K.P.Singh, J. - (1.) BY means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 18-6- 1988 and the order dated 21-6-1988 contained in Annexures II and III.
(2.) THE petitioner was duly selected for the post of Probationary Officer and was appointed on 9-10-1984 in the scale of Rs. 690-1420. On 6-10- 1987 the petitioner was suspended and was served with a charge sheet. Most of the charges against the petitioner were proved and punishment of reversion from the post of Branch Manager to the post of Field Supervisor was proposed to be imposed on the petitioner as is evident from Annexure II attached with the writ petition. On 21-6-1988 the Chairman issued the punishment order which is contained in Annexure IN attached with the writ petition. It is note-worthy that the petitioner has filed a representation to the Board of Directors on 20-7-1988 as is evident from Annexure IV. THE aforesaid representation was rejected by the Manager, Head Office through his order dated 20-8-1988, contained in Annexure V. In the above-mentioned circumstances the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The main contention raised on behalf of the petitioner before us is to the effect that the petitioner has been reverted to a lower post than the post to which he was appointed. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in AIR 1987 SC 1627 Hussain Sasansaheb Kaladgi v. State of Maharashtra. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the petitioner was guilty of embezzlement, and he was liable to be removed from the service. On the representation of the petitioner to the effect that he was recently married and that he would be ruined if he was altogether removed from the service of the Bank, a lenient view has been taken and the petitioner has been retained in the service of the Bank. The petitioner cannot be permitted to play hide and seek. Once he agreed to the punishment proposed to be awarded, he cannot be heard in the exercise of writ jurisdiction by this Court. In this connection our attention has been drawn to Annexure V-C.A. attached with the counter affidavit. It has also been stressed by the learned counsel for the Bank that if the technical plea raised by the petitioner is aceepted, the Bank should be made free to impose punishment in the light of the charges proved against the petioner as legally permissible. According to the learned counsel for the Bank, the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the punishment when he had agreed to the proposed punishment.
(3.) WE have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. No doubt, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have indicated vide para 2 as below : ".........A direct recruit to a post, it cannot be gain said, cannot be reverted to a lower post. It is only a promotee who can be reverted from the promotion post to the lower post from which he was promoted. These propositions are so elementary that the same are incapable of being disputed and have not been disputed." . Viewing from the angle of the above observations we think that the impugned order of punishment contained in Annexure lit suffers from an error of law but in the facts and circumstances of this case when the petitioner has been found-guilty of embezzlement and serious irregularities we do not consider it a fit case for interference in the exercise of our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The perusal of Annexure C. A. IV indicates the mistakes committed by the petitioner and it has been observed therein as below :- "Uprokt se sabit hota hai ki Shri Vipin Kumar Agrawal ne Shri Amar Singh ko Maukhik Adesh Dekar arop Men vernit Antaran Jamaon ko apne- khate Men jama hone diya evam baad man sway am bhugtan prapt kar khatedaron ko bhugtan kiya..................................................................... Shri Agarwal ne Shri Amar Singh ke kbateko apni ichchbanusar galat tarike se bhugtan karne ka ek madhyara (Tool) banakar karyakiya jo ki Bank ke liye gambhirrup se jokhim ka karan ho sakta tha. Uprokt anusar Shri Vipin Kumar Agarwal dwara yeh galat karya kiya janna sabit hota hai, yah bhi sabit hai ki Shri Vipin Kumar Agarwal dwara apne ansa kaka par dabao dala gaya, Shri Agarwal dwara Ansn. ka. karm. ki sevayen samapt karne ki dhamki diyejane ka arop sakshyon ke abhav men siddha nahin hota." To our mind, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is well know that even if an order is wrong but it is just and equitable, it need not be interfered with by a High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The perusal of annexure C. A. V indicates that the petitioner had accepted to be appointed on the post of Field Supervisor, therefore we do not agree with the technical plea raised by the petitioner in view of the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case. For the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner it is in cumbant upon the petitioner to establish that his conduct is above board and fair. In the present case the petitioner had accepted the proposed punishment, therefore, he cannot be permitted to raise a technical plea. In this connection our attention has been drawn to paras 5 to 9 of the counter affidavit of Shri K. N. Mehrotra which indicated that the petitioner was guilty of embezzlement and various other irregularities and could be removed from the Bank's service altogether. Therefore, if the Bank has accepted the request of the petitioner to retain him in its service, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise a legal plea in writ jurisdiction, specially when his conduct is unbecoming in deceiving the authorities in passing the order of punishment. Moreover, if the work of the petitions? is found satisfactory and he wins the confidence of the Bank authorities, he may be posted as Branch Manager from the post to which he has been reverted as is evident from the averments in the counter affidavit. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders in the present case at the instance of the petitioner.;