- (1.) S. R. Singh, J. These two petitions are knit together by common questions of law and fact. The First Information Report sought to be quashed in the two petitions, stems from one and the same incident in which papers relating to goods being transported in the trucks in question, were found to be falsified and it led to registra tion of the case in case crime No. 162 of 2000 under Section 420/467/468/471/424 I. P. C. at Police Station Kalyanpur District Kanpur Nagar. For convenient disposal, both the petitions were lumped together for being heard and are being disposed of by a composite order.
(2.) PETITIONER of writ Petition No. 2059 of 2000 is the proprietor of M/s and Sri Ashok Trading Co. situate at 53/6a Bangar Market Naya Ganj, Kanpur, engaged in the venture of purchase and sale of various items of Kirana namely, betel-nut (supari) and black pepper (Kali Mirch ). The petitioner of writ petition No. 2060 of 2000 carries on the same venture at Najai Bazar, Lalitpur under the name and style M/s Neelam Traders. The episodal facts as un folded in the First Information Report are that M/smt. and Sri Ashok Trading Co. Kan pur placed orders with M/smt. and Sri Neelam Traders at Lalitpur for supply of 438 bags of betel nut (supari) and 25 bags of black pepper (Kali Mirch ). The two goods laden trucks in which goods aforestated were being transported were intercepted by the Trade Tax officials. The req uisite papers concerning the transporta tion of goods were subjected to root and branch enquiry by the Asst. Commissioner. (Trade Tax), Jhansi and it debunked the falsification pertaining to Bill Nos. 197 and 199. The report divulges that pages pertaining to Bill Nos. 197 and 199 were removed and carbon copy of the Bills 197 and 199 of some other bill-book were im planted ostensibly with a view to robbing the department of trade tax dues. The quintessence of the indictment against the petitioner as embodied in the First Infor mation Report is excerpted below for ready reference: Sri Ashok Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner opened vigorously with two submissions: firstly, that the prosecu tion story as unfolded in the First Informa tion Report is a theme born of concoction and fabrication and if investigation is al lowed to go on qua the allegations in the First Information Report which has its substratum in false and fabricated allega tions, it would be perilously close to the abuse of the process of law; and secondly, that in view of the ratiocination of a Division Bench decisions of this Court in M/s New J. T. C. Corporation New Delhi v. State of U. P. and Ors, 1999 UPTC 1226 and Krishna Traders Kanpur Nagar v. State of UP. and Ors. , 2000 UPTC 274, the First Information Report could not have been lodged and investiga tion thereon would be interdicted by Section 14 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 inasmuch as, proceeds the submission, Section 14 of the Act extends to all types of offences that could be committed in relation to avoidance of trade tax. Sri Arhar Jeet Singh, learned Standing Counsel counter- acted the submissions made by the Counsel for the petitioner by submitting that this Court could not delve into the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the First Infor mation Report at this stage which upon being taken in its entirety, spelled out commission of offences under which the case has been registered and further that Sec. 14 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 does not deal with offences punishable under Sec tions 420/467/468/471/4241. P. C. We have bestowed our anxious considerations on the submissions made by the Counsel for the parties. So far as the first submission is concerned, it stands clinched by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Courts, the latest being the case of M/s Medchi, Chemicals and Pharma Pvt. v. M/s Biological E. Ltd. and Ors. , JT 2000 (2) SC 426; 2000 (2) JIC 13 (SC), that this Court has no jurisdiction or authority to go into the truth or otherwise of the allega tions made in the First Information Report at the stage of Investigation. All that has to be examined at this stage, is whether the First Information Report ex-facie discloses commission of a cognizable offence and if the Court veers round to the opinion that the First Information Report does disclose commission of a cognizable offence, it must stay its hands off and allow the investigation to be completed. The contention does not commend to us for acceptance that the First Information Report taken in its entirety does not dis close commission of offences punishable under Sections420/467/468/471/424 I. P. C.
