Surendra Narain Singh, J. - (1.) This petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution arises out of consolidation proceedings. The petitioner's case is that Khatas Nos. 8, 67 and 356 exclusively belonged to him. Khatas Nos. 10 and 212 jointly belonged to the petitioner along with opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5. These holdings are situate in village Manikpur, Pargana Karanda district Ghazipur. On the start of consolidation proceedings, the petitioner alleged that he requested the ACO to separate his share of Khatas Nos. 10 and 212 which jointly belonged to the petitioner along with opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 and further prayer, according to the petitioner made, was that Khatas Nos. 8, 67 and 356 along with other properties may be made subject matter of a separate chak to the petitioner. It was alleged that Parasnath Singh, opposite party No. 3, in collusion with the ACO got an order in his favour amalgamating the five khatas together and the order of the ACO dated 26 -8 -1964 showed that it was a consent order. It appears that the petitioner, when he came to know about this fact, filed an appeal with a prayer u/S. 5 of the Limitation Act before the SO (C). The appeal of the petitioner was admitted. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned. The appeal was considered on merits, and the ASO (C) having come to the conclusion that the order of the ACO was without jurisdiction, he set aside that order and directed the case to be decided on merits. He treated the case to be disputed one and directed the CO to decide the case on merits. Aggrieved with the order of the ASO (C), the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Dy. Director (C). Before the Dy. Director (C), it appears that some compromise was filed and the Dy. Director (C) passed the following order: - - The parties have filed a compromise before me, according to the terms of the compromise explained to me, the parties desire that original compromise which was filed by them before the ACO and on the basis of which the ACO had passed orders in the reconciliation proceedings, should alone be given effect to, and all other orders passed subsequently be considered as void. There is no illegality in this compromise. It is, therefore, directed that the orders of the CO and the SOC be set aside and the order passed by the ACO in the reconciliation proceedings be given effect to. The Dy. Director (C) in terms of the alleged compromise passed the above order on 7 -7 -1965. Some time after the passing of this order by the Dy. Director (C) the petitioner moved an application asserting therein that he had entered into no compromise with the contesting opposite parties and that he had engaged no counsel to enter into any compromise. It was said that he was kept under wrongful confinement by the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 and that he never came to court or entered into the compromise which had been made the basis of the order of the Dy. Director (C). On the allegations made in the petition it is clear that the petitioner asserted that he had not engaged any counsel and that he had no knowledge about the revision petition itself. That would suggest that the order which was passed by the Dy. Director (C) according the petition was an ex parte order. The Dy. Director (C) rejected this application of the petitioner on the ground that he considered that he had no jurisdiction to investigate this matter. Accordingly he dismissed the petition by his order dated 20th December 1965. Aggrieved with the two orders of the Dy. Director (C), the petitioner has approached this Court and has prayed for the quashing of these two orders of the Dy. Director (C).
(2.) I have heard Sri S.K. Verma, learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties in support of the decisions of the Dy. Director (C). Having heard him at great length, I am of the opinion that the Dy. Director (C) has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law. It is not necessary that detailed facts as have been asserted to by the petitioner and denied by the opposite parties be mentioned in this judgment. Suffice it to say that the allegations made in the petition were that the order passed by the Dy. Director (C) was without any information to the petitioner and that the petitioner had not engaged any counsel or filed any compromise before the court. If the allegations made by the petitioner are true, this is a clear case that a fraud was practised on the court and if there is a fraud practised on the court, it is the inherent right of that court to investigate this matter and find the truth about it. If the allegations made in the petition are true, the petitioner was entitled to a rehearing on the merits of the case.
(3.) S. 201 of the UP Land Revenue Act has been made applicable to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities. This Court in Putti v/s. Director of Consolidation ( : 1970 AWR 389) has held that Ss. 200 and 201 of the UP Land Revenue Act also apply to revision u/S. 48 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. Thus on the allegations made in the petition, the case was decided ex parte against the petitioner, the Dy. Director (C) had ample jurisdiction to decide this matter whether it was an ex parte order or not or whether there was sufficient ground for not being present on the date fixed.;