OM PRAKASH, J. - (1.) This is a revision against the Tribunal's order dated 22nd July, 1989. The appeal was dismissed in limine by the Tribunal on the ground that the same was belatedly filed. The delay was of six months and 28 days. The case of the applicant was that he was advised by his counsel to file the writ petition challenging the order passed by the Commissioner cancelling the eligibility certificate under section 4a (3) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 and that is why no appeal was filed within time. It is further contended that later when the counsel for the applicant met another counsel, then he was advised to file an appeal and thereupon the applicant who was so advised, filed the appeal before the Tribunal. The latter rejected the contention of the applicant observing : " Again the fact of bona fide belief and being misled by the aforesaid advice of the counsel have not been supported by way of an affidavit. Actually no affidavit has been filed on the part of the appellant in support of the fact as mentioned in the application for condonation of delay. As such we are of the considered judicial opinion that the appellant was not misled by developing a bona fide belief in respect of not chasing the forum of appeal under section 10 of the Act No. 15 of 1948. . . . . . . . . . . " The counsel for the applicant argued that alongwith the application for condonation of delay, a certificate of Sri Rajesh Kumar, advocate, dated 23rd October, 1988, advising Sri N. K. Jain, representative of the applicant to file appeal, was filed. From these facts, it is clear that the applicant was earlier advised to file the writ petition challenging the impugned order passed under section 4-A (3) and, therefore, no appeal was filed. It is only later when the applicant was advised by his representative to file the appeal, steps were taken to file the appeal and the delay was to be condoned on that count. To establish as to why the decision was taken to file the appeal at a belated stage, a certificate from the counsel who advised the applicant to file appeal was also filed. On these facts, it cannot be said that the applicant had had no bona fide belief that there was no need to file the appeal because he was advised by his representative to file the writ petition which is in fact, filed following advice of the counsel. It was also argued by the Standing Counsel that when the writ petition was filed, the applicant cannot be permitted to avail two remedies, i. e. , filing the writ petition and the appeal together. I do not see any force in this contention. The appeal is a statutory remedy and that can be exercised as a matter of right, whereas filing the writ petition under article 226 is a discretionary remedy which may be refused by the court, if a party has an alternative statutory remedy of appeal. So the right to file appeal if given by the statute, cannot be taken away simply because a writ petition was filed. It is stated by the applicant's counsel that the writ petition has not yet been admitted. If the appeal is entertained, then the writ petition may not be admitted on the ground of the right to appeal being exercised by the applicant. Lastly, it was argued that when no affidavit was given by the applicant, the application for condonation of delay could not have been legally accepted. The purpose of filing the affidavit along with application is only to ensure the correctness of the averments made in the application, but that does not mean that the application in no case can be accepted, if not accompanied by an affidavit. In this case the proof by way of certificate obtained from the counsel was filed and there is not reason to disbelieve that evidence and, therefore, I see not good reason to refuse the condonation of delay. The revision is, therefore, allowed. The Tribunal's order dated 22nd July, 1989, is set and the Tribunal is directed to entertain the appeal and decide the same on merits. No order as to costs. Revision petition allowed. .;