- (1.) By means of the present writ petition, the Petitioner has challenged the order dated January 25, 2010 passed in Case No. PWA07/10 whereby the objection filed by the Petitioner that provisions of the Payment of Wages Act are not applicable to its employees, has been rejected. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the State Government has not yet notified the BSNL as an establishment within the meaning of the Act. At this stage, the Court is not inclined to interfere in the present writ petition.
(2.) In the case of D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors., 1983 4 SCC 293, the Apex Court has held that there was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. It has been held that it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. The relevant portion is reproduced below: "There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them.' Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of-those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequence. After all Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stilled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues."
(3.) Reference may also be made to S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and Anr., 1983 4 SCC 214. In that case, Supreme Court commented that there appears to be three preliminary objections which have become quite the fashion to be raised by all employees. Firstly, there is no industry. Secondly, there is no industrial dispute. Thirdly, the workman is 'no workman'. The attention of the Court was also invited to National Council for Cement and Building Materials v. State of Haryana., 1996 3 SCC 206, wherein the Court deprecated the practice of the management to raise preliminary issues with a view to delay adjudication of industrial disputes.;