- (1.) HEARD Shri Daya Shankar Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Mahendra Pratap, learned AGA for the State and Shri. J. Lal, learned Counsel appearing for the Union of India.
(2.) VALIDITY of detention order dated 22-12-2000 passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad in exercise of power under sub-section (2) read sub-section (3) of the National Security Act, 1980 and continued detention pursuant thereto is under challenge in this petition under Article 229 of the Constitution of India. The detention is based on solitary incident giving rise case crime No. 229 of 2000 under Sections 307, 284, 223, 504 and 506 I. P. C. police station Cantt. , District Allahabad. According to the prosecution case as set out in the F. I. R. of case crime aforestated, on 27-11-2000 at 11 a. m. the petitioner and his associates, demanded Goonda tax from the contractor, Arjun Kochar and on refusal by the latter, a workman Manjeet was thrown away on the ground from 17th-18th Ft. high roof of the building under construction. The workman Manjeet received injuries. The incident was viewed as one disturbing public order. The sponsoring authority submitted a report for detaining the petitioner under National Security Act. The petitioner was arrested in the above case and the detention order was served on him in Central Jail, Naini on 22-12-2000 and the same was approved by the State Government on 3-12-2000. The representation dated 4-1-2001 received by the District Magistrate on the same day was sent to the State Government on 11-1-2001. It was received by the State Government on 12-1-2001 and 13-1-2001 and 14-1-2001 being holidays the same was considered on 15-1-2001 and rejected by the State Government on 16-1-2001. Copy of the representation was also sent to the Central Government where it was received on 17-1-2001 and rejected on 18-1-2001. The first ground on which Shri Daya Shankar Mishra has challenged the detention order is that there was no cogent material before detaining authority on the basis of which he could reach the requisite satisfaction that the petitioner could repeat the prejudicial activity in future. Learned Counsel submits that the detention order was passed on the basis of a solitary incident and in absence of any cogent material showing that there was a likelihood of the petitioner repeating such incident in future, it stands vitiated by error of law. Shri Mahendra Pratap submits that the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority to the effect that there was likelihood that the petitioner could repeat the prejudicial activity in future was based on cogent material, namely, report submitted by the sponsoring authority. It is submitted by Shri Mahendra Pratap that the nature of incident on which the detention order is based and the manner in which the offence was committed also lead to a reasonable inference that there were every likelihood of the petitioner repeating the prejudicial activity disturbing the public order. The petitioner was in jail and it is not disputed that in case of satisfaction of detaining authority as to likelihood of the petitioner is repeating the prejudicial activity on being released from jail is vitiated, the order of detention will also be vitiated. In Dharmendra Sugan Chandra Chelawat v. Union of India, 1990 (1) SCC 746: 1990 (1) JIC 396 (SC); the Supreme Court has held that for the validity of the detention order against a person in custody, it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show firstly, that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in detention and secondly, that there were "compelling reasons" justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu was already in detention. The expression `compelling reasons'. it was further observed by the Apex Court in the context for a person already in custody, implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which he may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likelihood to be released from custody in near future and (b) taking into account the nature of antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.
(3.) IN Debu Mahto v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974, 816, it has been held that a solitary act attributed to a person can form the basis for reaching the satisfaction that he might repeat such acts in future and in order to prevent him from doing so it is necessary to detain him. It was, however, observed: "such past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. But whatever it be, it must be of such a nature that an interference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned could be likely to repeat such acts so as to warrant his detention. It may be easier to draw such an inference where there is a series of acts evincing a curse of conduct but even if there is a single act, such inference may justifiably be drawn in a given case. " In a Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 15473 of 1996, Sunil Tyagi v. State of U. P. and others, decided on 10-1-1997 aforestated cases were considered and it was held that an order of detention can be passed on solitary act if the act is of such nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the concerned person can repeat such an act so as to warrant such detention.;