MOOTHAM, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Oak, elated the 18th February, 1958. The facts so far as they are relevant for the purposes of this appeal are these: In 1951 the appellant was appointed to officiate as an Assistant Teacher in a Government Basic Primary School, and she remained in the employment of the State Government until June, 1956. Throughout this period she was a temporary employee. Her relations with the educational authorities do not appear to have been very happy, and on the 15th July, 1955, the Assistant Director of Education (Women), U. P., Allahabad, directed the Inspectress of Girls Schools, 111 Region, Allahabad, to ask the appellant to show cause why her services should not be terminated for having used improper and undesirable language in relation to her superior officers in a representation which she had made to Government. The appellant submitted an explanation and the matter thereafter appears to have been dropped. At about this time it seems that the appellant considered that certain sums of money had been improperly deducted from her salary, and against these deductions she made several representations and also sent a notice to the State Government under Section 80 C. P. C. As a consequence of this actioa on her part she was on the 16th September, 1955 asked to explain (1) why she had given notice under Section 80 C. P. C. when all her dues had been paid; and (2) why, if ,she had anything to say about her dues, she did not make a representation to the Department. The appellant submitted an explanation which was forwarded by the Inspectress of Girls Schools to the Deputy Director of Education (Women). The Deputy Director then wrote a letter which is dated the 9th/10th February, 1956, to the Inspectress of Girls Schools in which she said: 'The charges framed against Shrimati Ram Dulari Kaithwar, as communicated along with your letter No. 9712, dated September 27, 1955, are not sufficient for termination of her services as recommended by you. I am therefore to request you to frame charges against her in the standard form as given on page 73 of the report of Disciplinary Proceedings Inquiry Committee. The teacher may also be asked to show cause why her services should not be terminated as laid down in Rule 55(3) of the C.C.A. Rules published on page 67 of the Report of the Disciplinary Proceedings Inquiry Committee.' On the 15th March, 1956, the appellant was served with another charge sheet. This charge sheet contained four counts of which the first and second were with regard to the matters in respect of which she had been asked to submit an explanation on, the 16th September 1955. The appellant was aG the same time called upon to submit an explanation as to why she should not be removed from service in accordance with Rule 55(3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules.
(2.) THE appellant submitted an explanation which was forwarded by the Inspectress of Girls Schools to the Assistant Director of Education, and on the 15th June, 1958, she received a notice terminating her services. That notice was in these terms: 'TERMINATION OF SERVICES: The services of Srimati Ram Dulari Kaithwar, Temporary assistant mistress (Rs. 35 -85) Government Higher Secondary School for Girls, Orai, am hereby terminated with effect from the date of the issue of this order.' A copy of this notice was forwarded to the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, with a direction to pay to the appellant one month's salary in lieu of notice. The appellant submitted a representation to Government against this order but that representation was rejected on the 15th April, 1957. She then filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in which she challenged the validity of the order terminating her services and prayed that it be quashed by a writ of certiorari. That petition was dismissed by the order which is the subject of the present appeal. The submission which has been made to Us on behalf of the appellant is that the notice dated 15 -6 -1956, was, in substance, an order removing her from service; and that as the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution had admittedly not been complied with that notice was bad in law. Both parties have placed reliance on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Slate of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, C. A. No. 488 of 1957, D/ - 25 -11 -1959: : (1960)ILLJ577SC . In that case the Government of Bihar had received complaints about the work and reputation of a Sub -Deputy Magistrate on probation. It held an enquiry and called upon him for an explanation and upon this being found to be unsatisfactory it had discharged him from service. The order of discharge stated shortly the facts which had led the Government to terminate his services. The Supreme Court held that there had been a contravention of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the question being concluded by the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India : (1958)ILLJ544SC . In the course of its judgment the Supreme Court summarised the observations made in Dhingra's case which had a bearing on the termination of service or discharge of a probationary public servant. It is conceded that these observations apply equally to the case of a temporary employee, but there has been considerable argument before us as to whether any of the observations applies to a ease in which, although an enquiry had been held, the order terminating the employee's services makes no mention of the enquiry and, taken by itself, puts no stigma on the employee. In Dhingra's case : (1958)ILLJ544SC , Das, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court said, at p. 862 (of SCR): (at p. 49 of AIR): 'It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the Contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a tight exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on' the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, G. J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India (S) ATR 1958 Bom 455, wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then prima faice, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so, Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with.' Now it is pointed out that the appellant, when the last charge -sheet was sent to her, was called upon to show catise why her services should not be terminated as laid down in Rule 55 (3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Rule 55 (1) prescribes the procedure which is to be followed when it is proposed to pass an, order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or to a lower sfage in the time scale. Sub -rule (2) provides that sub -rule (1) shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, and Sub -rule (3), so far as it is material, reads thus: '3. This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed.... to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a temporary government servant 'for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service. In such eases, the... temporary government servant concerned shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal, given an opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him, and his explanation in this behalf, if any, shall be duly considered before orders are passed by the competent authority.'
(3.) IT is argued that although the Government had the right to terminate the appellant's services without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal, it however elected to follow that procedure and it accordingly follows that the order ultimately made terminating the appellant's services was intended to be, and was, a punishment. T do not think this argument is well founded. 'The real test', it was laid down in Dhingra's case : (1958)ILLJ544SC , 'for determining whether the reduction in suchcases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences.' Penal consequences include forfeiture of pay or allowances, loss of seniority in the employee's substantive rank and the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion. : (1960)ILLJ577SC also makes it clear, I think, that the putting of a stigma on the employee's competence is a penal consequence as it affects his future career. In my opinion an order terminating an employee's (temporary servant's in the instant case) services which neither carries with it any penal consequence in the narrower sense nor imposes any stigma on the employee is not a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Article 311(2). The appellant in the present case had no right to the post which slip held she has not forfeited any pay or allowances to which she was entitled, and the order terminating her services does not place any stigma on her competence or honesty.;