R.K.Gulati - (1.) THIS is an application under Section 12 of the contempt of court Act, 1971. The prayer is that the Opposite Party No. 1 and 2 are liable to be punished for having shown disobedience to the order of this court dated 2-1-1989 passed in Writ Petition No. 13053 of 1987, Sri Pankaj Singh v. Labour Commissioner, U. P. and others. The order dated 2-1-1989 was to the following effect :- "Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel and Mr. J. N. Tewari, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4, we direct the respondent nos. 1 and 2 to make appointments on the posts of Class III and Class IV In future strictly, from the select list, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-I to the writ petition without disturbing the respondent no. 4". THIS application for contempt has been filed on the assertion that the opposite parties nave made appointment of two persons outside the select list, since after the above order was passed.
(2.) IN reply to the show cause notice, the opposite parties have filed their respective defence by tiling separate counter affidavits. IN the counter affidavit tiled by Attar Singh, the defence taken Is that the order dated 2-1-1989 passed in the writ petition was never served on him nor he had any knowledge of the same before 11th January, 1989. The appointments of two persons of which reference is made in the contempt application, were made before the deponent came to know of the order passed by this court. Under these circumstances, it is claimed that there was no willful disobedience on his part so as to warrant any action for contempt. In the rejoinder affidavit the aforesaid facts are not refuted. What has been stated in reply is that the opposite parties must be presumed to have knowledge of the directions contained in the order dated 2-1-1969 passed in the writ petition, inasmuch as, they were represented through their counsel at the time when the writ petition was decided. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant I am not satisfied that any case for contempt is made out. The argument that the opposite parties were represented through their counsel and they must they must be presumed to have the knowledge of the order which is alleged to have been violated, is of no assistance to the applicant.
(3.) IN order to constitute a contempt within the meaning of Section 2 of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971, the disobedience must be wilful. Clause (b) of Section 2 says "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or a wilful breach of undertaking given to a court. Where the contempt powers are sought to be INvoked it must be established that the contemner is liable for breach of injunction or similar orders. The Courts will be reluctant to to exercise their powers, and will do so only in the clearest cases, namely, where an offender having had proper notice of the order, has been shown beyond all reasonable doubt to have committed the contempt. IN civil contempt as is evident from Section 2 (b), the emphasis is laid on the disobedience being wilful. IN other words, every infraction of the courts order does not amount to contempt of court. It is only a wiiful and deliberate violation of the Court's order and contumacious conduct on the part of the contemner which is to be condemned in the contempt proceedings. In Jiwani Kumari v. Satyabrata Chakravorty, 1990 (2) ARC 521, the Supreme Court has laid down that before a party can be committed for contempt, there must be a wilful or deliberate disobedience of the orders of the Court. Where no such wilful, or deliberate, or reckless disobedience of order in made out, the application for contempt is to be dismissed.;