K. P. Singh, J. - (1.) This writ petition is directed against the judgment of M. S. Haq, I. A. S. , Member, Board of Revenue dated 22-9-1972 whereby the defendant's second appeals were allowed. The plaintiff petitioner had filed a suit for partition under Section 176 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and had claimed half share in the disputed pro perty. The claim of the plaintiff-petitioner was contested by the defendants-opposite parties and they had alleged in the alternative that the plaintiff was not entitled to more than 1/4 share in the disputed land. The Trial Court through its judgment dated 9th March 1968 allotted 3/8th share to the plaintiff in the disputed property. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court both the parties preferred appeals which were decided by the appellate Court through its judgment dated 23rd November, 1968 (Annexure "' attached to the writ petition ). The appellate Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to half share claimed in the plots of both the suits hence it allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate Court the defendants opposite parties preferred two appeals which were allowed by the second appellate Court through its impugned judgment dated 22nd September, 1972. The second appellate Court has found that the plaintiff-petitioner is entitled to only 3/8 share in sir plots and he is entitled to 1/4 share in khudkast plots. The plaintiff-petitioner being aggrieved by the judgment of the second appellate Court has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not disputed before me that the ancestors of the parties in the suits were entitled to half share in the khewat. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the ancestors of the parties are not descendants of a common ancestor, hence the parties do not constitute one family. According to him when the petitioner's ancestor was entitled to half share originally in sir plots, hence on the death of Mst. Abhiraji, the contesting opposite parties cannot get larger share in the sir plots. The share of Mst. Abhiraji shall be inherited by the plaintiff-petitioner and the claim of the contesting opposite parties based on a compromise in mutation Court is wholly untenable and that the second appellate Court has patently erred in upsetting the judgment of the appellate Court and recognizing the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the basis of the compromise in mutation case. Secondly he has contended that in khudkast land the second appellate Court has patently erred in fixing 1/4 share of the petitioner on the basis of revenue entries. He has emphasised that three persons of the other branch were recorded as khudkast holders whereas the plaintiff alone of his branch was recorded along with three other persons of the other branch, hence he was entitled to the khudkast property on the basis of the pedigree and fixation of 1/4 share by the second appellate Court in khudkast land is patently erroneous in the circum stances of the present case. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that the second appellate Court has recorded findings of fact on the appraisal of evidence in the case, hence the aforesaid findings are not amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel for ths contesting opposite parties the compromise in mutation case should be treated as a family settlement and since the share of the plaintiff petitioner was indicated as 6/16 in the aforesaid compromise, hence the second appellate Court was fully justified in fixing 3/8 share of the petitioner in sir plots. He has also contended that according to the revenue entries only four persons were recorded as khudkast holders of some of the plots, hence in those plots the petitioner's share was rightly fixed as 1/4 and there was no other evidence to indicate that the plaintiff petitioner should get more than the share allotted by the second appellate Court. He has very much emphasised that the plaintiff-petitioner being a co-sharer in the khewat cannot claim larger share in the khudkast plots on the basis of his share in the khewat. Khudkast right is acquired by cultivating the land by the proprietors, hence when there was nothing to fix the share of the plaintiff petitioner in khudkast plots the second appellate Court rightly based its conclusion on the basis or revenue entries. During the course of argument the learned counsel for the contesting parties emphasised that the term "family" is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons whom the law recognises as having right of succession or having claim to a share in the disputed property and in this connection he has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Ram Charan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi and others, A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 323. He has also placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Kaley and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1976 (3)8. C. C. 119 and has contended that 'family' has to be construed widely and it should not be confined to people having legal title to the property. In short the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has emphasised that the compromise between the parties ancestors in a mutation Court should be treated as a family settlement and that the findings recorded by the second appellate Court should not be interfered with in the circumstances of the present case. Copy of the compro mise in mutation Court has not been filed in the present writ case. It is not disputed before me that the parties to the suit are not descendants