- (1.) HEARD Shri R. P. Singh Yadava for the applicant in revision and the learned A.G.A. for the State.
(2.) IT appears that on the basis of first information report dated 1-6-1994 case was investigated and charge - sheet against the applicant and three others was submitted in the Court of the Magistrate on 4-7-1994. The Magistrate took cognizance and sent the record to copyright section for preparation of copies. The record was then received back in the Court of the Magistrate on 16-7-1994. The accused persons appeared in the Court on 18-8-1994. The case remained pending in the Court of Magistrate and 17-2-1997 was fixed for framing of charges. On this date an application was moved on behalf of the accused persons to discharge them on the basis of guidelines framed by the Apex Court in the case of Common Cause a Registered Society through its Director v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1619. The learned Magistrate allowed the said application on the ground that since the offence under S.323, IPC is punishable up to a period of one year and offence under S.324, IPC up to a maximum period of three years the trial as per the above guide lines should have been concluded within a period of two years and if the same was not so concluded the accused is entitled to acquittal or discharge, as the case may be. The complainant challenged the said order of the learned Magistrate in revision before the Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 318 of 1999 and by the impugned order said revision has been allowed. The learned Sessions Judge referred to the decision of Common Cause Society v. Union of India, report in (1997) All Cri C 342 : AIR 1997 SC 1539) and has held that since the case was fixed for 17-2-1997 for framing charges in law it would be deemed that trial had not yet commenced and therefore, limitation of two years period had not yet commenced. In subsequent judgment of Common Cause Society, the Apex Court clarified and modified the previous judgment and in paragraph II it was observed : II. The phrase "pendency of trials" as employed in paras 1(a) to 1(c) and the phrase "non - commencement of trial" as employed in paras 2(b) to 2(f) shall be construed as under : (i) xxxx xxxx xxxx (ii) In cases of trials of warrant cases by Magistrates if the cases are instituted upon Police reports the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under S.240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by Magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than on police report such trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the accused concerned under S.246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." Undisputedly the case in hand was a trial of warrant case instituted upon Police report and as per the above guidelines in such cases trial shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under S.240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the earlier decision of Common Cause case in paragraph 2(f) it was laid down that where the cases pending in criminal Courts under IPC or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment up to three years, with or without fine and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. By the subsequent decision the Phrase 'pendency of trial' and the phrase 'non - commencement of trial' as employed in the aforesaid paragraph was explained and it was observed that in cases of trials of warrant cases by Magistrates if the cases are instituted upon Police report the trial shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under S.240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(3.) IN the case in hand undisputedly 17-2-1997 was fixed for framing of charges as such in view of the subsequent decision of Common Cause Society trial could not be deemed to have commenced and accordingly the period of two years limited in the earlier decision of Common Cause could not be deemed to have expired. Thus the revisional Court has committed no error in setting aside the order of learned Magistrate whereby the applicant in revision was discharged.;