any such extraordinary facts and circumstances in which we may interfere in the matter ignoring the alternative remedy available to the Petitioner under the Act to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal.;