M. M. LAL, J. - (1.) In this writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed that the letters dated December, 15, 1988 and January 4, 1990, issued by the Commissioner, Sales Tax, may be quashed. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel at some length at the stage of admission we propose to dispose of this writ petition finally. Vide letter dated December 15, 1988, copy of which is annexure No. 2 to this petition, the Commissioner of Sales Tax brought to the notice of Deputy Commissioners/joint Directors/sales Tax Officers, etc. , a judgment dated July 29, 1985 of honourable Supreme Court reported in [1985] 60 STC 80; 1985 UPTC 1141 (Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner) in which it was held that the coconut with or without husk was neither fresh fruit nor vegetable and desired them to act accordingly. Vide second letter dated January 4, 1990, copy of which is annexure No. 3 to the petition, Commissioner of Sales Tax, after referring to his aforesaid letter dated December 15, 1988, informed the aforesaid officers the decision of the Government taken after considering the representations made by the various business organisations that the sales tax due on the sale of coconut up to December 14, 1988, with penalty and interest shall not be realised and that the said sales tax shall be realised only after the said date. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that because coconut containing water was a fresh fruit hence the same was exempt from payment of sales tax. It may be noted that under section 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the State Government is empowered to exempt any goods from the payment of sales tax by issuing a notification to that effect. Exercising the said power conferred by said section 4, the State Goverment on March 31, 1956, issued a notification, copy of which is annexure No. 1 to the petition, by which among other articles "fresh fruits and green vegetables" were exempted from payment of sales tax. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the State Government had exempted fresh fruit from the payment of sales tax and also when coconut containing water was a fresh fruit the same could not be taxed. In our opinion the said argument is devoid of force. It is well-settled that when an assessee claims exemption he has to adduce material on the basis of which it may be said that a particular article is exempted and if he cannot or if he fails to do so then the Revenue has to proceed on that basis. It is also equally well-settled that in interpreting items in statutes, like Sales Tax Act, resort should be had not to the scientific and the technical meaning of the terms or expressions but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. If any term or expression is defined in the statute then it must be understood as per the said definition but in the absence of any such definition the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted. In this case neither the term fresh fruit nor the term coconut has been defined in the enactment. No material has been produced before us to the effect that coconut with husk which is sold in this part of the country is treated as fresh fruit by those who deal in the said commodity. Anyway, the point as to whether or not coconut with or without husk was a "fresh fruit" or "vegetable" came for consideration before the Supreme Court in [1985] 60 STC 80; 1985 UPTC 1141 (Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner) and it was decided that coconut with or without husk was neither "fresh fruit" nor "vegetable" so as to earn exemption from levy of tax. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that the said case which came before the honourable Supreme Court was from Tamil Nadu but the present case relates to U. P. where situation is different. We find no merit in this argument because both in Tamil Nadu and in U. P. "fresh fruits" and "green vegetables" are exempt from payment of sales tax and the point which was before the honourable Supreme Court and which is also before us is the same, i. e. , whether coconut with or without husk is fresh fruit or green vegetable and when it has been decided by the Supreme Court that coconut with or without husk was not a fresh fruit we are bound by the said decision. It may not, however, be out of place to state here that it is a well-known fact that whereas in Tamil Nadu green coconuts are sold but as against the same coconuts which are sold in U. P. are with husk. In our opinion coconut with husk cannot be said to be "fresh fruit" in any view of the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to us [1979] 43 STC 429 (All); 1978 UPTC 698 (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kedari Lal Barsaiya), in which it was observed that "kachcha naryal" is fresh fruit and is exempt under Notification dated March 31, 1956. That judgment rendered by a single Judge is no longer good law in view of the opinion, expressed by the Supreme Court in [1985] 60 STC 80; 1985 UPTC 1141 (Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner), which is directly on the point and hence binding on us. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged before us that the liability to pay sales tax can be imposed by issuing a notification by the State Government and that the said liability could not be fastened by the aforesaid letters circulated by the Commissioner, Sales Tax. In this respect he has referred to us [1989] 72 STC 424 (All.); 1988 UPTC 1232 (Hindustan Reprographics Ltd. v. State of U. P.) in which a reference has been made to section 4 (29-A) of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904, which defines "notification" as "notification published in the Gazette of the State". There can be no dispute that in exercise of powers conferred under section 3-A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act the State Government can fix or modify the rate or point of sales tax. The said power cannot be exercised by the Commissioner, Sales Tax. In this case the Commissioner, Sales Tax, has obviously not exercised any such power. By means of the aforesaid letters the Commissioner, Sales Tax, did not levy sales tax or modify the rate of sales tax on the coconut. In the first letter dated December 15, 1988, the Commissioner, Sales Tax, simply brought to the notice of his subordinate officers the judgment delivered by the honourable Supreme Court in [1985] 60 STC 80; 1985 UPTC 1141 (Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner ). In our opinion even if the Commissioner, Sales Tax, had not brought the said judgment of the Supreme Court to the notice of his subordinate officers, the said officers by virtue of article 141 of the Constitution were bound by the said judgment of the Supreme Court. And by means of second letter dated January 4, 1990, the Commissioner, Sales Tax, conveyed the decision of the State Government by which the relief was given to the dealers that the sales tax payable on coconut up to December 14, 1988, was not to be realised. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted before us that there was no notification by means of which sales tax could be charged on the sale of coconut. This argument is misconceived because by virtue of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 3-A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, the tax is payable by a dealer "on the turnover in respect of goods other than those referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d), at the point of sales by the manufacturer or importer at the rate of 8 per cent". However, when the State Government desires to modify the said rate it is empowered to do so by means of a notification. The State Government has not issued such a notification by which the rate of tax may have been modified. Therefore, under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 3-A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, sales tax is payable at the rate of 8 per cent on coconut, which is obviously not covered by clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of section 3-A. It may be observed that by means of the aforesaid letter dated January 4, 1990, the Commissioner, Sales Tax, informed his subordinate officers that the sales tax was payable on raw coconut at the rate of 8 per cent. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that so far the Sales Tax Department had never realised sales tax from the petitioner on the sale of coconut, that therefore, the petitioner had also not charged any sales tax from his customers and that accordingly if the sales tax is now realised from the petitioner he will be prejudiced to a very great extent. We find no merit in the said argument, firstly because the liability to pay tax does not depend on the fact as to whether a dealer has or has not charged any sales tax from his customers and secondly, the State Government has been very fair. The State Government has taken a decision not to realise any sales tax on the sales of coconut made prior to December 15, 1988, when the aforesaid letter dated December 15, 1988 (annexure No. 2 to the petition) was issued. In view of the observations made above and for the reasons stated we find no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. .;