Ashok Srivastava, J. - (1.) THIS criminal revision has been filed by the revisionist feeling aggrieved by the order dated 9.5.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Court No. 3, Mau in S.T. No. 225 of 2001. Through this order the learned Additional Sessions Judge had allowed an application moved before him by the learned D.G.C. (Criminal), Mau under Section 321 Cr.P.C.
(2.) THE brief facts of the case are that the alleged incident had taken place on 8.5.98 at about 10.30 a.m. in village Kurthi Jafarpur, P.S. Kopaganj, Mau. An F.I.R. was lodged by head constable No. 9, Wasim Anwar. According to the FIR a large number of persons in the shape of a crowed of 250-300 strength surrounded the police outpost, Kurthi Jafarpur. THE accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly which was armed with deadly weapons. THE mob had attempted to kill police personnel and other persons, caused simple and grievous hurt to a number of people, damaged properties, used criminal force in order to intimidate public at large and the police personnel and caused simple hurt to the government servants in order to deter them from discharging their official duties. An FIR was lodged with the police on the same day at about 1.45 p.m. in which 52 persons were named. THE matter was investigated and a charge sheet under Sections 147/148/ 149/307/336/332/323/427/506 IPC was filed in the Court of learned Magistrate. THE relevant case crime number was 206/98. THE learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and after furnishing copies to the accused persons committed the case to the Court of Sessions. On 10.10.2002 the learned Sessions Judge, Mau framed charges against all the fifty two charge sheeted accused persons under various Sections of Indian Panel Code. THEreafter the learned lower Court proceeded to examine the prosecution witnesses. It appears that this case was transferred from the Caurt of (earned Sessions Judge to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Court No. 3 in due course of administrative distribution of the session trials. On 7.2.2007 the learned D.G.C. (Criminal), Mau submitted an application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge under Section 321 Cr.P.C. Objections were filed on this application from the side of the revisionist. After hearing both the parties the learned lower Court on 9.5.2007 disposed of the said application. He allowed the application and permitted the learned D.G.C. (Criminal) to withdraw the case and as a consequence all the accused persons were acquitted. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the present revision has been filed. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the records. Lower Court record has been received and is tagged with the file of this revision. It has been submitted from the side of the revisionist that the learned public prosecutor had moved the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. under the direction of the District Magistrate/State without application of his own mind. Referring the case of Subhash Chand v. State and others, AIR 1980 SC 423, it has been argued that the decision of the public prosecutor must be independent and not in obedience of the direction of higher authorities. Referring another case law Balabhadra Dass v. State of Orrisa, 1991 Cr LJ 2457, it has been further argued that while exercising his power under Section 321 Cr.P.C. the public prosecutor should not Act merely as a rubber stamp of State Government. Referring to the application under Section 321 Cr.P.C. and the government order dated 18.1.2007 the learned counsel for the revisionist has further argued that the application moved by the learned public prosecutor is not based on any material. It has also been stated that the learned public prosecutor has only mentioned in his application that since the State Government has decided to withdraw the case, the case should be permitted to be withdrawn. At this stage reference of Abdul Kareem v. State of Kamataka, 2001 Crl LJ 148 SC, has been given. It has also been submitted that the public prosecutor has not exercised his discretion and acted mechanically just to obey the direction of the State which action of the public prosecutor is bad and illegal. It has also been argued from the side of the revisionist that the learned lower Court has followed the ruling given by this Court, ignoring various rulings of the Apex Court cited before him. It has further been submitted that the learned lower Court has passed the order in a cursory manner and he did not go deep in the merits of the case as well as the settled provisions of law laid down by the Apex Court. In the above background it has been submitted from the side of the revisionist that the revision be allowed and the impugned order should be quashed and set aside. The revision has been opposed vehemently from the side of the private opposite parties. It has been stated that the order passed by the learned lower Court is sound and based on established principles of law as laid down in respect of Section 321 Cr.P.C. It has further been submitted from their side that the revisionist does not have locus standi to move this revision and the revision should be dismissed on this count alone. This contention has been advanced, which is of preliminary nature, with a view to dislodge the locus standi of the revisionist to prefer the present revision. It was argued that when learned D.G.C.(Criminal) applied before the learned lower Court for permission to withdraw the prosecution against the accused persons the revisionist had no locus to oppose the withdrawal since it was a matter entirely between the public prosecutor and the learned Additional Sessions Judge and no other person had a right to intervene and oppose the withdrawal and since the revisionist had no locus to oppose the withdrawal, he was not entitled to prefer the present revision against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
(3.) REPLYING to the arguments relating to the locus of the revisionist the learned counsel for the revisionist has stressed that in criminal law any person can set Court in motion and stated that on this point law is very clear as has been established by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay's case (1984) 2 SCC 500. I have considered the arguments as advanced by the learned counsels for the parties. I do not think that there is any force in the contention raised by the private opposite parties. It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain Acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (Supra) the Apex Court pointed out the position of law. The relevant portion is quoted as follows: "It is well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that any-one can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint case, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complaint, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (I) Section 187-A of Sea Customs Act, - 1878 (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of Import and Export Control Act, 1947 (iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity Supply Act. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribed any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complaint is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the Cr. PC. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an Act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (See Section 2(n), Cr.P.C.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for his orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offence is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an Act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary, Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statues enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be withheld down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception." ;