J. M. L. Sinha, J. - (1.) This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Ram Naresh Tripathi praying that the order dated 28th July, 1979 passed by the respondent No. 1 be quashed. The facts giving rise to this petition can, briefly be stated are as follows: The petitioner is a tenant of house No. 104-A/297 Ram Bagh, Kanpur since several years. Sri Shyam Narayan Nigam, father of respondents No. 2 to 4, moved an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of Act No. XIII of 1972 for the release of the house. Sri Shyam Narayan Nigam died on 28th August, 1975. By the said date the arguments in the case had been heard but the judgment was not pronounced. The petitioner therefore, filed an application before the Prescribed Authority that, since Sri Shyam Narayan Nigam had died and his heirs and legal representa tives did not bring themselves on record, the application could not proceed further. According to the allegations in the petition, when the petitioner enquired about the result of this application from the Reader of Prescribed Authority he was informed that the application had been allowed and the case was consigned. On 30th January, 1978, however, the petitioner came to know that the application under Section 21 (1) (a) had been allowed vide order dated 20th May, 1976 and that on 25th January, 1978, an order was passed by the Prescribed Authority for the eviction of the petitioner through police force. On 31st January, 1978 the petitioner moved an application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 20th May, 1976 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This application was dismissed on 10th July 1979. The petitioner had also filed an appeal against the expert order but it was got dismissed as not pressed. Thereafter an application was moved by the petitioner on 27th July, 1979 stating that the exparte order dated 20th May 1976 was a nullity and hence the order dated 25th January, 1978, passed by the Prescribed Authority for his eviction by police force, may be withdrawn. This application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority on 28th July, 1979. Finding no other alternative the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. The petition has been opposed on behalf of the respondent's No. 2 to 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in his arguments before us, raised the following contentions; (i) That the application dated 27-7-1979 moved by the petitioner was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority without any application of mind and, hence a direction be issued by this Court to decide that application afresh. (ii) that in view of the provisions contained under Section 34 (4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 of rule 25 of the rules framed there under it was mandatory for the heirs and legal representatives of Shyam Narayan Nigam to bring themselves on record within one month from the date of the death of Sri Nigam and, since this was not done, the petition had abated and no orders could be passed thereon for the release of the accommodation. (iii) that in any case the applicant under Section 21 of the Act moved by Sri Nigam was based on his personal need and that need ceased to exist on the death of Sri Nigam hence the order dated 20-5-1976 is bad in law. (iv) That the orders dated 20th May, 1976 and 25th January, 1978 being orders passed in favour of a dead person are nullity and could not be executed. Elaborating his first contention learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in his application dated 27-7-1979 it was, inter alia, urged that the order dated 20th May, 1976 having been passed in favour of a dead person was a nullity and further that the personal need of the landlord having come to an end with the death of the landlord it was not open to the Prescribed Authority to pass the order for release of the accommodation. Learned counsel added that in his order dated 28th July 1979 the Prescribed Authority did not consider any of these objections and hence we may quash that order and direct the Prescribed Authority to decide the application afresh. Having given our careful thought to the contention raised we find that it has no substance. A perusal of the order dated 28th July 1979 would show that the Prescribed Authority disposed of the aforesaid two contentions with the observation that they had also been raised earlier and considered on merits. The petitioner has annexed with the writ petition a copy of the order dated 10th July, 1979 (Annexure T) by which the application for setting aside the order dated 20th May, 1976 was rejected. A perusal thereof shows that the afore mentioned contentions were considered and rejected by the Prescribed Authority in the last paragraph of that order. Consequently there is nothing wrong if the Prescribed Authority, while passing the order dated 28th July, 1979 did not deal with those contentions again and disposed them of with the observation that they had already been considered on merits earlier and rejected. It would have been entirely fruitless for the Prescribed Authority to repeat in his order dated 28th July, 1979 what he had already said in his order dated 10th July, 1979. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. Coming to the second contention, it was urged that Section 34 (4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 and Rule 25 of the rules framed there under made it mandatory for the heirs and legal representatives of Shyam Narayan Nigam to get themselves substituted in the latter's place if they at all wanted to continue the proceedings, and since they failed to do so, the proceedings came to end with the death of Sri Nigam and the Prescribed Authority could not pass the order dated 28th May, 1976. Section 34 (4) reads as under: "where any party to any proceeding for the determination of standard rent of or for eviction for a building dies during the pendency of the proceeding, such proceeding may be continued after bringing on the record; (a) in the case of the landlord or tenant, his heirs or legal repre sentatives; (b) in the case of an unauthorised occupant any person claiming under him or found in occupation of the building. " Now, in the first instance Section 34 does not say as to what shall be the consequence if the heirs and legal representatives do not get themselves substituted. The language of the sub-section (4) of Section 34 is not even prohibitory so that it could be argued that omission on the part of the heirs and legal representatives to get them selves substituted is fatal. To elaborate the reasoning further, if sub-section (4) of Section 34 had been "when any party to any proceedings for the determination of standard rent or for eviction from a building dies during the pendency of the proceedings, such proceedings cannot continue except after bringing on record. . . . . . . . . ". 