S.Malik - (1.) THIS case arises out of a reference made by the District Judge, Meerut, to the Court for initiating contempt proceedings against the opposite parties.
(2.) IN short, the relevant facts are that inspite of a stay order passed on 31-1-1976 by the learned District Judge, the alleged contemners demolished the wall which was the subject matter of proceedings under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The wall is said to have been demolished on 11-3-1976 flouting the stay order. The learned District Judge called upon the alleged contemners to show cause why the matter be not referred to the High Court. After an enquiry the learned District Judge referred the matter to this Court by his order dated 31-1-1978, recommending that contempt proceedings be initiated against the opposite parties. It may be pointed out that under section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the period of limitation within which this Court can take congnizance of an alleged Contempt is one year. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the opposite parties that as more than one year had passed already when the learned District Judge referred the matter to this Court, this Court could not take cognizance of the alleged contempt of this Court of the learned District Judge. In support of this contention the attention of this Court was drawn to the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Gulab Singh v. The Principal Shri Ramji Das, AIR 1975 Allahabad 366. It was contended on behalf of the applicant on the other hand that the delay should be condoned as section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the facts of this case. In support of this contention the attention of the Court was drawn to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1976 S. C. 105. On perusing the observations made by the Supreme Court, I find that the observations made therein do not apply to the facts of this case. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court interpreted in that case the provisions of section 29 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act Section 29 (2) (b) as also Section 5 of that Act deal with the filing of a suit, appeal or application within or beyond the period of limitation provided for in law, either in the Limitation Act or under some special law and not the taking of cognizance of a matter by the Court. Under section 5 of the Limilation Act the delay in filing a suit, appeal or application can be condoned. But section 5 of the Limitation Act does not deal with condonation of the period of limitation for taking cognizance by a Court as laid down in a special Act like section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
(3.) IT was next argued that as Article 215 of the Constitution lays down that all High Courts are courts of record, a High Court has been given unfettered power to punish contempt of a subordinate court and, therefore, the question of limitation would not arise. I do not agree with this contention. Article 215 no doubt empowers every High Court to punish contempt of a court subordinate to it, but the Contempt of Courts Act lays down how that power has to be exercised. Article 215 of the Constitution and relevant provisions of theContempt of Courts Act have to be read together. The High Court cannot take cognizance even of contempt of itself if the period of one year has already elapsed. Moreover, there is nothing no the record explaining the delay in making the reference by the learned District Judge. The District Judge by his order dated 18-11-1977 observed that he was satisfied, prima facie that contempt of his Court was committed by the parties. He has not explained the delay in making the reference. There is no explanation why the reference could not be made within a year after 11-3-1976 when the alleged contempt is said to have been committed.;