Amerendra Nath Verma, J. - (1.) A decision of this Court in the case of Satna Cement Works v. The Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad and another reported in 1985 AWC 165 and a few decisions of the Supreme Court conclude the controversy raised in this case. The short question is whether octroi imposed by the Nagar Mahapalika is leviable on the stocks of steel bars and iron slab and cutting, etc. which, according to the petitioners, enter the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, only in transit enroute the various points of destination situate outside the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika. At identical controversy arising in respect of the trade of cement came up for consideration before this Court in the above case. That pronouncement, in our opinion, furnishes a complete answer to the question arising in this case.
(2.) WE may straightaway extract Section 172 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (the "Act" for the short hereafter), upon a true and proper construction of which the fate of this case hinges. It provides : "172. Taxes to be imposed under this Act- (2) In addition to the taxes specified in sub-section (1) the Mahapalika may for the purposes of this Act and the subject to the provisions thereof impose any of the followieg taxes, namely, (a) an octroi on goods or animals brought within the city for consumption, use or sale therein ; Provided that octroi on goods under cl. (b) and a tax under cl. (c) shall not be levied at the same time. It will thus be seen that for the incidence and attraction of octroi on goods two elements must be present : (i) whether the goods sought to be taxed were meant for consumption, use or sale within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika. (ii) the goods should be 'brought within'. We will, therefore, examine the issue arising in the case in the light of these two factors.
(3.) HAVING set out the outlines of the legal controversy raised by the parties we revert to the essential facts. The various petitioners are iron and steel dealers and commission agents having their offices within the territorial limits of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. In the course of the trade they buy iron and steel ginders, bars, 'T' iron, slab and cuttings etc from the Steel Authority of India (the 'SAIL'). They take delivery of these items from the godown of the SAIL at Naini which is situate outside the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika on Mirzapur Road and is about one kilometer from the octroi post of the Nagar Mahapalika. When the petitioners bring any goods for sale, use or consumption within the territorial limits of the Nagar Mahapalika they claim that the same are subjected to octroi at the octroi post and there is no dispute about it between the parties. In addition to such sales the petitioners assert that they also export the iron and steel goods purchased by them to destinations outside the limits of Nagar Mahapalika. The petitioners claim that against such orders they make the supplies directly from the SAILS godown at Naini to those points of destination. Accordingly they lift the requisite quantity of goods from the SAIL'S godown and load them on trucks at that very place for being transported to destinations outside the limits of Nagar Mahapalika. Such consignments enter the Mahapalika through the Mahapalikas octroi barrier at one end and without stopping within the limits of Mahapalika they pass through the outer barrier at the other end at the exit point and thereafter the trucks continue their onward journey to destinations outside Allahabad. On these facts, the petitioners contend that the goods passing through Allahabad in the course of such journeys are not liable to be subjected to octroi as they are not 'brough within' the city. Merely passing through the limits of Mahapalika in the course of their onward journeys, it was argued, could not, by any stretch, be construed as the goods having been 'brought within' the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika. The submission is completely covered by the decision of this Court in Satna Cement Works' case (supra). In the Satna Cement Works case the petitioners had challenged the levy of octroi on the cement which was stocked in a village outside the limits of the Mahapalika on the ground that the cement entered the limits of Nagar Mahapalika only in transit in the course of journey to places outside the limits of Allahabad and consequently it could not be subjected to octroi as the entry into the Nagar Mahapalika could not, in those circumstances, be treated as an entry for the purpose of consumption, use or sale, within the limits of the Mahapalika. The contention was upheld by this Court. Honourable N. D. Ojha, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Court, stated the law thus : "It is admitted that the said cement enters within the limits of the Nagar Mahapalika the aforesaid octroi barrier, even though only for going out through the octroi barrier at the other end on its onward journey to village Dubrajpur and it cannot be disputed that if the aforesaid entry satisfies the requirement of the goods being 'brought within' as contemplated by Section 172 (2) (b) of the Act the levy of octroi will be vaid. The crucial question, therefore, which falls for consideration is the true import and interpretation of the aforesaid two words 'brought within'. In Burma Shell Co. v. Belguam Municipality, AIR 1963 SC 906 it was held in paragraph 21 of the report that the true concept of octroi included the bringing in of the goods in local area so that the goods came to a repose there. The word 'repose' used by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid expression according to dictionary, inter alia, means 'rest, quiet, stillness' and the word 'there' obviously means within the limits of the local area concerned. In Town Municipal Council v. Urmilla Kothari, AIR 1977 SC 873, it was held that if goods are carried In trucks which merely pass through the areas which lie within the municipal limits and are not unloaded add reloaded at any place within the municipal area the important element of repose and rest which the words 'brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation' in Section 124 of the Karnatak Municipalities Act, 1964 imply is absent. It is further held that in such a case as the continuity or continuation process of the carriage of goods is not in any way in fact broken within the municipal limits it cannot be said that the goods were brought in or exported as contemplated by Section 124 aforesaid. Before octroi can, therefore, be levied on goods under Section 172 (2) (b) of the Act the journey of the goods after being brought within the limits of a Nagar Mahapalika should break within the said limits and the said goods should lie there in a state of rest, quiet or stillness for 'consumption, use or sale therein'. The view taken by it in the case of Burma Shell Co. (supra) was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal Thakaralal v. Broach Municipality, AIR 1976 SC 1446." ;