K.B. Asthana, J. - (1.) THE opposite party as landlord made an application to the Munsif Under Section 7 -B of the UP (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter called the Act) with the requisite particulars as required by the provisions of that section mentioned therein. It appears that the notices were issued to the Applicant tenants but despite notice they did not appear. The learned Munsif then parsed an order of eviction from the accommodation. After the order of eviction had beep made, a copy of it was forwarded to the District Magistrate and in compliance with' that order the District Magistrate evicted the Applicant tenants. It was then that an application was made to the Munsif by the Applicant tenants that they were never given any notice of any application Under Section 7 -B and all the orders were passed behind their back. They prayed that the order of eviction be set aside and they be afforded an opportunity to contest the application of the landlord Under Section 7 -B. An affidavit was filed by the Applicant tenants in support of their application for setting aside of the order of eviction. The learned Munsif rejected the application of the Applicant tenants merely on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to review his previous order which he could not set aside under the law. The learned Munsif, however, did find that the notices were not served on the tenants and there were serious irregularities almost amounting to fraud in the proceedings. The tenants have now come up in revision against the order of the learned Munsif.
(2.) THE main question that arises for determination in this revision is whether the Munsif while exercising jurisdiction Under Section 7 -B of the Act, is a civil court, or is a mere persona designate. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the landlord opposite party that there being two stages in the proceedings Under Section 7 -B of the Act, namely, the first culminating in an order either of dismissal of the application on the deposit of the arrears of rent by the tenant, or in the eviction of the tenant on his failure to deposit the rent and the second stage being on the objection of the tenant having been entertained, the application being registered as a suit on payment of the requisite court -fees by the landlord. The submission was that it is only at the second stage envisaged in that section, that the proceedings become civil proceedings in the nature of a suit and the Munsif then would be exercising the jurisdiction of a civil court. I am unable to agree with this submission of the learned Counsel for the landlord, opposite party. The nature of the jurisdiction of the Munsif Under Section 7 -B, to my mind, will not depend upon the stages envisaged under that section. That the application at a certain stage can be converted into a suit which is a civil proceedings and then the Munsif trying the suit would be a civil court does not seem to be the correct -approach. The application of the landlord made Under Section 7 -B with the requisite particulars and the order thereon in the first stage envisaged in Section 7 -B is as much civil proceeding as the conversion of that application into a suit when the second stage is reached. The whole controversy about the nature of the jurisdiction of the Munsif has been put beyond doubt by a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chatur. Mohan v. Ram Behari Dixit, 1964 AWR 141. In that case the question which was considered was whether a Munsif exercising jurisdiction Under Section 7 -E of the Act was a civil court and the answer of the Full Bench was that it was a civil court. Applying the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench Takru, J. in the case of J. Hay v. S.L. Thakral, 1968 AWR 687 held that the Munsif exercised jurisdiction Under Section 7 -B of the Act as a civil court. I do not agree with the learned Counsel for the landlord, opposite party, that the ratio of the Full Bench decision in the case of Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari Dixit (supra) will not apply to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Munsif Under Section 7 -B of the Act. It would be seen that in the Full Bench case of Chatur Mohan (supra) the decision mainly rested on the words: "the tenant may apply to the Munsif having jurisdiction for an order to the landlord", occurring in Sub -section (4) of Section 7 -E. It was held that that what was meant was by the words, 'Munsif having jurisdiction was the court of the Munsif which had the territorial jurisdiction'. Similar phraseology has been used in Sub -section (1) of Section 7 -B of the Act wherein it is laid down: "The landlord may make an application to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for an order of ejectment of the tenant." The phraseology in Sections 7 -B and 7 -E is similar and respectfully agree with the decision of Takru, J. in the case of J. Hay v. S.L. Thakral (supra). I have thus no doubt in my mind that the Munsif exercising jurisdiction Under Section 7 -B of the Act acts as a civil court. The next question then that has to be considered is whether the proceedings before the Munsif Under Section 7 -B of the Act are regulated and controlled by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court of the Munsif being a civil court it follows that the proceedings before it would be resulted by the Code of Civil Procedure unless there is something in the Rent Control Act which limits or otherwise affects exercise of any power. The provisions of Section 7 -B are sufficiently indicative of the procedure to be followed but in many other respects those provisions are silent. That will not mean that the Munsif as a civil court cannot take recourse to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. One of the powers preserved by the Code of Civil Procedure is the inherent power of the court Under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The approach which has been made by the learned Munsif does not appear to me to be a correct approach. The application of the tenants for setting aside of the order of eviction was not strictly an application for review of the previous order. It was more in the nature of inviting the court to exercise its inherent power and remedy the wrong done to them by a fraud having been committed during the proceedings before the court. The courts are meant to do justice. Thus the course of justice should always be unsullied. If by fraud or deceit the court is led into passing orders under a law and that fraud is discovered subsequently, there is nothing in law that the court cannot exercise its inherent jurisdiction to undo the abuse of process of the court. No doubt a separate proceeding can always be launched by an aggrieved party but that is not a circumstance that the court in whose proceedings the fraud has been committed will find itself powerless. The order envisaged in the first stage of Section 7 -B is always passed in exercise of a power of a summary nature and is a special power conferred on the Munsif as a civil court. If a case is made out that in reality there was noncompliance with the provisions of Section 7 B but apparently it was shown that they have been complied with and the order was passed on a misapprehension of the real facts, I think the learned Munsif in the exercise of his inherent jurisdiction can set aside the consequential order which was passed in ignorance of the real facts.
(3.) THE learned Counsel for the opposite party drew my attention to the decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of Radha Rani Bhargava v. Dr. A.P. Singh, 1966 AWR 355 in which it was held that the Munsif after passing an order of ejectment under Sub -section (5) of Section 7 -B and sending it to the District Magistrate for execution Under Sub -section (6) becomes functus officio. I have no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the case. Fraud transcends every technicality of the procedure. Here is a case in which fraud is alleged. The learned Munsif having inherent jurisdiction to make an enquiry into it and then pass the consequential orders as said above, ought not to have thrown but the -application of the tenants on the ground that he had no power to make an enquiry. The District Magistrate Under Sub -section (6) of Section 7 -B does not perform any judicial function but only performs a ministerial act in pursuance of the order of the Munsif. So even if he executes that order it does not mean that the order of the Munsif merges into the action of the District Magistrate. The order of the Munsif Under Sub -section (5) is the main order which empowers the District Magistrate to evict the tenant. Thus the tenant even if evicted can get the adequate relief if the order of the Munsif Under Sub -section (5) gets out of his way. The District Magistrate will have nothing else to do except to restore possession to the tenant. I should not be taken to hold that a review simpliciter can be granted by the learned Munsif Under Order 47 of the Code as that is not the question before me in the instant case. The allegations made by the tenant Applicant amounted to a fraud having been committed on the proceedings of the court and all the observations which I have made above must be taken in that context.;