A. N. Varma, J. - (1.) This petition is directed against two orders, one passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad dated 24. 8. 1978 allotting the premises in dispute to the respondents Nos. 3 and 5, and the other 4. 4. 1979 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dismissing the revision filed by the petitioners against the former order. The facts relevant for the determination of the case as found by the Courts below are that an accommodation bearing No. 68 Akhara Man Khan Allahabad, of seven rooms, was allotted to Sudhir Chandra Buxi, the respondent No. 5 herein, by an order of allotment dated 30. 1. 1979. Sub sequently, Sudhir Chandra Buxi let out three rooms to Rajendra Nath Tewari, petitioner No. 1, and two rooms to Mahendra Prasad Srlvastava, petitioner No. 2. It has been found that the subletting by Sudhir Chandra Buxi was with the consent of the landlord. The subletting in the case of both the petitioners took place prior to the coming into force of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 ). Years later, Naresh Chandra, respondent No. 3 filed an application for allotment of the afore said premises by means of an application dated 31. 8. 1976 on the ground that the premises were liable to be deemed vacant under Section 12 (1) (b) of the aforesaid Act in as much as the tenant-in-chief Sudhir Chandra Buxi had sublet the premises to the petitioners, who were not the members of his family. Upon this application, an inquiry was caused to be made into the question whether or not, there was a deemed vacancy. The Rent Control Inspector submitted a report which confirmed the aforesaid facts. On the receipt of the report, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the premises occupied by the petitioners vacant by an order dated 19. 12. 1977 and the notice regarding the same was issued to the petitioners. In response to the notice, the petitioners filed objections stating that they were in occupation of the premises with the consent of the landlord as his tenants. It was further claimed by the petitioners on the basis of these facts that in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the aforesaid, the petitioners were liable to be deemed to be in lawful occupation of the premises as authorised tenants thereto. The building in question was, therefore, not liable to be deemed to be vacant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that the petitioners were not tenants directly from the landlord but they were sub-tenants of Sudhir Chandra Buxi and that in as much as the petitioners were not members of the family of Sudhir Chandra Buxi, the premises were liable to be deemed vacant under Section 12 (1) (b) of the said Act. That being so, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order dated 24. 8. 78 allotting the premises to respondent No. 3. Against the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the petitioners filed a revision but without any success. Hence this writ petition. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if it be assumed that the petitioners were sub-tenants, and not tenants directly from the owner and landlord of the premises, on the finding that the occupation of the petitioners or their continuance as sub-tenants had the consent of the owner and landlord, the petitioners were entitled to be deemed to be authorised tenants of the premises under Section 14 of the Act. Counsel for the respondent-allottee on the other hand urged that on the finding that the petitioners had been inducted into the premises by the tenant-in-chief without the permission of the District Magistrate and on the further finding that the petitioners were not the members of the family of the tenant-in- chief, the premises were liable to be deemed vacant under Section 12 (1) (b ). It was submitted that the acceptance of the argument of the learned counset for the petitioners would lead to an anomalous position. For on the one head, the premises will be liable to be deemed vacant under Section 12 (I) (b) of the Act, and on the other hand, their occupation would be deemed to have been regularised under Section 14 of the Act. Before I deal with the rival contentions mentioned above, I may observe that the learned counsel for the petitioners fairly conceded that it was not possible to challenge the finding recorded by both the Courts below that the petitioners were in occupation as subtenants of Sudhir Chandra Buxi, and not directly the for owner and landlords. Having given the matter a careful thought seems to me that the contention raised by the clear counsel for the petitioners is well founded. His reliance in support of his submission on a decision this Court in the case of Kripa Ram v. Additional District Judge, Meerut (1976 A. W. C (Sic) ). In that case, the relevant facts were that Dayal was the owner and landlord of the premises. He let them out to one Manohar Lal. Manohar Lal in his turn let out the premises to Kirpa Ram. Manohar Lal died on 28. 2. 