(3.) DESCENDING to the second submission, we are pursuaded to the view that Section 14 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 does not operate as a bar to investigation of cases under Sections 420/467/468/471 and 424 I. P. C. In order to have a proper deal to the question, Section 14 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act is quoted below. "14. Offences and penalties.- (1) Any per son who (a) fails lo pay without reasonable cause within the time allowed the lax assessed on him under this Act; or (b) (*. . . . . . *) (c) being liable to pay the tax under this Act, carries on business as a dealer without applying for registration under and in accord ance with Section 8-A; or (d) refuses to permit or refuses or neglects to produce for inspection, examination any book, document or account, or refuses to allow copies to be taken in accordance with the provisions of Section 13; or (e) act in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall, without prejudice to his liability under any other law for the time being in force, and in addition to the recovery of tax or any other dues payable to him under this Act, on conviction be punishable with fine which may extend to (two thousands rupees), and where the default is a continuing one, to a further fine which may extend to Rs. 50 for every day after the first day during which the default continues: Provided that, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction under clause (a) of this sub-section, the minimum punishment lo be awarded shall be a fine of five hundred rupees or the amount of tax involved in the offence, whichever is less. (2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-sec-lion (1) any person who wilfully- (a) submits a false return of turnover under this Act; or (aa) uses any goods purchased after pay ment of the tax at concessional rate, or without payment of any tax, under Section 4-B for a purpose other than that for which a recognition certificate was granted under that section or otherwise disposes of such goods; or (aaa) being liable to pay tax under this Act, fails to submit without reasonable cause return of his turnover under the provision of this Act or the rules made thereunder or fails to deposit the tax before or along with the return as provided in sub-section (1 -A) of Section 7; or (b) maintains or produces false accounts, registers or documents; or (bb) (*. . . *) (c) issue or furnishes a false certificate or declaration by reason of which a tax on sale or purchase ceases to be leviable under this Act or the rules made thereunder, or (d) makes a false verification or declara tion on an application for registration or connec tion with any other proceeding under this Act; or (e) evade payment of the tax which he is liable to pay under this Act; or (f) obstructs or prevents an officer em powered under Section 13 from performing any of the functions specified in sub-sections (2), (3) (4), (4-A) and clause (a) of sub-section (5) of Section 13 and in sub- section (1) of Section 13-A;or (ff) tampers with any seal put under sub section (4-A) of Section 13;or (g) demands or charges on the sale or purchase of any goods any tax not due under the provisions of this Act; or (gg) obstructs or prevents the officer-in-charge of a check-post or barrier established under Section 28 from performing any of his functions under this Act; or (h) refuses or neglects to furnish any in formation which may be in his knowledge or possession and which he has been required to furnish for the purpose of this Act, or furnishes information which is false in any material par ticulars; or (i) carries on or continues to carry on business as a dealer without furnishing the security demanded under Section 9-C, shall without prejudice to his liability under any other law for the time being in force, and in addition to the recovery of tax or any other dues payable by him under this Act, on conviction, be punishable with simple imprison ment which may extend to one year or with fine, or both, and where the default is a continuing one to a further fine which may extend to Rs. 100 for every day after the first day during which the default continues: Provided that in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, the minimum punish ment to be awarded shall be simple imprison ment for a term of three months. (3) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act or under the Rules made thereunder except with the previous sanction of the (Commissioner) and no Court inferior to that of a Magistrate of the first class shall try any such offence. Dwelling on the above quoted sec tion, the learned Counsel canvassed that clause (b) of Section 14 (2) extends its coverage to a case where a person who "wilfully maintains or produces false ac counts, registers or documents" may be punished under Section 14 with a simple imprisonment which may extend to one year or with a fine or both. In our opinion, there is nothing in Section 14 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 which may inhibit investigation and trial of an offence of forgery etc. in relation to accounts, registers or documents maintained in the course of business. That apart, punish ment of a person as provided under Sec tion 14 of the Act is "without prejudice to his liability under any other law for the time being in force. " In the above perspec tive, the second submission advanced by Sri Ashok Kumar too has no cutting edge. So far as decisions taken aid of by the learned Counsel are concerned, suffice it to say that both the decisions were rendered in a Civil M/sc. Writ Petition by a Tax Bench that had not been assigned any criminal work by Hon'ble the Chief Justice nor is there anything eloquent of the fact that the Government Advocate was heard before quashing the First Information Report impugned therein. In fact in the first case, there was not even a prayer for quashing the First Information Report. In the second case, though there was a prayer for quashing the First Information Report, it was decided mainly on the basis of the decision in the first case and that too without any notice to the Station Officer of the concerned Police Station arrayed as party respondent No. 4 in the said petition for the Chief Standing Counsel had received notice for respondents 1 and 2 only. The Standing Counsel, who repre sented the State authorities in the cases aforestated, was not authorised to repre sent the State in a Criminal case. To cap it all, the decisions cited are per incuriam. It seems to us that the attention of the Bench was not drawn to express provision of Sec tion 14 of the Act and to its finer notes to find out whether the penalty provided therein is "without prejudice" to the liability under any other law for the time being in force. In Lancaster Motor Com pany (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. , 1941 (1) KB 675, the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision rendered "without any ar gument, without reference to the crucial words of the Rule and without any citation of the authority". The said decision was received with approbation by the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation New Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, 1989 (1) SCC 101. In Shama Rao v. State of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC: 1680, the Apex Court has ob served that "it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down therein. " The Apex Court echoed the said principle in State of U. P v. Synthetic Chemicals Ltd. , JT 1994 SC 308, in the following words: "any declaration of conclusion arrived without application of mind or proceeded without any reason, cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general na ture, binding as a precedent. ";