M. P. Mehrotra, J. - (1.) This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. The facts, in brief, are these. One Sughar Singh was treated as the tenure-holder and ceiling proceedings had taken place in his name at an earlier stage. Some land had been declared as surplus land in the said proceedings. It seems that Sughar Singh died, and thereafter, a fresh notice was issued under Section 10 (2) of the Act and ceiling proceedings again took place. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority, by his order dated 3-2-1978, a true copy whereof is Annexure 1 to the petition. 11. 59 acres of irrigated land was declared as surplus by the said order. Thereafter, the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, who are stated to be minor sons of Sughar Singh, filed an appeal before the appel late Court and the said appeal was decided by the suid Court by its judgment dated 19-5-1976, a true copy whereof is Annexure 2 to the petition. The appeal was allowed and the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was set aside and it was held "that no further area in the holding is liable to be taken as surplus under the Act. " Now the State has come up in the instant writ petition and in support thereof, I have heard the learned Standing Counsel and in opposition, Sri B. Dixit learned counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, has made his submissions. The notice, which was issued in the earlier proceedings under Section 10 (2) of the Act and the orders, which were passed in the said proceedings, are not on the record. Similarly, the notice, which was subsequently issued under Section 10 (2) of the Act in the subsequent proceedings is also not on the record. It seems that after the death of Sughar Singh his widow Smt Maya Devi also died. It is not clear as to the date on which she died, whether it was after the issuance of the second notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act in the subsequent proceedings or before the issuance of the said notice. It is not clear to me as to how after the death of Sughar Singh, the said widow could be said to have succeeded to the 5and left by her husband Sughar Singh when the minor sons of Sughar Singh were in existence on the death of their father. This aspect of the matter has not been noticed in the impugned orders by the authorities concerned. The appellate Court: thought that Section 29 of the Act could not be applicable as Smt. Maya Devi could not become the tenure-holder within the meaning of Section 29 of the Act. The appellate Court observed: "her land had also been tagged with that of her husband while deter mining ceiling area in previous proceedings. In view of this fact, the death of her husband made no difference and she did not herself become a tenure-holder. Tenure-holder was, beyond doubt, her husband Sughar Singh. Thus, the definition of term tenure-holder cannot be stretched to cover the case under Section 29 of the Act. " These observations in my opinion, are based on a wrong interpretation of Section 29 of the Act. The mere fact that the land of the members of the family stands clubbed with the holding of the tenure- holder, does not mean that after the death of a tenure-holder, such members cannot become them selves independent tenure-holders. This interpretation of Section 29 of the Act, in my view, is wrong. Therefore, the members of the family of Sughar Singh after the latter's death, could themselves be treated as independent tenure-holders, This result comes out from the combined reading of the definition of 'family' in Section 3 (7) and the definition of 'tenure-holder'in Section 3 (17) of the Act and from the language of Section 29 of the Act itself. Therefore, the appellate Court's finding must be held to be wrong However, so far as the operative part of the appellate Court's judgment is concerned, in my view no interference is called for in these pro ceedings and the State's petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. The Prescribed Authority was bound to have proceeded against the members of the family of Sughar Singh after the latter's death under the provisions of Section 29 of the Act, but that could be done if it could have been shown that any member of the said family succeeded to certain land left by the late tenure-holder and that such member cane to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to which he was entitled as an independent tenure-holder taking into consideration the land already held by him and the land to which he succeeded after the death of Sughar Singh. I should like to emphasise that even though I used the expression 'member' of the family, it should be clear that it is a reference for the situation when Sughar Singh was alive. After the death of Sughar Singh, there is no question of the existence of Sughar Singh's family because such members will now be independent tenure-holders. Sri Dixit contended that the appellate Courts' interpretation of Section 38-B of the Act is correct. I should like to point out that even though there was no question of applying the principle of res-judicata, so far as the question of proceedings under Section 29 of Act against a member of the family of the late Sughar Singh is concerned, still, the rinding, which had been given in the earlier ceiling proceedings against Sughar Singh, must be held to be binding unless there was some, change brought about by the amending Act which amended the provisions of the Ceiling law and which necessitated a reopening of such findings. This is the law laid down by the Division Bench in Kishan Kumar v. State, (W. P. No. 3073 of 1977 ). Therefore, if the State seeks to proceed against any one of the heirs of Sughar Singh under Section 29 of the Act, then it can only be done when it is shown that some land had been inherited by such heir and along with the land already held by him, he holds more land than he is entitled to hold in his ceiling area. In such proceedings, the findings, which were given in the proceedings against Sughar Singh, will be held to be binding unless the State can show that in view of the amendments in the Ceiling Law, such findings are liable to be reopened and re-decided as laid down by the Division Bench in Kishan Kumar's case (supra ). With these observations, I dismiss this petition but make no order as to costs. .;