Jagdish Sahai, J. - (1.) The petitioner has come to this Court on the allegation that he was appointed to the post of Organizer of Agencies by the New India Assurance Company Limited, Agra. After the State took over the insurance business by passing the Life Insurance Corporation Ordinance the services of the petitioner were transferred to the Life Insurance Corporation with effect from 1-9-1956 upon the same terms and conditions on which he was employed in the New India Assurance Company, Agra and was given the appointment of Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Zone, Kanpur. His designation was changed from 1-1-1957 to that of a Field Officer. One Sri C. P. Ambesh who, according to the petitioner's allegation; is inimical to him filed a complaint against the petitioner to the Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Agra, respondent No. 1, alleging that the petitioner had misappropriated an amount of Rs. 460 alleged to have been handed over by him to the petitioner. According to the petitioner no such cheque was given to him by Sri Ambesh. The respondent No. 1 made Over the matter to the police and the petitioner is being prosecuted under Sections 406/420/467, I.P.C. at the instance of the police in a criminal court. On 22-9-1958 the respondent No. 1 issued a notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be suspended under Clauses 40 and 41 of the Staff Regulations, 1956. The petitioner sent a reply to the show cause notice. On 27-1-1959 the petitioner was suspended under Clause 41 of the Staff Regulations, 1956. In the suspension order it was mentioned that there were certain fresh complaints of misappropriation also but the same were not specified. On 20-2-1959 the petitioner filed an appeal to the Executive Committee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, Bombay against the suspension order under Clause 42 of the Staff Regulations, 1956. On 11-3-1959 the petitioner received a letter dated 18-2-1959 from respondent No. 1 in which new charges were levelled against him and he was asked to submit his explanation. By a separate letter dated 3-3-1959 which the petitioner also received on 11-3-1959 some more allegations were made against him and he was also called upon to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. On 17-3-1959 the petitioner wrote to the respondent No. 1 inviting his attention to the letters issued by him and requesting for copies of complaints forming the basis of the charges and other materials in order to furnish his explanation. On 9-4-1959 the respondent No. 4 issued a letter to the petitioner which was received by him on 11-4-1959 stating therein that it had been concluded that the petitioner had no explanation to submit. The petitioner again sent a telegram to respondent No. 1 requesting for the copies of the documents immediately. On 13-3-1959 while the petitioner was under suspension the respondent No. 1 referred the various complaints for investigation to the police and a case was registered against the petitioner in terms of that report. The respondent No. 1 terminated the services of the petitioner by a notice published in a local daily 'Amar Ujala' of 9th May, 1959. On 21-5-1959 the petitioner received a copy of the formal order of dismissal dated 7-5-1959. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Executive Committee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, Bombay, which was dismissed on 29-4-1960. On these facts the petitioner has come to this Court and prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the dismissal order dated 7-5-1959 and the appellate order communicated to him through the letter dated 29-4-1960. There is also a prayer for the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to treat the petitioner as in service and to pay him all his arrears of salary and other amounts due to him. In addition there is the usual prayer for the issue of any other suitable writ, order or direction as the circumstances of the case may justify.
(2.) It may be stated that the order of the appellate authority dismissing his appeal has not been filed by the petitioner and that order is not before me. I have heard Mr. Brij Lal Gupta in support of this petition. His contention has been that the petitioner has been illegally dismissed I do not wish to express any opinion on this contention because I am of the opinion that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing a suit which in the circumstances o the present case I consider not only adequate but more suitable, and also because in my judgment the reliefs claimed by the petitioner in this writ petition cannot be granted to him. That the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing a suit has not been denied even by Mr. Brij Lal Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner was charge-sheeted for gross misconduct and there were allegations against him for misappropriating money belonging either tq the policy-holders or to the Lite Insurance Corporation. Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the charges framed against him would require detailed examination of evidence and it is obvious that the summary proceedings of a writ which are concluded ordinarily on the basis of affidavits alone cannot be appropriate for the same. There are also allegations that the petitioner had not a reasonable opportunity of defending himself, that the witnesses were examined at his back and he was not allowed to cross-examine them and that copies of the complaints and statements were not furnished to him. These are all questions of fact, which in my opinion can be better investigated by a civil court of original jurisdiction. The reason why I have come to the conclusion that the reliefs claimed by the petitioner in this petition cannot be granted to him is that as the law stands the proper remedy of the petitioner would be to file a suit for the damages for wrongful dismissal, even assuming that he had been wrongfully dismissed. Admittedly the petitioner is not a Government servant. The Life Insurance Corporation of India not being a department of the Government but an autonomous body, the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India would, therefore, not be applicable to his case. There is good authority for the proposition that a servant is always at the pleasure of the master.
(3.) Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act runs as follows : "21. The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced : (a) ............ (b) a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details, or which is so dependent on the personal qualifications or volition of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the Court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms; Illustration to Clause (b) A contracts to render personal service to B; "A contracts to employ B on personal service; A, an author, contracts with B, a publisher, to complete a literary work, B cannot enforce specific performance of these contracts". It is not denied that the relationship between the petitioner and the Life Insurance Corporation of India is entirely that of a servant and a master. It is therefore obvious that if the mandamus claimed by the petitioner were to be granted the order of this Court would be in the teeth of the provisions of Section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act. In the case of Dr. S. Dutta v. University of Delhi, AIR 1958 SC 1050 a question arose whether an award made in respect of the dispute between Dr. S. Dutt, a professor in the Delhi University, and the said University, which declared the dismissal of Dr. Dutt to have no effect on his status and further declared that he still continued to be a Professor in the University was valid or not? The Supreme Court held that the said award disclosed a legal error on the face of the record because it was in violation of the provisions of Section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act.;