Hari Swarup, J. - (1.) THIS revision has been referred to us by a learned single Judge as he felt some difficulty in view of the judgment of a learned single Judge in Ramiharl v. Jodhan, 1972 AWR 623.
(2.) THE plaintiff Instituted a suit in the civil court for a relief of declaration that he was the sirdar of the land in dispute and for possession in case he was found to be out of possession. THE plaintiff had also claimed relief for cancellation of a sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 in respect of the holding in dispute and for an injunction. A defence was taken to the effect that the civil court had no jurisdiction and the suit was cognizable by the revenue court. THE trial court rejected the plea taken in defence and the revision filed under Section 115, CPC was dismissed by the Additional District Judge holding that the suit was cognizable by the civil court. THE defendants have come up in revision to this Court and have urged that the civil court had no jurisdiction. As in Ramdhari's case, 1972 AWR 623 a learned single Judge had taken the view that once the relief of cancellation of sale deed is claimed and injunction is prayed for, the suit can be cognizable in the civil court, this revision has been referred to us. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides :- " THE Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of suits cognizable by the Revenue Court. A suit for declaration of sirdari rights and for possession is maintainable in the Revenue Court. THEre is, however, no express bar in respect of suits for cancellation of sale deeds and injunctions. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the opposite party that because in the suit relief for injunction and cancellation of the sale deed was also sought, the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit even in respect of other reliefs. In this connection Explanation to Section 331 is relevant which runs as under: "If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted." It makes clear that for purposes of cognizance of suit in the revenue court it is the cause of action and not the relief that is relevant. In Ramdhari's case, 1972 AWR 623 learned single Judge had obviously overlooked the Explanation in Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. As the cause of action in the present case was the interference or threatened invasion to the rights of the plaintiff over an agricultural holding, the relief could be claimed against that cause of action in the revenue court and the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. It was urged by the learned counsel for the opposite party that because the sale deed had to be cancelled, it must be deemed to have initiated the cause of action for the suit. In this respect it has to be remembered that an instrument can create a cause of action only if by itself creates a right and so long as that instrument is not avoided the title continues to be effective. This would be a case where the instrument is a voidable instrument. But in case the instrument referred to in the plaint is a void document, that is it creates no title ab initio it cannot give rise to a cause of action for claiming the relief of possession.
(3.) IN Mena v. Baldeo, 1966 AWR 597 (Para 8) it was held : "It may be noted here that position would have been very different if the document which was sought to be cancelled was a document void ab initio, for instance, if it had been executed by the plaintiff while he was minor, then the document being completely void it would not have been necessary to avoid it and in that case he could, merely by proving that it was a void document, get a declaration of his title to the property or even possession without cancellation of the sale deed. It was possible for the revenue court in those circumstances to look into the facts and after coming to the conclusion that the sale deed was completely void and ineffectual to pass title to the transferee could have given a declaration or could have also decreed possession in favour of the plaintiff. But in cases where avoidance of a document is necessary the position is different". We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in Mewa's case. In Gorakh Nath Dube v. H N. Singh, AIR 1973 SO 2451 it was held : "We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. In the case before us, the plaintiff's claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid inoperative and void, such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation court.'' A similar view was expressed by Full Bench of this Court in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, 1976 AWC 412.;