Mootham, C.J. - (1.) The question which has been referred to this Bench is whether an order of a learned Judge of this Court dismissing an appeal against an order granting a temporary injunction is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
(2.) The meaning which should be given to the word 'judgment' in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court and in the corresponding Clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts has engaged the minds of Judges for close on a hundred years, and has given rise to a divergence of opinion which can now only be resolved by the Supreme Court. The question has been considered in a very large number of cases many of which have been referred to in the judgment of my brother Srivastava. Basically there are three views as to what constitutes a 'judgment'. A decision according to one view will amount to a judgment if it determines some right or liability affecting the merits of the dispute between the parties; according to the second, the essential requirement, is that it puts an end to the proceedings so far as the Court in which those proceedings are pending is concerned; and, according to the third view, a judgment means a decree which determines the rights of the parties in all matters in issue in the suit; the authorities are justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Co. Ltd., 8 Beng LR 433, Tuljaram Row v. Alaggappa Chettiar, ILR 35 Mad 1 and Dayabhai v. Murugappa Chettiar, ILR 13 Rang 457: (AIR 1935 Rang 267) (FB).
(3.) I do not think it necessary in this case to hazard a further definition of the word 'judgment'. It is generally accepted that 'judgment' in Clause 10 includes a 'final judgment', a 'preliminary judgment' and an 'interlocutory judgment', all of which expressions are used in the Letters Patent. It is also clear that the term 'judgment' does not necessarily exclude an order. The Privy Council held in Hurrish Chunder v. Kali Sundari Debia, 10 Ind App 4 (PC) that an order refusing to transmit for execution an order of the Privy Council was a judgment within the meaning of the corresponding Clause (Cl. 15) of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court; and the Supreme Court in Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Deb, 1953 SCR 1159 : (AIR 1953 SC 198) has expressed the opinion that an order directing a plaint to be rejected or taken off the file and an order rescinding leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court are judgments within the meaning of Clause 15, A Full Bench of this Court in Sital Din v. Anant Ram, AIR 1933 All 262 was of the opinion that the word 'judgment' should not be read in a restricted sense and would include a final order.;