A.N.Varma, J. - (1.) THE petitioner has assailed the validity of the orders passed by the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, in the purported exercise of powers under Section 3 (2) of the U. P. Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 in respect of premises no. 196, Bagh Kesho Das, Muzaffarnagar.
(2.) THE essential facts are that the petitioner Kunwar Jagdish Prasad (who died during the pendency of the petition and is now represented by his heirs and legal representatives) was the owner of the disputed premises. It is asserted in paragraph 5 of the petition that he suffered losses in various businesses he was carrying on at the relevant time. Consequently he was in the look out of a suitable tenant for the aforesaid premises obviously for augmenting his income. Just at that time he came across an advertisement in a local newspaper, dated April 1, 1977 issued by the Sales Tax Officer, Muzaffarnagar, inviting offers from landlords wilting to rent out accommodation consisting of 12 or more rooms for bousing the Sales Tax Office. In the advertisement, it was stated that the Department was prepared to pay rent at 50 P. per sq. ft. In response to this advertisement the petitioner seat an application to the Sales Tax Officer expressing his willingness to let out the premises mentioned above. In his letter addressed to the Sales Tax Officer he set out his terms. THE petitioner also met the Sales Tax Officer on April 2, 1977 and it is asserted that the latter was prepared to pay rent at the rate of 75 P. per sq. ft Of carpet area provided the petitioner bore ail the taxes. On the advice of the Sales Tax Officer the petitioner sent another application on April 5, 1977 stating that be would let out the premises on a rental of 75 P per sq ft. While the aforesaid negotiations were going on, the petitioner was served with a notice dated April 15, 1977 asking the petitioner to show cause why the disputed premises be not requisitioned under Section 3 (1) (a) of the aforesaid Act for the office of the Sales Tax Department. The petitioner filed his objection against this. Thereafter by his order dated May 26* 1977, the District Magistrate passed a reasoned order rejecting the objections of the petitioner. This order was followed by another order dated May 27, 1977 by the District Magistrate issued under Section 3 (2) stating that the disputed premises were requisitioned for accommodating the office of the Sales Tax Officer. The petitioner should, therefore, deliver possession of the house in question by May 29, 1977 to the District Magistrate through the Sales Tax Officer. The petition is directed against these two orders. Dr. Gyan Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenged the impunged orders on two grounds : (i) that the District Magistrate had no power to requisition the accommodation in view of the first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 which states that no accommodation shall be requisitioned which is bonafide used by the owner thereof as the residence of himself or his family ; (ii) that recourse to sub-section (2) of Section 3 by the District Magistrate was wholly mala fide having been resorted to only to pressurize the petitioner to let out the building in question for the office of the Sales Tax Officer at the rate of rent dictated by the latter.
(3.) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties and given the matter our careful consideration, we find no merit in either of these two contentions. We begin with the first contention. The submission was that the accommodation in question was being used by the petitioner as his residence at the time of the initiation of the requisition proceedings. The District Magistrate could not, therefore, requisition the same in view of the first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3. Sub-section (2) of Section 3, in so far as relevant for our purpose, states : "(2) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or occupier of the accommodation the District Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, he may, by order in writing requisition the accommodation and may make such further orders as appear to him to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning : Provided that no accommodation or part there of- (a) which is bona fide used by the owner thereof as the residence of himself or his family, or (b) which is exclusively used, either for religious worship by the public or as a school, hospital, public library or an orphanage or for the purpose of accommodating persons connected with the management of such place or worship or such school, hospital, library or orphanage, shall be requisitioned". ;