Devi Prasad Singh, J. - (1.) HEARD learned Counsel for the petitioner. None appears for the respondents.
(2.) CONTROVERSY relates to the arbitration proceedings which took place in pursuance to the judgment and order dated 15.3.1988, passed in Civil Appeal No. 378 of 1985. While deciding the appeal filed against the order passed by the Munsif Magistrate dated 17.10.1985, the appellate Court had directed that the arbitrator shall adjudicate the controversy within 90 days. However, submission of the petitioner's counsel is that one Raja Ram Kesarwani who was the chief arbitrator out of seven expired, hence an application was moved for extension of time. By the impugned order, the appellate Court has rejected the application with finding that the time cannot be extended.
(3.) THE petitioner's counsel has invited to Section of the Arbitration Act which is reproduced as under: 16. Power to remit award. (1) The Court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit (a) where -the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred; or (b) where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution; or (c) where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it. (2) Where an award is remitted under Sub -section (1) the Court shall fix the time within which the arbitrator or umpire shall submit his decision to the Court: Provided that any time so fixed may be extended by subsequent order of the Court. (3) An award remitted under Sub -section (1) shall become void on the failure of the arbitrator or umpire to reconsider it and submit his decision within the time fixed. Under Sub -section (2) of Section (supra), power has been conferred on the Court to fix time within which the arbitrator or umpire shall submit decision to the court. The proviso to Sub -section (2) of Section further provides that the Court concerned may extend the time by subsequent order. A plain reading of Section shows that the appellate court was very well having jurisdiction to extend the period for arbitration. While passing the impugned order, the appellate court observed that after final verdict in the appeal, the appellate court could not have extended time. The finding recorded by the appellate court at the face of record seems to be incorrect. Under proviso(supra), the appellate court was well within power to extend the period. The purpose of statutory provisions should be given full effect by the court and ordinarily, time should be extended keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a particular case.;