V.D.Bhargava, J. - (1.) This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Sri Gian Singh, who is one of the Cycle Rickshaw owners in the Nagar Mahapalika of Agra. According to his contention, the State of Uttar Pradesh has embarked on a policy of gradually abolishing the plying of cycle rickshaws in the State. With this object they insisted that the Municipal Boards should frame a set of bye-laws providing for the abolition of cycle-rickshaws in the State. By a letter dated 25/30- 11-1955 the Government of India had recommended to the State of Uttar Pradesh as also to other States that issue of fresh licences for new cycle-rickshaws should be stopped. The said recommendations of the Government of India were accepted by the State of Uttar Pradesh. In accordance with that policy model bye-law.s were framed, the relevant part of which is as follows: "4. No fresh licences shall be issued after the promulgation of these bye-laws." The said bye-laws were sent to all the Municipal Boards by the State Government on 22-11-1958, with a direction that the Municipal Boards concerned should adopt those bye-laws. The Municipal Board of Agra had been superseded previously. The Administrator published the said bye-law as required under Section 301(2) of the U. P. Municipalities Act under the signatures of the Executive Officer. The proposal of introducing the said bye-law and later on as adopted by the Board read as follows: "No fresh licences shall be issued after the promulgation of these bye-laws." It was contended that these bye-laws framed under the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act continued to be duly framed bye-laws under the provisions of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhi Niyam, 1959. A meeting of the Municipal Corporation was held on the 17th of March, 1960, in which it was resolved that in its view the number of cycle-rickshaws in Agra was less than its requirements and that a large number of persons were suffering because of the decision of the State Government to reduce the number of rickshaws and the income of Corporation was also suffering. AS such with a view to provide more employment to poor persons the Corporation resolved to grant fresh, licences to new applicants for the same. The resolution was adopted by a majority of the members of the Corporation.
(2.) The petitioner claims to be the owner of some rickshaws and as such has come to this Court on the ground that the decision of the Municipal Corporation dated 17-3-1960, is ultra vires and, therefore, this Court should by means of a writ of mandamus command the respondents to forbear to give effect to their resolution of the date and a writ of certiorari be passed quashing the resolution of the Municipal Corporation.
(3.) In my opinion the petitioner has not a sufficient right to present this petition in this Court. It is not anybody, who can challenge the validity of an order or a resolution of a Board. Before a petitioner comes to this Court to ask for the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, he must himself establish that he has a substantial right which has been infringed. There will be several thousand rickshaw owners in the Corporation of Agra. The right of the present petitioner, which will be affected by the grant of more licences is infinitesimal. It is very doubtful, whether there will be any depreciation in his income, but even if, for the sake of argument, it is admitted, then also it is not sufficient to give any right to the petitioner to come to this Court. In Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41, their Lordships were considering a case where one of the partners of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company had filed a writ petition as a share-holder. He had some right in the Company, but that right was held not to be sufficient or justified to maintain a writ petition.;