- (1.) HEARD counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri Sudhir Bharti learned counsel for all the respondents. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, this petition is being finally disposed of at this stage without calling for counter-affidavit.
(2.) THE case of the petitioner is that O.A.No. 557 of 2004 was pending before the Central Administrative Tribunal. On 10.3.2008 the said O.A. was dismissed in default as the counsel for the petitioner could not appear. THE petitioner thereafter filed an application for recalling of the said order on 2.3.2011 alongwith an application for condonation of delay which was supported by an affidavit. In the said application as well as affidavit, it has been stated that as the case could not be marked by the clerk of the counsel for the petitioner, therefore counsel could not appear on the date fixed and the case was dismissed for non prosecution. It is also stated in the affidavit that when the petitioner inspected the file on 25.1.2011 this fact came to the notice of the petitioner and immediately after coming to know about the same he filed restoration application alongwith an application for condonation of delay. By the impugned order dated 7.4.2011 both the applications, i.e. delay condonation application as well as restoration application have been rejected by observing that no good ground for condonation of delay is made out. The law relating to the delay condonation has been dealt with by the Apex Court in numerous cases. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537 : 1987 (2) SCR 387 has given following guidelines while dealing with the delay condonation application: "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
(3.) THERE is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. "5. In the case of Ramji Dass and others v. Mohan Singh, 1978 ARC 496 the Apex Court has held that "we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts' discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing". 6. Again the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) 389 after considering various cases of the Apex Court on condonation of delay application has held : Para 12................ " The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice -oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause". Para 13................. "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory". ;