- (1.) FOR 4 vacancies created by the Regional Transport Authority for Deoband Ambehta route, a large number of persons applied for the grant of stage carriage permits. The petitioner as well as respondents 3 to 7 were also among the applicants. On 10th January. 1966. the Regional Transport Authority, Dehra- dun, considered the various applications and granted four permits to respondents Nos. 3 to 6. The rest of the applications were rejected. The petitioner felt ag grieved, and filed an appeal. Four other persons also filed appeals. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 13th December. 1968. dis missed the petitioner's appeal on the ground that it was barred by time. It stated that the fact that the appeal was time-barred was not contested by the appellant This order is challenged in the present writ petition.
(2.) THE petitioner received a copy of the order of the Regional Transport Authority rejecting his application, on 18th September. 1966. He sent the memo randum of appeal by post which was received in the office of the State Trans port Appellate Tribunal on 18th Octo ber. 1966. Rule 72 of the Motor Vehi cles Rules provides that any person ag grieved against an order of the Regional Transport Authority may. within thirty days of the receipt of such order, prefer an appeal either in person or by post, to the Secretary. State Transport Appel late Tribunal. So. the appeal could be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the order. In my opinion, the phrase "within 30 days of the receipt of such order" gives clear 30 days time to the appellant, with the result that the date on which the copy of the order -was re ceived by him was to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. This view is supported by several decisions. In Kashi Nath Pande v. Shibban Lal Saxena, AIR 1959 All 54, it was held that when S. 110 (3) (c) of the Represen tation of the People Act. 1951 provid ed that an application for substitution has to be presented ''within 14 days of the publication of the notice of with drawal", it imported the applicability of the principle underlying Section 12 (1) Limitation Act and Section 9. General Clauses Act, with the result that the date from which the period of limita tion is to be reckoned has to be exclud ed. In Padma Charan Mahapatra v. Superintendent of Police. AIR 1965 Orissa 71 it was held that the expression "with in 15 days" occurring in Section 12-A of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 1930, means 15 clear days, which would necessarily exclude the due date of payment in M/s. N. M. Hussain and Co. v. S. D. Ranguwala, AIR 1953 Mad 602, the phrase "within a week" occurring in Section 3 of the Madras Act 25 of 1949, was held to mean a clear one week, with the result that in com puting the period of one week, the date of the occurrence was to be excluded. The petitioner received a copy of the order on 18th September, 1966. That day had to be excluded. After excluding it. he had 30 days' time to prefer the appeal. The memorandum of appeal reached the office of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 18th October. 1966. which was the 30th day. The appeal was hence within the pres cribed period of limitation. It was not barred by time.
(3.) THE learned counsel for the respondents urged that since the peti tioner did not contest the fact that the appeal was barred by time before the Appellate Tribunal, this Court should not exercise the discretionary jurisdic tion under Article 226 of the Constitu tion. The error made by the appellant was not on facts. The error was in law. in thinking that the appeal was barred by time. It is well-settled that admis sion on a point of law does not bind a litigant (See Shiv Singh v. State Trans port Appellate Tribunal. AIR 1969 All 14 para 16_.) This would, therefore, not be a sufficient ground for throwing out the writ petition.;