N. D. Ojha, J. - (1.) Respondent No. 3, Avadh Narain Tandon is the land lord of an accommodation of which the petitioner is tenant. An application was made by respondent No. 3 for release of the accommodation in the occupation of the petitioner under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that he bonafide needed it for his own use. The application was con tested by the petitioner but was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. Against the order an appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the District Judge which has been dismissed by the III Additional District Judge, Bareilly, repon-dent No. 1. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the accommodation in question was let out to the petitioner in the year 1969 and since thereafter there has been no change in the circumstances which could justify the Prescribed Authority as well as the Additional District Judge to come to the conclusion that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide. It has also been urged that the authorities below seem to have been influenced by an irrelevant consideration in regard to the social status of respondent No. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that the impugned orders do not suffer either from any error of jurisdiction or any manifest error of law which may justify interference under Article 226 of. the Constitution. The orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge are concurrent in so far as the finding that the need of the respondent No. 3 was bona fide is concerned. This finding is based on an appraisal of evidence and is essentially a finding of fact which cannot be challenged in a writ petition (See Mattual v. Radhe Lal (A. I. R. 1974s. C. 1596), and India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakhruddin (A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 45. ). The submission made by counsel for the petitioner that there had been no change in the circumstances since 1969 when the accommodation was let out by respondent No. 3 in this behalf was that there had been considerable change in the circumstances and this case has been accepted by the authorities below. The following finding recorded by the Additional District Judge indicates that there has been a change in the circumstances on account of which the need of the landlord was found to be bona fide : "as against this, the landlord has a family of six persons. The landlord and his wife are both persons of status. The landlord is a business man and his wife is Vice-Principal of an institution. Both have their social relations and obligations. The son of the landlord is now married and he and his wife need separate bedroom and separate portion of the house so as to maintain purdah in the family. The two school-going children of the landlord's son also need a room for study and for living. It is true that the daughter of landlord has now been married and the daughter-in-law has replaced her, but the daughter did not need a separate portion whereas the daughter-in-law needs it. Moreover, because of the marriage of the son and daughter of the landlord, the social gatherings and the visit of new relations must have increased as compared to the position in 1969 when the accommodation was let out to the tenant. It is also true that though due to paucity of accommodation the landlord has added a room on the upper floor and has covered a verandah with grils, it cannot be said that this addition becomes sufficient for the landlord for the pre sent. The additions rather show that because of dire necessity temporary arrangements have been made in the house for adjusting the members of the family. It is an admitted position that the landlord and his son have a car and a scooter now for which they do not have any garrage. The son of the landlord is running independent business. In the changed circumstances the present newly wedded couple needs complete indepen dence without inconvenience to the parents. The landlord has all around been needing more accommodation and improvising temporary arrange ments. To my mind, therefore, the need of the landlord is bona fide and genuine. The landlord will suffer greater hardship if the accommodation is not released. In view of the aforesaid finding it is not possible to accept the submission made by counsel for the petitioner that there had been no change in the cir cumstances since 1969. In this connection Rule 16 (1) (b) of the Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, are also relevant which provide that where a residential building was let out at a time when the sons of the landlord were minors and subsequently one or more of them has married, the additional requirement of accommodation for the landlord's sons shall be given due consideration. Considerable emphasis was placed by counsel for the petitioner on the circumstance that the landlord had constructed an additional room on the first floor and it was urged on its basis that the need of the marri ed son was met by the said room. These are matters of appraisal of evidence. The circumstance has not been ignored by the authorities below and if even after consideration of this material they have still come to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bona fide it is not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence and to record a contrary finding. From the conduct of respondent No. 3 it further appears that he was not out to harass the petitioner in any manner. As is apparent from the order of the Additional District Judge the respondent No. 3 filed an affidavit on 21st February, 1978, in paragraph 3 whereof he offered that even if a room with store and garrage was released in his favour he would not press for the release of the remaining accommodation. This offer was, however not accepted by the petitioner. It is true that the Addi tional District Judge has recorded a finding of fact that the nature of the acco mmodation in occupation of the petitioner was such that it could not be bifu rcated. Nonetheless the offer made by the respondent No. 3 indicated, as already pointed out above, that he did not want to unnecessarily harass the petitioner and had made the release application because he was feeling dearth of accommodation on account of the changed circumstances as pointed out by the Additional District Judge in his finding quoted above. In so far as the submission made by counsel for the petitioner that the authorities below seem to have been very much influenced by the circumstance that the respondent No. 3 enjoyed a good social status suffice it to point out that the finding about the need of respondent No. 3 recorded by the authorities below is not based on his social status alone but is based on the actual requirement of additional accommodation by him. Further social status cannot be said to be i, wholly irrelevant consideration as would be apparent even from the language of Rule 16 (1) (a) of the Rules which permits taking into considera tion social status also while considering the need of a landlord for additional requirement. Lastly it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that there had been no proper comparison of the hardship which is likely to be caused to the petitioner in the event of the release application being allowed with the hardship likely to be caused to respondent No. 3 in the event of the application being dismissed. Having gone through the impugned orders I find it different to accept this sub mission either. The question of comparative hardship has been considered as is apparent even from the extract of the order of the III Additional District Judge quoted above. A categorical finding has been recorded that the landlord will suffer greater hardship if the accommodation was not released in his favour. In this connection counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner had no alternative accommodation at his disposal and in the event of being evicted he will be faced with great hardship. A similar submission was made before the Supreme Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Abad Khan (A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 272), which was a case under the Jammu and Kashmir (Houses and Shops) Rent Control Act. The submission was repelled and it was held: "it is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be vacated from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the Legislature when Section 11 (i) (u) was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs a decree for eviction. " In the result I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed and the interim order is vacated. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. .;