- (1.) J. C. Gupta, J. All these revisions have been preferred against the orders of the Magistrate made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) whereby a direction has been issued to police to register First Information Reports and investigate the same.
(2.) THE Court has heard Sri G. S. Chaturvedi senior Advocate Sri K. D. Tiwari, Sri P. R. Maurya, Sri Sunil Kumar, Sri M. K. Shukla and Sri Rajiv Sisodia for the applicants in the above revisions and the learned AGA for the State. A preliminary objection was raised by learned AGA regarding the maintainability of these revisions. It was submitted by learned AGA that in all these revisions, orders made under Section 156 (3) of the Code are not open to challenge for two reasons. Firstly, an accused has no locus standi in the matter and is not entitled to be heard until process is issued against him on the basis of report submitted by police after investigation under Section 173 Crpc. According to him no revision is maintainable under the Code at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance of the offence has been taken nor process issued. Secondly, that by the mere order of registration of case and investigation made under Section 156 of the Code the rights and liabilities of a person named therein as an accused are not adversely affected nor such order finally decides the proceedings, therefore, such an order is interlocutory in nature against which no revision lies on account of statutory prohibition as contained in sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code. On the other hand relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ajay Malviya v. State of U. P. and others, 2000 (41) ACC 435, it was urged by Sri G. S. Chaturvedi that as the order made under Section 156 (3) of the Code requires application of judicial mind, it is open to challenge in revision before this Court or the Sessions Judge, as the case may be. It was further submitted by Sri G. S. Chaturvedi that in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1990 (2) JIC 997 (SC) ; AIR 1992 SC 604, it was held that this Court possesses extra-ordinary inherent powers to quash an FIR or Complaint on limited grounds such as that the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint taken at their face value do not disclose commission of any offence or that the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no reasonable man would ever believe them to be true or that the First Information Report/complaint has been lodged with a strong mala fide. According to him on these grounds, therefore, an order made under Section 156 (3) can be challenged in revision.
(3.) IN reply learned AGA submitted that the proper remedy open for the applicants was to seek extra- ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, if they wanted quashing of the First INformation Report on the grounds enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra ). It was further submitted that the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Ajay Malviya's case (supra) requires re- consideration. Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. Under Section 190 (1) of the Code, a Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of any offence. Section 190 (1) Crpc is reproduced below:- "190. Cognizance of offence by Magistrate.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- section (2) may take cognizance of any offence - (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence ; (b) upon a police report of such facts ; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. ";