M. Hameedullah Beg, J. - (1.) The applicant, the Secretary of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Rasra, has applied for proceeding for contempt of Court against certain firms of grain merchants which had filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the validity of the provisions of the UP Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (UP Act No. XXV of 1964) (hereinafter referred to as "the Adhiniyam"). The Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Rasra, had been realising the market fee from the opposite parties under the impugned provisions. It appears that, after filing the writ petition in this Court, the opposite parties had obtained an interim order suspending the obligation to pay the market fee to the Committee, but, at the same time, the order made it clear that the grain merchants must maintain regular accounts of all transactions, "so that if the case is decided against them recoveries can be made from them of the market fee." This interim order of 10 -7 -1969 was confirmed by a Bench on 23 -2 -1970, despite an application filed by the Secretary of the Samiti to vacate it. The applicant alleges that, as the opposite parties have not been keeping the accounts, they have committed a contempt of Court. If the interim order is to be interpreted as a conditional order, as the applicant before me submits that it should be, the effect of any failure to comply with the condition in it is that the interim order would cease to operate so as to protect the opposite parties. In other words, the suspension of the obligation to deposit market fee continued only so long as the condition attached to the suspension was observed, and, the effect of failure of the opposite parties to observe the condition annexed to the suspension granted is that an automatic remedy lay in the hands of the applicant. In order to be on the safe side, the applicant could have come to this Court and pointed out that the opposite parties having failed to observe the condition, it was no longer bound to abstain from realising the market fees. This could have been the correct course which has not been adopted by the applicant now before me. This Court did not debar realisation of market fees if the accounts were not kept.
(2.) Another objection to this application is that a violation of the provisions of the Adhiniyam is a punishable offence u/S. 37 of the Adhiniyam. The applicant now before me alleges that it was one of the conditions of the licenses granted to the opposite parties that they "shall maintain such accounts in such forms and submit such returns in respect of specified agricultural produce as may be specified by the Mandi Samiti from time to time." The allegation of the applicant is that the necessary accounts must be maintained in form VI prescribed u/R. 76 sub -R. (14) of the Rules made under the Adhiniyam. The rules provide that a copy of the sale vouchers in form VI must be given to the Samiti. This amounts to keeping the accounts. Hence, the failure to give the sale vouchers or to maintain and render accounts in prescribed form will expose the opposite parties to liability for prosecution. It is true that S. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act does not operate as a bar to the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of a contempt if it is also otherwise a criminal offence under some provision of law. S. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act only bars the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of an alleged contempt of a court subordinate to this Court where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the decision relied upon on behalf of the opposite parties - -Ziaul Hasan v/s. Aziz Ahmad (1933 AWR 934) will not be applicable here. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act is discretionary. Its exercise may, therefore, be refused if there are other more suitable remedies available. Firstly, O. 39 R. 2 sub -R. (3) CPC, in case of a violation of an interim injunction provides an alternative relief. Secondly, in the instant case, the interim order itself, as already indicated above, contains the automatic remedy which seems to be contemplated by the order in the event of failure to keep accounts. Thirdly, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the opposite parties, there is the remedy of criminal prosecution for failure to maintain accounts.
(3.) Learned counsel for the applicant contends that the remedy by way of prosecution will not be available to the applicant inasmuch as there is an interim order by this Court. I am unable to accept this contention. The order of this Court does not debar a prosecution for failure to keep accounts. On the other hand, the order recognises the obligation of opposite parties to keep accounts. I am unable to see how an order recognising an obligation to keep accounts can operate as a bar to a prosecution for failure to keep accounts. In fact, in para. 11 of the rejoinder -affidavit, the applicant himself has stated that certain proceedings u/S. 561 -A CrPC, to which reference was made in para. 15 of the counter -affidavit, related to prosecutions u/S. 37 of the Adhiniyam. This means that steps under the Adhiniyam had been already taken by the applicant himself. If proceedings u/S. 561 -A CrPC had been taken against these prosecutions, the fate of the prosecutions would have to be ultimately decided there. It is stated by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that those proceedings u/S. 561 -A CrPC have been dismissed. In any case, the applicant had no justification for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act instead of taking the other appropriate remedies indicated above. I, therefore dismiss this application. In the circumstances of the case I award Rs. 80/ - as costs to the opposite parties and Rs. 80/ - as costs to the State Counsel as notice had to be sent to the State. Mr. S.S. Abidi has held the brief of the case on behalf of the State. Two months time is granted to the applicant to pay costs.;