'it could be argued that by using that language the legislature made its intention explicit, namely, that proceedings for determination of standard rent or eviction shall come to an end with the death of the deceased party unless his heirs and legal representatives get themselves substituted. As already said the legislature did not use any such words in Section 34 (4 ). We may also at this stage refer to the provisions contained in Order 22 Civil Procedure Code Rule 3 or Order 22 specifically states that where the right to sue survives and no application for substitution is made within the period of limitation the suit shall abate. If the legislature intended that an application for determination of rent or for release of accommodation should abate unless the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party get themselves substituted, legislature could make that intention explicit by incorporating in the Act a provision of the nature contained in Order 22, Rule 3 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. Again, the purpose of substitution of the heirs of a deceased party is that it may continue the proceedings from; the stage at which it was left by the deceased party and may produce the relevant material' before the authority/ Court. If the legal representative of the deceased party did not have that right they would be deprived of an opportunity to produce their evidence and make their submission which could clearly prejudice them. However, in a case where the evidence has been led and arguments have been heard, nothing is left to be done by any party, or on his death by his heirs or legal representatives. All that remains to be done is Court's job, namely, that of preparing and pronoun cing the judgment after taking into consideration the evidence adduced and submissions made by either party. In such a case it would be little more than an idle formality to require substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased party. That could merely delay the proceedings without any benefit to either party. It was with this end in view that the legislature incorporated Rule 6 in Order 22, Civil Procedure Code which specifically states that if the death of a party occurs between the conclusion of the hearing and the pronoun cement of the judgment, there shall be no abatement. It is true that Order 22, rule 6 Civil Procedure Code has not been made applicable to the proceedings under Act 13 of 1972. We have, however, already referred to the principle behind Order 22, Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code and we see no reason why that principle cannot be applied to the proceedings under Act 13 of 1972. We are fortified in taking this view, by the decision of Patna High Court in case of Ram Charan Ram Keshari v. Sri Ambika Sao, (1979 (1) R. C. J. 553. ). In that case the Patna High Court relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ebrahim Aboo Bakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property (A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 319.), in which the Supreme Court held that the principle contained in Order 22, Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code could apply to the proceedings under Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The Patna High Court said that if the principle contained in Order 22, Rule 6 can apply to proceedings under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, there is no reason why that principle should not apply to the proceedings under Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. We are in agreement with that reasoning. We may also add here that there is nothing in Section 34 (4) which may be inconsistent with the application of the principle contained in Order 22, Rule 6. Sub-section (4) of Section 34 merely states that in the event of the death of any party the proceedings may be continued after bringing on record the heirs and ' legal representatives of the deceased party. We may stress on the words 'continue the proceedings'. In a case where proceedings are already over and all that remains to be done is the delivery of judgment, there is nothing to be continued by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party and, consequently, it is not mandatory to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives. We have already said earlier that in the present case Shyam Narayan Nigam died in between the conclusion of the arguments and the pronouncement of the judgment. The non-substitution of his heirs and legal representatives could not therefore, invalidate the order dated 20th May, 1976. As for Rule 25 of the rules framed under the Act 13 of 1972, it only prescribes the limitation for making an application under sub-section (4) of Section 34. If any thing contained in Section 34 sub-section (4) cannot invalidate the order dated 20th May, 1976, obviously Rule 25 can also not invalidate it. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is also, therefore, rejected. Learned counsel next contended that in any case Shyam Narayan Nigam moved an application under Section 21 on the ground of this personal need and he having died, the purpose for which the release was sought came to an end. Learned counsel urged that for this reason too, the Prescribed Authority could not order release of the accommodation. The argument fails to bear scrutiny. The petitioner has annexed with the petition a copy of the application dated 7th July, 1979. In that application the petitioner himself stated that the application under Section 21 had been moved by Shyam Narayan Nigam for the need of his family members. Consequently, it cannot be successfully urged that the need for which the release of the accommodation was prayed for ceased to exist on the death of Shyam Narayan Nigam. The contention raised is accord ingly rejected. Coming to the last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was urged that the order dated 20th May, 1976 and 25th January, 1978 being orders in favour of a dead person are nullity and could not be enforced. Learned counsel urged that it is a general principle of common law that no order can be passed in favour of or against a dead person. According to learned counsel this principle is an off-shoot of the principle of natural justice. Learned counsel further urged that Order 22 Rule 6 engrafts an exception on this general principle of common law and, since Order 22, Rule 6 does not apply to proceedings under Act 13 of 1972, the order dated 20th May, 1976 and 25th January, 1979 shall be hit by this general principle. We have given our careful thought to the aforesaid contention but we find that it is wholly devoid of substance. What the learned counsel urged was that no order can be passed in favour of or against any person - because it will be against the principle of natural just-ce. The principle of natural justice, however, is that no order should be' passed against any person without affording him an opportunity of being heard. Here the impugned order was not passed against but in favour of Sri Shyam Narayan Nigam. Further Sri Shyam Narayan Nigam had full opportunity leading evidence and making submissions and he had actually made use of that opportunity. We thus fail to understand how the order dated 20th May, 1976 or 25-1-1979 can at all be hit by the principle of natural justice. Again, once we have accepted that the principle of Order 22, Rule 6 can apply to the proceedings under Section 21 of Act 13 of 1972, the arguments raised by the learned counsel can have no rele vance. The last contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is also thus rejected. No other contention having been raised, we dismiss this writ petition as devoid of substance. The stay order dated 30-7-1979 is vacated. The petitioner is, however, granted two months time to vacate the accommodation in question. The parties shall bear their own costs. .;