- (1.) THE respondents Nos. 3 and 4 filed S. C. C. Suit No. 22 of 1997 against the petitioners in the Court of Judge Small Causes Court, Meerut for eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent. THE eviction was sought alleging that the premises in suit was constructed in the year 1990. THE suit having been filed in the year 1997, the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 does not apply to the premises in suit. THE suit for eviction as well as for recovery of arrears of rent was decreed by Judge Small Causes Court, Meerut on 18-7-1998 by judgment, Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition. Aggrieved by it the petitioners preferred S. C. C. revision No. 375 of 1998, which have been dismissed by respondent No. 1 on 30-3-1999 by judgment, Annexure No. 9 to the writ petition. Aggrieved by the orders, the petitioners have preferred this writ petition invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the request that both the orders, Annexures Nos. 8 and 9 to the writ petition be quashed and the suit of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 be dismissed with costs.
(2.) I have heard Sri K. K. Arora, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri R. K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4. The first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the father of respondent No. 4 is posted as District Judge and respondent No. 3 is his mother. That taking undue advantage of the position the decree has been obtained in hot haste. That the adjournment application moved by the petitioners was rejected and the matter was decided by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court without providing opportunity to the petitioners to produce the evidence and hearing. The copy of the order sheet has also been filed in support of the argument, which is Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition. It is contended that the order sheet shows that on 16-7-1998 the petitioners moved the application for adjournment on the ground of his illness. That the case was adjourned only for one day and 17-7-1998 was fixed though the petitioner No. 2 was ill. That on 17-7-1998 the petitioners again moved an application for adjournment on the same ground. The application was also supported by the medical certificate, even then the application was rejected. That proper opportunity of hearing was not granted and the suit was decided in hot haste under the pressure of the respondents. I have considered the arguments. It is admitted that in this case that fifteen adjournments were granted to the petitioners by the trial Court. It is no doubt true that short adjournments were granted. However, it was a small cause matter and should have been decided expeditiously. No prejudice can be presumed for the reason that short adjournments were granted.
(3.) IT is also true that application for adjournment was moved by the petitioners on 16-7-1998 on the ground of illness which was supported by medical certificate. Even then the case was adjourned for day only. However, on 17-7-1998 again the application for adjourment was filed with the medical certificate of the same doctor. The respondents also produced the medical certificate of the same doctor from which it became apparent that the doctor is in the habit of issuing false medical certificates. The medical certificate was therefore not relied. IT is contended by Sri K. K. Arora, learned counsel for the petitioners that if one wrong medical certificate was given it does not mean that the other medical certificate was also false. This principle of law is correct and no such presumption can be taken. However, when the evidence was brought that the doctor whose medical certificate has been filed also issued a false medical certificate, the court is justified in rejecting such medical certificate. In the circumstances, no illegality was committed by refusing to grant adjournment. This matter was considered by the revisional Court in great detail and he expressed the opinion that sufficient opportunity of hearing was given. After considering the arguments, I am of the view that the judgment of the Court below cannot be quashed for the reason that proper opportunity of hearing was not given.;