K. C, Agarwal, J. - (1.) This writ petition is directed against a judgment of the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, dated May 29, 1979 dismissing a revision filed by the petitioner under Section 18 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, Act No. XIII of 1972 (briefly stated Act No. XIII of 1972 ). The dispute involved is in respect of upper portion of House No. 100 Colonelganj, Allahabad. This house was let out to one Y. N. Kashyap who constructed his own house in Mohalla Allahpur as a result whereof the disputed house fell vacant. The vacancy of the house was notified on 8th November, 1977. Upon the notification of its vacancy, a number of persons applied for allotment. Since we are concerned in this case only with the applications filed by the petitioner for allotment and respondent No. 3, the dates of their application may be given. Shambhu Nath Srivastava respondent No. 3 filed the application for allotment on September 17,1977 whereas the petitioner made it on May 18, 1977. Having found that the respondent No. 3's claim for allotment was more pressing than those of the other applicant's including the petitioner. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the premises to the respondent No. 3 on 25th July 1978. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred a revision under Section 18 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The Additional District Judge held that since respondent No. 3 was the first applicant in point of time for the allotment, the order made in favour of the said respondent was not liable to be set aside. He also found that since in a revision filed under Section 18 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, the Court had power to interfere only on the ground of jurisdictional error and as no jurisdictional error had been committed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the allotment order could not be set aside. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. Counsel for the petitioner, Sri L. P. Nathani, raised three points before me. The first was that Rule 11 deals with priority under which an applicant could be given precedence or a preference but this rule did not entitle respon dent No. 3 to obtain an allotment order without proof of bona fide requirement. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer erred in allotting the" premises to the respondent No. 3 without giving a finding on the said question. In this con nection, counsel also submitted that out of the two applicants for allotment viz. the petitioner and respondent No. 3 the competing claims of the aforesaid two had to be considered and the allotment order should have been made to the person who was found to have the greatest need. Since none of the two authorities exercised the power of allotment in accordance with the manner stated above, the allotment order was liable to be set aside. Rule 11 deals with the priorities in making allotment of a residential building. However, the priorities have been classified into three categories. We are concerned in this case with the third category which reads as under: "thirdly, for accommodating others; and in each case of the above cate gories subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), the principle "first come' first served" shall be followed. " Before applying the rule, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was required to consider the bona fide need for allotment and after having found that the need of applicant was genuine", the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to take resort to clause third of rule 11 for making an allotment order in his favour. In considering this question of requirement, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not allot to a premises to a person merely on the ground that he was the first to apply. The requirement had to be ascertained objecti vely for finding whether the same was needed honestly and in good faith. It was riot enough that an applicant should merely desire to use and occupy the premises. What was necessary was that he should need the premises for use and occupation. Out of the several applications for allotment the Rent Control and Eviction Officer can even reject the application which was first in point of time, if he found that the need of such person was not bona tide or honest. In the instant case, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer considered all the applications and came to the conclusion that the need of the respondent No. 3 was most compelling. He had only three rooms in his possession and those three rooms were insufficient for meeting his need of residence and office. After having found that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer also held that since the said respondent was first in point of time in making the application for allotment, he made an order in his favour. It was not correct, as was suggested by the petitioner's learned counsel that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was led away by the fact of the respondent No. 3 was the first in point of time and that he did not con sider the claim of the petitioner on merits for allotment. The following finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer negatived the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner: From the above, it would appear that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer considered the competing needs of the petitioner and respondent No. 3 and found that the need of the said respondent was more pressing than that of any other applicant for allotment. Since respondent No. 3 was the first appli cant he was given the benefit of Rule 11. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer misapplied Rule 1) and excluded the petioner from considering only on account of the fact that respondent No. 3 was the first applicant for allotment. The claim of the petitioner had been considered on merits and he had not been excluded. Sri Nathani counsel for the petitioner also urged that the fact that respondent No. 3 has been prosecuting the case for the allotment since the be ginning was an irrelevant consideration and since the Rent Control and Eviction Officer erred in taking it into account and passing the allotment order solely on its basis, the order was erroneous. It is true that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did refer to the said circumstance in the order but it would not be correct to say that the allotment order had be- n made in favour of the respondent No. 3 solely on that ground. As observed above, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer considered the claim on merits and allotted the premises to the respondent No. 3. An irrelevant consideration if taken into account would certainly vitiate the order of a statutory authority. But every irrelevant consideration stated in a judgment or order which did not have any effect on the ultimate decision of the authority would not vitiate the order. To illegalise an order the error must not be trivial in nature, It is immaterial that an authority has considered irrelevant matters in arriving at its decision if it has not allowed itself to be influenced by those considerations. In such an event the right thing appears to be to overlook a minor error of this kind if it has not affected the decision. The second submission by the learned counsel made was that as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not give reasons for the view taken by it, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was illegal. Counsel emphasised that the proceedings of allotment were quasi-judicial in nature and every authority is obliged to give reasons for making such an order. The submission is devoid of substance. The recording of reasons is regarded as a necessary requirement of fair decision. The requirement to give reasons secures in black and white what the Judge has in mind and gives satisfaction to him who has suffered from such an order. Giving of reasons also has the merit of satisfying such a person not only that he had been heard but also that what he pleaded had been considered and recorded. There is, therefore, no denial that reasons ought to be given in such a matter. But how many reasons are required to be given in a particular case is a question of fact. It depends upon the nature of proceed ings which an authority is dealing with. The reasons recorded, however, must show that the authority has applied its mind to the controversy and decided the question involved before it on correct considerations. In the present case, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was required to consider the claim of the applicant for allotment about their need to occupy the disputed house. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer selected respon dent No. 3 by comparison of merits of all the legible applicants of allotment. In making this selection, priority was given its due role. This was the reason which led to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the passing of the allot ment order in favour of respondent No. 3. It is not correct that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer reached the conclusion by making the allotment order in favour of respondent No. 3 without giving any reasons for it. In Union of India v. M. L. Capoor and others, A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 87. 51 the Hon'ble Beg, J. (as he then was) drew a distinction between reasons and conclusion. He held "reasons are the links between materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or qusi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached". To my mind reason is faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil. It is a motive or ground for action. It is not correct to say that the decision of own allotment was taken in favour of res pondent No. 3 without giving reasons for it. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that the need of respondent No. 3 was bonafide and allotted the premises to him. This was the reason which was required by law to be given for passing an allotment order. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that since the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer does not show the ground on which the application of respondent No. 3 was allowed the requirement of giving reasons should not be held to have been complied with. Failure to give reasons in relation to every particular point that he has raised in the hearing would not be a sufficient ground for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. There must be substantially wrong or inadequate reasons in order to enable the jurisdiction of this Court to be invoked. From the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer it is apparent that the need of the petitioner was not found genuine. It is not open to this Court to substitute its own discretion and to hold that the petitioner was more needy than respondent No. 3. The discretion lay with the rent Control and Eviction Officer and as the discretion has not been abused or arbitrarily exercised, this Court cannot interfere. The third submission was that as the respondent No. 3 was already occupying a portion of this house he was under rule 10 (5) (c) of the Rules framed under the Act disentitled from getting the allotment. The submission is not correct. Rule 10 (5) lays down that no building shall 'ordinarily' be allotted to a person who is occupying a building governed by the Act. The use of the word 'ordinarily' is purposive and did not take away the discretion of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Upon the facts, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was satisfied that respondent No. 3 was entitled to an allotment order and as such it is not possible to say that the allotment order being in contra vention of rule 10 (5) (c) was invalid. For these reasons the writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circums tances, the parties shall bear their own costs. .;