74. Upon the death of Manohar Lal, Rameshwar Dayal filed an application for the release of the premises under Section 16 (1) of the aforesaid U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground that the sole tenant was dead and that the occupation of Kirpa Ram after the death of Manohar Lal having become unauthorised, the premises were liable to be deemed to be vacant. The learned Judge overruled the contention of Rameshwar Dayal on two grounds. First, he held that having regard to the provisions of Transfer of Property Act upon the death of the tenant-in-chief, Kirpa Ram, the sub tenant acquired the right to continue in possession of the property, so long as the original lease continued, as a losses directly from the owner and landlord. He was entitled to hold the building under tenancy on the same terms and conditions as the original lessee or the tenant-in-chief. The second ground was founded on Section 14 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The learned Judge held that in as much as the sub-tenant was in occupation of the premises on the coming into force of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 with the consent of the owner and landlord, he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. The learned Judge held that the occupation of the sub-tenant was liable to have been regularised under Section 14 of the Act. The learned Judge applied the provisions of Section 14 of the Act to the case, even though Kirpa Ram was only a sub-tenant in occupation of the building, though with the consent of the landlord on the date of the coming into force of the aforesaid Act. The facts of the aforesaid case are in pari materia with the facts of the present case. The ratio of the above case squarely covers the controversy of the present case. I am in agreement with the view expressed by K. C. Agrawal, J. in the aforesaid decision that Section 14 of the Act was enacted for the regularisation of possession of tenants in occupation of the building under tenancy where the occupation had the consent of the landlord. To my mind, Section 14 was enacted for the purpose of regularisation of the relationships which would be otherwise perfectly lawful, but for the absence of a permission from the District Magistrate or an order of allotment. Now the Transfer of Property Act expressly recognizes the right of a lessee to sublet. The Rent Control Acts operating in this State merely ought to place some fetters on that right. However, neither in the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. III of 1947), nor in U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 there was any absolute prohibition against subletting. The only requirement both under the predecessor Act and the present Act was or is that a written permission of the District Magistrate was necessary In the absence of Section 14, the occupation of subtenants or tenant would have been liable to be deemed unauthorised (see Sections 11 and 13 of the present Act ). The Legislature, therefore, intervened and enacted Section 14. A non-obstante Clause was used in Section 14 emphasising the inten tion of the Legislature. It is obvious that an exception was granted in the Act seeking to protect all such relationships which, but for that pro vision, would have been struck down as unauthorised. I am, therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by K. C. Agrawal J. in the aforesaid decision that under such circumstances, the benefit of Section 14 ought to be available even to sub-tenants who were inoccupation of the building under tenancy on the relevant date with the consent of the landlord. In support of his submission, counsel for the petitioners also relied on the definition of the term 'tenant' in the Act as laid down in Section 3 (a) of the Act. Counsel contended that having regard to the object and purpose of Section 14 of the Act, the subtenant delay falls within the defini tion of the term tenant' as defined in the Act, as sub-tenant is a person by whom rent is payable though to the tenant-in-chief. Section 3 (a) does seem to lend support to the contention. There is nothing in the context of Section 14 which may persuade to not to give a contrary meaning to the term (tenant) from that assigned to it by section 3 (a ). If anything, the context of under-lying purpose of Section 14 fully warrants that we should give to the word tenant the simple meaning assigned to it by Section 3 (a) as including a sub tenant also. The language of Section 14 also points to the same conclusion. It reads thus: - "14. Regularisation of occupation of existing tenants. Notwithstand ing anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2-A) or a tenant occupation of a building with the consent of landlord immediately shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of such bulding " It speaks of 'a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord' I find no warrant, upon the plain terms of the section, to limit the operation of the Act only to tenants of the owners. I see no distinction between tenants and sub-tenants in the context of Section 14, if there is the consent of the owner to the occupation of the sub-tenant on the relevant I am, therefore, of the view that on the facts found by the Courts below the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act and the Courts below have wrongly held that the building in question was liable to be deemed vacant. Coming to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner would lead to a direct conflict between Section 14 and 12 (1) (b) of the aforesaid Act. He submitted that I should adopt a harmonious construction so that both the provisions may be given full effect without leading to any anomaly. I cannot agree. The argument of the learned counsel totally ignores the use of non-obstante Clause in Section 14. Section 14 begins with Not -withstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force. 'it is settled law that where such words are used, the pro vision would have an overriding effect over the other provisions of the Act mentioned in non-obstante Clause. Section 14 of the Act was, therefore ex pressly enacted as an exception or as an overriding provision intended to overcome the effect or application of the other provisions including Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act, therefore, overrides Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act in view of non-obstante Clause used therein. In view of what has been stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders passed by respondents nos. 1 and 2 respective ly dated 4. 4. 1979 and 24. 8. 1978 are quashed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. .;