K. M. Dayal, J. - (1.) THE present petition has been filed against the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority rejecting the application for enhancement of rent under section 21 (8) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act.). THE undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner was owner of the disputed building which was let out to the State Government on rent. It was to house certain Government Offices. Under the proviso to Sec. 21(8) of the Act the landlord was entitled to enhancement of monthly rent in accordance with the proviso to the Act. THE claim was contested by the State Government and the application has been dismissed by both the authorities on the ground that the disputed building was a public building. A public building is defined in the Act under Sec. 3 clause (o) of the said Act as under:- " "Public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation;" Sec. 2(1) provides exemptions from the operation of the Act and in clause (a) of that sub-section any public building was so exempted. On the other hand, the definition of public building as well as exemption under clause (a) of Sec. 2(1) were incorporated in the Act by the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. By same Act, sub-sec. (8) was added in sec. 21 which reads as under :- "(8) Nothing in Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-sec. (1) is applicable. Provided that in the case of such a building the District Magistrate may, on the application of the landlord enhance the monthly rent payable to a sum equivalent to one twelvth of ten percent of the market value of the building under tenancy and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the month of tenancy following the date of the application : Provided further that a similar application for further enhancement may be made after the expiration of a period of five years from the date of the last order of enhancement." At the first impression it so seems that the authorities below were right in holding that the Act did not apply to any public building and, therefore the provisions of sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 21 of the said Act could also be not invoked. But after looking various provisions of the Act it appears that there may be certain apparent contradictions in the two provisions of the Act but there is no real contradiction therein.
(2.) THE contention that clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 2 of the Act made the provisions of sub-sec. (8) of sec. 21 redundant has to be rejected. No words in an enactment should be considered to be redundant or surplus in interpreting that provision. In B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Coimbatore, AIR 1978 SG 17 it was held: "It is a cardinal rule of construction that no words should be considered redundant or surplus in interpreting the provisions of a statute or a rule". THErefore, the two provisions which are apparently in conflict have to be construed in a manner that may be harmonious and both could be reconciled. In the case of J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC1170 it was held : "THEre will be complete harmony, however, if we hold instead that CI. 5 (a) will apply in all other cases of proposed dismissal or discharge except where an inquiry is pending within the meaning of clause 28. We reach the same result by applying another well rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. THE learned Attorney General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provision in the same legislative instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. THE rule that general provision should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same persons give two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest, the earlier direction should have effect." In Pretty v. Solly, 1959-58, ER 1032 quoted in Craies on Statute Law at. p. 206, 6th Edition Romilly, M.R. mentioned the rule thus : "THE rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same Statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the Statute to which it may properly apply. THE rule has been applied as between different provisions of the same Statute in numerous cases some of which only need be mentioned, De Wition v. Brecon, (1858) 28 LJ Ch 598, Churchil v. Crease (1928) 5 Bingh 177, United States v. Chase, (1889) 185 US 255 and Carroll v. Greenwhich Ins. Co., (1905) 199 U.S. 401." For giving harmonious construction to the two provisions of the Act we have to see the purpose and intent of the Act as it stood originally and effect of the amendment on it. As the Act stood prior to its Amendment Act No. 28 of 1976 the public buildings were not exempt from the operation of the Act and provisions of Sec. 21 could be invoked for evicting Central or State Government or other authorities mentioned in the definition of the public building as any other tenant. By enactment of sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 21 the right of the landlord to evict the State Government etc. was taken away. THE relief was granted to the landlord by way of enhancement of rent. Two provisions were added to that sub-section. THE first was that the landlord was entitled to enhancement of monthly rent for the building to a sum equivalent to l/12th of 10% of the market value of the building and under the second proviso that such enhancement could be claimed after expiry of every five years. This makes it clear that the legislature was aware of the fact that the buildings which were in the tenancy of the Government or other authorities from before the enactment of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 were carrying on rent which was fixed much earlier. It was also aware of the fact that the market value of the building has gone up and further that it might go up with the passage of time in future. THE aforesaid provisions were, therefore, inserted to ensure the 'landlord a fair return from his property. It is true that under section 2 (1) it is mentioned that "nothing in this Act shall apply to any public building." But clause (8) of section 21 does not apply to every public building. It applies to only some of them. Buildings in the tenancy of the Central Government have not been brought within the ambit of sub-section (8) of Section 21 of the Act. It may be noted that the two provisions have been added to the Act by the same Amending Act No. 28 of 1976. Section 26 of the Amending Act relates to the transitory provisions. Under sub-section (2), (4) of Section 26 of the aforesaid Act the authorities concerned were given opportunity to save the tenancy and to avoid effect of the eviction orders already passed under sub-section (1) (a) of Section 21 by agreeing to pay rent at the same rate as provided in sub-section (8) of Section 21. THEse provisions make it clear that sub-section (8) was an exception to the general exemption of 'public building' under Section 2(1) (a) of the Act and was not meaningless. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited M/s. Hira Lal Ratan Lal v. Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1973 SC 1034. In that case explanation II to section 3D of the U. P. Sales Tax Act was under examination. It was argued that explanation II to the section could not enlarge the ambit of section itself and the explanation could not be deemed to be a charging section. It was held : "If the provision is unabmiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear. Ordinarily a proviso to a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for special treatment. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. But cases have arisen in which this court has held that despite the fact that a provision is called proviso, it is really a separate provision and the so-called proviso has substantially altered the main section." Similar question arose in another case reported in Commissioner of Income-Tax Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Bhandari & Sons (Pvt.). Ltd., 1963 Vol. 47 ITR 802. It related to interpretation of section 10 (2) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 relating to exemptions in assessment and the charging after sale of properties so exempted. It was hled that "from the language of (vii) and the second proviso to it that whereas the clause deals with the grant of an allowance, the proviso is really a charging provision in computing the profits of a business under section 10". Thus there is no difficulty in holding that the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 21 of the Act can be a subjective provision under which the landlord could claim enhancement of the rent in respect of the building mentioned in the aforesaid sub-section. It is not disputed that the disputed building is in the tenancy of the State Government and entitled for the exemption under section 2 (a) of the Act. Sub-section (8) of section 21 is squarely applicable' in the instant case. What is required by the first proviso of that section is that the building should be such building that is in the tenancy of the State Government ........................." As the two provisions have been incorporated in the Act by same Amending Act, it cannot be said that the legislature did not intend to confer rights on the parties in accordance with sub-section (8) of section 21. The right of the landlord to evict the State Government under section 21 (1) of the said Act was taken away by sub-section (8) and by that proviso the landlord was granted the relief in the shape of enhancement of rent according to the market value of the property. I accordingly hold that sub-section (8) of section 21 was not redundant and an application under the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 21 of the Act is maintainable in case of buildings let out to State Government or other authorities covered by that sub-section.
(3.) IN the result, the present petition is allowed. Orders of the Additional District Magistrate (City) Moradabad dated 31-7-78 in case No. 10 of 1977 and that of District Judge Moradabad in Civil Appeal No. 352 of 1978 dated 7th May 1979 (Annexures 5 and 7 of the writ petition) respectively are quashed. The case will be considered afresh by the Prescribed Authority in accordance with law and the observations made above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.;