of a common ancestor, hence the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in both the cases did not apply to the facts of the present case nor the observations support the contentions raised on behalf of the contesting opposite parties. In the former case reported in Ram Charan Das v. Girja Devi and others, (Supra) it has been emphasised that: "courts give effect to a family settlement upon broad and general grounds that its object is to settle existing or future dispute regarding property amongst members of a family. " (Italicising is mine ). The consideration for a family settlement is the expectation that a stage of settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and good-will amongst the relations. " Similarly in the latter case reported in Kaley and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (Supra) it has been observed as below:- "by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement, members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and good-will in the family. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties originating in mistake or ignorance of facts as to what their rights actually are or all the points on which their rights actually depend. The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strife's which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. " From the above I think that the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court would apply to a family settlement where the descendants of a common ancestor are involved. In the present case it has not been established that the parties belong to a family, hence the compromise in mutation Court cannot be treated as a family settlement. The disputes settled through a compromise in a mutation Court between the co-sharers not members of a family cannot be put at par with a family settlement. In my opinion the compromise in mutation Court against legal shares between the co-sharers who are not members of a family cannot be treated as a family settlement. It is well known that admissions on question of law can be demonstrated as erroneous and in that circumstance it should be ignored and the rights of the parties should be determined in accordance with law. Since the contesting opposite parties were not at all related to Mst. Abhiraji whereas the plaintiff was a collateral of Mst. Abhiraji's husband; the latter alone could succeed to her share and the contesting opposite parties cannot claim any right in sir plots belonging to Mst. Abhiraji wherein I have indicated that I think that the second appellate Court and the Trial Court have patently erred in determining the share of the plaintiff-petitioner in sir plots by placing reliance upon the compromise in mutation Court. As regards khudkast plots it is no doubt true that the plaintiff was recorded with three persons of the branch of the contesting opposite parties, but as the plaintiff had half share in khewat it is not clear how the khudkast plots were acquired by the parties. If the parti or uncultivated land is brought under cultivation by four proprietors and they are recorded as khudkast holders it may be that all the proprietors would get equal share; but if a proprietor acquires khudkast right in representative capacity, then the share of the proprietors would be determined in the light of the pleading and evidence on record. In the present case the ancestor of the plaintiff-petitioner who had been recorded In the khewat was entitled to half share and in sir plots the plaintiff is entitled to half share, as I have indicated above, I do not think that the plaintiff's claim in khudkast land can be fixed to l/4th share on the basis of recent revenue entries alone. In this connection it is proper that the attention of the second appellate Court should be. drawn to the ruling reported in Prabhu Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1979 R. D. 158 as well as to the ruling reported in Chandra Bhaskar Tiwari v. Deputy Director of Consolidation Deoria and others, 1979 A. L. J. 1063 wherein I have indicated that to determine the shares of the parties in sir and khudkast land it is necessary that the pleadings of the parties and the evidence with regard to acquisition of cultivatory right in the disputed land may be properly valued and then the share should be deter mined. In the present case the defence case with regard to plaintiff's share in sir plots fails, hence it is necessary to reexamine the pleadings and evidence on record to determine the share of the plaintiff-petitioner in khudkast plots in accordance with law and legal evidence on record. I have a feeling that the second appellate Court has committed an error in determining the plaintiff's share in khudkast plots without referring to this pleadings and evidence on record. If in khewat and sir plots the plaintiff-petitioner is entitled to half share, there should be cogent reasons to indicate why the plaintiff-petitioner may not get half share in khudkast plots. In fixing plaintiff's share in khudkast land it is in the ends of justice that the pleadings and evidence on record should be re-examined. For the reasons given above the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the section appellate Court dated 22-9-1972 whereby the second appeals filed by the defendants opposite parties were allowed is hereby quashed and the second appellate Court is directed to re-examine the claim of the plaintiff-petitioner with regard to khudkast plots in the light of the observations made above and the plaintiff-petitioner's share should be fixed as half in sir plots. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. .;