- (1.) These two petitions have been filed by various persons, who were employed as casual labourers in the Engineering Department (Bridges) Broad Gauge (Constructions) North-Eastern Railway. Their services have been terminated by various similar orders offering them one month's salary in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation. The petitioners have challenged the orders on various grounds including the ground that the juniors to them have been retained and their services have been terminated without preparing a proper seniority list. They also claim to have acquired the status of temporary servants and therefore entitled to notice under R. 146 of the Rules contained in the Indian Railways Establishment Code Volume 1. The case of the other side is that the petitioners had acquired no title as they were employed on different projects and were not seniors in accordance with the seniority lists prepared for them as required by R. 77, Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, which runs as under: "The employer shall prepare a list of all workmen in the particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of their service in that category and cause a copy thereof to be pasted on a notice board in a conspicuous place in the premises of the industrial establishment at least seven days before the actual date of retrenchment.
(2.) The first question which arises in the case is whether there was a valid seniority list and the services of the petitioners had been terminated on the basis of that seniority list. In the petition it has been alleged that the petitioners were employed on projects. It is asserted that they were employed in the Engineering Department. This allegation is admitted in the counter-affidavit although it is asserted that they were employed on projects. It is, however, not stated in the counter-affidavit that the various projects on which the petitioners were employed did not fall under the jurisdiction of one Divisional Personnel Officer or one District Officer-in- charge.
(3.) Under the Industrial Disputes Act the term 'employer' has been defined in cl. (g) of S. 2. In the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, with reference to the definition of the term 'employer' in cl. (g) of S. 2 the following prescription has been made: "(g) with reference to cl. (g) of S. 2, it is hereby prescribed that (ii) in relation to an industry concerning railways carried on by or under the authority of a Department of the Central Government, (c) the District Officer-in-charge or the Divisional Personnel Officer or the Personnel Officer shall be the employer in respect of casual labour employed on a Zonal Railway or any other railway establishment independent of a Zonal railway." In the supplementary affidavit filed in the case it was asserted that the seniority list had not been prepared by the person authorised to do so under cl. (c) mentioned above. In the supplementary counter-affidavit it is asserted that because of some circular letter dated 22-1-1974 issued by the Railway Board the seniority list had been prepared on the basis of the Bridge Inspector/CONSTRUCTION/Gonda. It has not been alleged in the counter affidavit that the inspector was either the District Officer- in-charge or the Divisional Personnel Officer or the Personnel Officer. The Bridge Inspector/Construction/Gonda could not, therefore, be deemed to be the 'employer for purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act or the Rules. A similar question was raised in Ram Sewak Sah V/s. Union of India (Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case Nos. 347 and 1499 of 1977) in the Patna High Court. It was held that the list having been prepared by the Inspector of the area concerned and not by the District Officer-in-Charge as required under R. 77 of the Rules was not the one required by law. The list was accordingly quashed. The dicision of the Patna High Court in the above case applies with full force to the present ease. On the material before us. We are also unable to hold that the seniority list relied upon by the respondents on the basis of which termination orders had been passed, was drawn up in accordance with law. The list and the orders are, therefore, liable to be quashed.;