K. P. Singh, J. - (1.) This writ petition is against the judgment of Shri Ram Janam Singh, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, dated 2-2-1980, whereby the revision petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. Necessary facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner had got two Chaks: one Chak was carved out on plots Nos. 146 and 144 and another Chak was to the north of the aforesaid Chak of the petitioner. The contesting opposite party Mahabir Singh had filed an objection regarding the Chak of the petitioner situate to the north of his Chak on plots Nos. 1 44 and 146. It appears that on 20-1-1971, the Chak of the petitioner situate to the north of the disputed chak in the present writ petition was disturbed at the instance of the opposite party no. 4 Mahabir Singh. Against the order of the consolidation officer dated 20-1-1971 the petitioner had filed an appeal which was held as not maintainable by the order dated 21-8-1974 (See Annexure "4" ). Against the judgment of the trial Court dated 21-8-1974 the petitioner had preferred revision petition. In that revision petition it appears that the opposite party No. 4 had raised a preliminary objection that the revision petition was not maintainable and then the Presiding Officer Shri Mahipal Singh did not accept the preliminary objection and ordered that he had jurisdiction to decide the dispute about allotment of Chak even if there was no objection by a tenure holder. Thereafter the revision petition was heard by Shri Ram Janam Singh who remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer for reconstruction of the record through his order dated 6-7-1979. Against the order of the revisional Court dated 6-7-1979 the petitioner had come to this Court and I allowed the writ petition on 16-11-1979 and directed the revisional Court to get the record reconstructed and to decide the dispute between the parties. Therefore the revisional Court again dismissed the revision petition through the impugned judgment dated 2-2-1980. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a great length. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the appeal and revision petition filed by the petitioner was maintainable and the revisional Court has patently erred in dismissing the revision petition. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner when the revisional Court had overruled the preliminary objection raised by the contesting opposite party and this Court had directed the revisional Court to decide the dispute between the parties after getting the record reconstructed, the revisional Court acted illegally in dismissing the revision petition on the ground that the petitioner bad filed no objection regarding his Chak situate on plots Nos. 144 and 146. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Mustafa Alt and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U. P. Lucknow and other's 1967 R. D. 149, and has contended that even in the absence of an objection under Section 20 of U. P. C. H. Act (hereinafter referred1 to as the Act) the revisional Court had ample powers under Section 48 of the Act to grant requisite relief to the petitioner and since the revisional Court has refused relief to the petitioner, its judgment deserved to be quashed. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that in the circumstances of the present case the impugned order passed by the revisional Court is correct order and it should not have been interfered with. He has invited my attention to the ruling reported in Smt. Sundar Pala v. Shambhu Singh and others 1967 R. D. 5, wherein a learned single Judge of this Court has observed as below at page 7 : ". . . . . . . . . . . . Thus if a person has not been careful to raise an objection under Section 20 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, a latter establishment of rights cannot dislodge the rights that have accrued to the new chak holder under Section 20. " The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted that with regard to the disputed Chak the petitioner had not filed any objection in the beginning and his objection related to a different Chak situate to the north of the present disputed Chak and if any order had been passed regarding that Chak it would not give any cause of action to the petitioner to put forward his claim with regard to the disputed Chak either in appeal or in revision against the order relating to a different Chak. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. In may opinion, the ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. True that the revisional Court under Section 48 of the Act has wide powers to pass any order as it thinks fit in a case. The aforesaid section reads as below :- " (1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case of proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also oil a reference under sub-section (3 ). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heird, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1 ). " But the wide powers of the revisional Court must be within the four corners of the provisions of Section 48 of the Act. The revisional Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the subordinate authorities only when their orders are incorrect, illegal or improper. In the present case, the petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer regarding his Chak situate to the north of the disputed Chak in the present writ petition hence in appeal or revision the petitioner could legitimately make grievance about the Chak situate to the north of the disputed Chak in the present writ petition. The claim of the petitioner regarding the disputed Chak in appeal and revision giving rise to the present writ petition is wholly unwarranted and unjustified. When the revisional Court has refused to grant relief to the petitioner with regard to the disputed Chak, I think in the circumstances of the present case it has committed no illegality, impropriety or incorrectness. Since the order dated 20-1-1971 passed by the Consolidation Officer related to a different Chak of the petitioner situate to the north of the disputed Chak in the present writ petition, the petitioner cannot get any relief either in appeal or in revision against the order dated 20-1-1971 regarding the disputed Chak in the present writ petition. I think by the impugned judgment substantial justice has been done between the parties and the impugned judgment of the revisional Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. The impugned judgment is not only on technical point but also on merits of the petitioner's claim with regard to the disputed land. The petitioner could make legitimate grievance about the disputed Chak before the Consolidation Officer within the prescribed time and if the Consolidation Officer had given decision against the petitioner's claim he could have filed an appeal against the judgment of the Consolidation Officer and thereafter he could have filed a revision petition against the order of the appellate authority regarding the disputed Chak in the present writ petition. As the petitioner had not approached the relevant authority with regard to the disputed Chak within the prescribed time, his claim with regard to the disputed Chak in the present writ petition in appeal and revision against the order of the Consolidadation Officer dated 20-1-1971 relating to a different chak is wholly misconceived and unjustified. The learned counsel for the petitioner also invited my attention to the definition of the term "chak" [section 3 (1) (a)] and "holding" [saction 4 (c)] and has contended that since a Chak of the petitioner had been disturbed by the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 20-1-1971 the petitioner had a right to file an appeal and maintain revision petition and the consolidation authorities have patently erred in dismissing the appeal and the revision petition. To my mind, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are devoid of merits. The definition of the term "chak" itself indicates "a parcel of land allotted to a tenure-holder on consolidation. " Section 19 (e) of the Act contemplates allotment of three Chaks to a tenure holder hence I think that all the Chaks allotted to a tenure holder cannot constitute one Chak so as to afford a right to a tenure-holder to file an appeal against different Chaks of his when his another Chak is disturbed through the impugned order of an authority. In the present case the claim of the petitioner with regard to his Chaks situate on plots Nos. 144 and 146 was rightly negatived by the appellate authority and the revisional Court when the impugned order of the consolidation officer dated 20-1-1971 related to a different Chak situate to the north of the disputed Chak in tne present writ petition. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. .;