K.V. Asthana, J. - (1.) ONE Ganga Ram was run over by a bus of the UP Roadways on 16 -12 -1967. As a result of the injuries received in the unfortunate accident he died. His dependents, that is his widow, mother, sons and daughters then served a notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure dated 7 -3 -1968 on the State Government and then instituted a regular suit in the court of the Civil judge, Farrukhabad on 9 -7 -1968 for recovery of damages. They also filed an application to sue in forma pauperis. During the pendency of the proceedings in the court of the Civil Judge Farrukhabad it came to light on 26 -10 -1968 that Claims Tribunal had been constituted under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the district of Farrukhabad appointing the District Judge as the sole member of the said tribunal. Thereupon the pending claim was ordered to be returned for presentation to the Claims Tribunal by an order of the court dated 28 -10 -1968. The plaint was taken back and in the form of a claim petition was presented before the Tribunal on 4 -11 -1968. Since the claim petition was presented more than sixty days after the date of accident, an application was made before the Tribunal for condonation of the delay supported by an affidavit stating facts in explanation of the delay. It was said that claimants had taken legal advice but due to the ignorance of the counsel of the fact that Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act had been constituted, formalities for filling a suit in the civil court were taken first and then in the bona fide belief that the only forum for recovery of damages being the civil court the suit was prosecuted in the civil court. It was then said that as soon as it was discovered that the Claims Tribunal had been constituted in the district of Farrukhabad, without any further delay the claim was presented before it.
(2.) NO counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State. The Tribunal after hearing the parties refused to condone the delay having taken the view that the ignorance of the counsel of the notification constituting the Tribunal being on account of his negligence and not on account of any bona fide mistake, would not serve as an excuse. The result was that the application for condoning the delay was rejected and the claim petition was also rejected as barred by limitation. Against the above said order of the Tribunal. the sons, daughters, widow and mother of Ganga Ram filed an application purporting to be under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure before this Court impleading the State of UP through the Collector of Farrukhabad as opposite party.
(3.) A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the opposite party that the Claims Tribunal was not a civil court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hence the revision was incompetent. Learned Counsel for the Applicants contended in reply to the preliminary objection that the District Judge as such having been appointed as the sole member of the Tribunal, he will continue to have jurisdiction as a court under the Code of Civil Procedure while entertaining a claim petition, the Tribunal being the court of the District Judge, any order passed on the claim petition would be an order passed by the District Judge as a civil court, hence liable to revision by the High Court under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chatur Mohan v. Ram Bihari Dixit. I do not think the learned Counsel for the Applicants can derive any assistance from the ratio decidendi of the Full Bench decision cited. There the decision turned on the language of Section 8 -E of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Under the said section the Munsiff having jurisdiction was constituted as the authority to receive applications. That is to say, that all applications under Section 8 -E of the Act were to be filed before the court of the Munsif having jurisdiction. The Full Bench decided that the Munsif was not a 'persona designata' under the scheme of the said section and as a civil court a special jurisdiction was conferred upon him for deciding applications under the said section. Here the scheme under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is entirely different. The State Government by notification in the official gazette constitutes Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for specified area for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. It is permissible under the scheme of the said section to constitute a one member Tribunal. Persons qualified for appointment as member of a Claims Tribunal are (a) who is or has been a judge of the High Court ,or (b) who is or has been a District Judge or (c) who is qualified for appointment as a judge of the High Court. It is clear from the scheme that being a District Judge is a mere qualification. It is open to the State Govt, to appoint a person who is a District Judge in district of Farrukhabad to be member of the Claims Tribunal for any specified area even outside Farrukhabad. Under the scheme it does not automatically follow that all claims petitions arising out of accidents within limits of the district of Farrukhabad must be filed before the District Judge of Farrukhabad. The State Government could appoint the District Judge of Agra to receive claims petitions out of the accidents arising within the limits of district Farrukhabad. The ratio of Full Bench decision in the case of Chatur Mohan v. Ram Bihari Dixit supra does not apply. I have no hesitation in holding that a Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not a civil court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil procedure Code. The Preliminary objection has force.;