Yashwant Varma,J. - (1.) Heard learned counsel for parties.
(2.) The instant petition has been preferred seeking the following reliefs:- '(a) a writ, order or direction of a suitable nature commanding the respondents to revise the result of the written examination of Assistant Teacher in LT Grade for physical Education held in pursuance to the Advertisement No.1 of 2010 and on the basis of such revised result to hold fresh interview and declare final select list; (b) a writ, order or direction of a suitable nature quashing the final select list declared by the respondents on 25.5.2012 (Annexure No.4);'
(3.) Quite apart from the fact that the recruitment process itself relates to the year 2010, the Court finds no ground to countenance the prayer as made since the recruitment notice does not evidence any power of re-evaluation having been made or conferred upon the respondents. Additionally the Court bears in mind a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 2 SCC 357 wherein while dealing with the authority and expertise of the High Court to deal with the correctness of answer keys, it was held as under:- 19. In Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta [Kanpur University v. Samir Gupta, (1983) 4 SCC 309] this Court took the view that: (SCC p. 316, para 16) '16. ? the key answer should be assumed to be correct unless it is proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to be wrong by an inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong, that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable body of men well-versed in the particular subject would regard as correct.' In other words, the onus is on the candidate to clearly demonstrate that the key answer is incorrect and that too without any inferential process or reasoning. The burden on the candidate is therefore rather heavy and the constitutional courts must be extremely cautious in entertaining a plea challenging the correctness of a key answer. To prevent such challenges, this Court recommended a few steps to be taken by the examination authorities and among them are: (i) establishing a system of moderation; (ii) avoid any ambiguity in the questions, including those that might be caused by translation; and (iii) prompt decision be taken to exclude the suspect question and no marks be assigned to it. 23. In appeal against the decision [Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth v. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education, 1980 SCC OnLine Bom 148 : AIR 1981 Bom 95] of the High Court, it was held by this Court in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] that the principles of natural justice are not applicable in such cases. It was held that: (Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27], SCC p. 38, para 12) '12. ? The principles of natural justice cannot be extended beyond reasonable and rational limits and cannot be carried to such absurd lengths as to make it necessary that candidates who have taken a public examination should be allowed to participate in the process of evaluation of their performances or to verify the correctness of the evaluation made by the examiners by themselves conducting an inspection of the answer books and determining whether there has been a proper and fair valuation of the answers by the examiners.' 24. On the validity of the Regulations, this Court held [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] that they were not illegal or unreasonable or ultra vires the rule-making power conferred by statute. It was then said: (Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27], SCC p. 42, para 16) '16. ? The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitution. None of these vitiating factors are shown to exist in the present case.?' It was also noted by this Court that: (SCC p. 52, para 22) '22. ? the High Court has ignored the cardinal principle that it is not within the legitimate domain of the Court to determine whether the purpose of a statute can be served better by adopting any policy different from what has been laid down by the legislature or its delegate and to strike down as unreasonable a bye-law (assuming for the purpose of discussion that the impugned regulation is a bye-law) merely on the ground that the policy enunciated therein does not meet with the approval of the Court in regard to its efficaciousness for implementation of the object and purposes of the Act.' 25. Upholding the validity of Regulation 104, this Court then proceeded on the basis of the plain and simple language of the Regulation to hold that: (Paritosh Bhupeshkumar case [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27], SCC p. 48, para 20) '20. ? The right of verification conferred by clause (1) is subject to the limitation contained in the same clause that no revaluation of the answer books or supplements shall be done and the further restriction imposed by clause (3), prohibiting disclosure or inspection of the answer books.' This Court then concluded the discussion by observing: (SCC pp. 56-57, para 29) '29. ? As has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court, the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them. It will be wholly wrong for the Court to make a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root problems involved in the working of the system and unmindful of the consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as opposed to a pragmatic one were to be propounded. It is equally important that the Court should also, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice. It is unfortunate that this principle has not been adequately kept in mind by the High Court while deciding the instant case.' ... 27. The principle laid down by this Court in Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27] was affirmed in W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das [W.B. Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das, (2007) 8 SCC 242 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 871 : 5 SCEC 792] and it was reiterated that there must be finality attached to the result of a public examination and in the absence of a statutory provision re-evaluation of answer scripts cannot be permitted and that it could be done only in exceptional cases and as a rarity. Reference was also made to Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission [Pramod Kumar Srivastava v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2004) 6 SCC 714 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 883], Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda [Board of Secondary Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda, (2004) 13 SCC 383 : 5 SCEC 457] and Board of Secondary Education v. D. Suvankar [Board of Secondary Education v. D. Suvankar, (2007) 1 SCC 603 : 5 SCEC 719]. ... 30.1. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination permits the re-evaluation of an answer sheet or scrutiny of an answer sheet as a matter of right, then the authority conducting the examination may permit it; 30.2. If a statute, Rule or Regulation governing an examination does not permit re-evaluation or scrutiny of an answer sheet (as distinct from prohibiting it) then the court may permit re-evaluation or scrutiny only if it is demonstrated very clearly, without any 'inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation' and only in rare or exceptional cases that a material error has been committed; 30.3. The court should not at all re-evaluate or scrutinise the answer sheets of a candidate? it has no expertise in the matter and academic matters are best left to academics; 30.4. The court should presume the correctness of the key answers and proceed on that assumption; and 30.5. In the event of a doubt, the benefit should go to the examination authority rather than to the candidate.' ;