Bind Basni Prasad, J. - (1.) THIS defendant is admittedly the tenant of the plaintiff -respondent. The latter brought a suit for the arrears of rent and ejectment of the defendant from the house. The trial court decreed the suit in part, as regards the arrears of rent, but dismissed it for the ejectment on the ground that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid. The lower appellate court disagreed with this finding and decreed the claim for ejectment also. The defendant comes in appeal to this Court.
(2.) TWO points have been argued in this Court : The first point is that the plaintiff obtained the permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Bent and Eviction Act ,of 1947 (Act III of 1947). for the institution of the suit of ejectment on the ground that he had no accommodation for himself. It is contended that after the suit had been decided by the trial court, the plaintiff was able to obtain the possession of another house for his residence. The plaintiff, therefore, does not any longer require the house in suit for his residence. Hence despite the fact that the District Magistrate has granted the permission, the suit should be dismissed as the object of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Bent and Eviction Act is to afford relief to the tenants of houses and this object will be defeated if the suit is decreed on a ground which no longer exists. The legal position is this According to the Transfer of Property Act every landlord has an unfettered right to evict tenants at will. During the war when there was difficulty about accommodation, Orders were issued under the Defence of India Rules to avoid the harassment of tenants and afford protection to them -With the expiry of the Defence of India Act, the Orders issued under it also came to an end. Ordinances were then made to continue the same protection to the tenants. Subsequently these ordinances were replaced by the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act of 1947 (Act III' of 1947). According to it the right of the landlords to eject the tenants has been restricted. Section 3 read with Section 10 of the Amending Act of 1948 would show that if a tenant is sought to be ejected for any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3, then the permission of the District Magistrate is not necessary for the institution of such a suit. If, however, it is intended to institute a suit for the ejectment of a tenant on any ground other than those mentioned in Section 3, then the landlord has to obtain the permission of the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate has been given a discretion to refuse or grant the permission. The grounds upon which he may refuse or grant -the permission are not specified in the Act. It appears that in the present case, the District Magistrate granted the permission to the plaintiff because the latter was in need of accommodation for himself. The allegation that the plaintiff has been able to secure another house for himself has not been proved. Learned counsel contends that he was not given an opportunity to establish this, and requests that he should be given such an opportunity. Assuming that the plaintiff has been able to secure another house for his residence, the question is now does it affect the merits of this case. With the grant of permission by the District Magistrate, the bar of the institution of the suit imposed by Section 3 was removed for the plaintiff. Subsequent events cannot re -impose that bar. The grant of the permission under Section 3 created a position so far as plaintiff was concerned so as to make available to him the rights which he has, as a landlord under the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel, contends that subsequent events should be taken into consideration by the Courts in appeal for the disposal of the cases. Reliance is placed on Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukla v. Keshrwar Lal Chaudhati : A.I.R. 1941 FC 5 Nitanjan Lal Bhargava v. Mr. Ram Kali Devi, A.L.R. 1950 All. 396 In both these cases the subsequent events which happened after the decision of the case by the lower court way the enactment of a fresh law and it was held that the courts should take them into consideration. Another case which has been relied upon is Mandli Prasad Ramcharanlal v. Ramcharanlal : A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 1 In this cage one of the parties died and the question was whether the maintainability of the suit is affected by reason of the death of the minor plaintiff after the institution of the suit. Learned Judges held : A suit must be tried in all its stages on 'the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement. The Court, however may in suitable cases take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parts on the basis of the altered conditions. This doctrine is of an exceptional character and is applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed has. by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate, or, that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties.
(3.) THE present case is distinguishable from the three cases just referred to. There has been no alteration in the law nor has there been any event of the nature which happened in the Nagpur case just referred to. It is still a disputed fact whether or not the plaintiff needs the house in suit to his residence. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the plaintiff has a large family and he is still in need of the house in suit. In these circumstances, the subsequent event, even if it has actually happened, cannot be taken into consideration in the decision of this appeal. In fact, I am inclined to the view that this subsequent event cannot re impose a bar against the plaintiff which was removed by the grant of permission to him by the District Magistrate. The bar once removed cannot be re -imposed.;