D.S.SINHA, J. - (1.) HEARD Shri Vinay Malviya, learned Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. appearing for the respondent-applicants, and Shri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioner-opposite party.
(2.) THE petitioner-opposite party filed the Writ Petition No. 680 (Tax) of 1987 under Article 226 of the Constitu­tion of India challenging the order dated 2nd June, 1987 passed by the Divisional Level Committee, the respondent No. 2, constituted under Sec­tion 4-A of the U.P. Sales-tax Act, 1948 (now rechristened as U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948), hereinafter called the Act, whereby its application for grant of ex­emption under Section 4-A the Act was rejected. This Court vide its order and judgment dated 14th October, 1987 al­lowed the petition and quashed the im­pugned order dated 2nd June, 1987, and directed that the application of the petitioner-opposite party be recon­sidered and fresh order thereon be passed within one month of the date on which a certified copy of the order was placed before the respondent No. 2. The respondent-applicants have filed instant review application, 2 years and 337 days beyond the period of limitation, drawing attention of the Court to the fact that Section 4-A of the Act has been amended by U.P. Ordinance No. 26 of 1991 with retrospective effect, and that Clause 22 of the said Ordinance permits the ag­grieved party to move for review of the decision of any Court or authority in the light of the amended Section 4-A of the Act. On this premise, the applicants seek review of the judgment of the Court dated 14th October, 1987 deciding the Writ Peti­tion No. 680 (Tax) of 1987.
(3.) THERE is nothing on record before the Court to suggest that the direction of the Court for deciding the application of the petition-opposite party afresh within one month of the production of the certified copy of the order, had not been com­plied with by the respondent No. 2 and the proceedings in pursuance of the direction of this Court were pending either on the date of introduction of the Ordinance or on the date of moving instant review ap­plication; or they are still pending. Thus, it would be reasonable to presume that proceedings must not be lingering on for all this period of over thirteen years, and must have concluded.;